Brexit Means Brexit?
The Selected Proceedings of the Symposium,
Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur | Mainz
6–8 December 2017.

Edited by Christa Jansohn
Contents

Words of Welcome

Reiner Anderl ............................................................................................................... 5
Christa Jansohn .......................................................................................................... 7

Session I: Brexit: Constitutional and Strategic Implications for the UK

Andreas Fahrmeir
Migration Control and Brexit ...................................................................................... 11

Session II: Economy

Otmar Issing
The Consequences of Brexit: Reflections of an Economist ...................................... 21

Iain Begg
The Likely Economic Effects of Brexit ......................................................................... 29

Markus Wübbeler
Ageing UK and Brexit: Views on the Demographic Change in the Light of the Referendum ........................................................................................................... 37

Session II: Scotland, the UK and EU

Mariot Leslie
Scotland and Europe: The End of the UK’s Other Union? ....................................... 49

Session IV: Brexit and the Media

Henrik Müller
The Personal, the Political and Populism: Why Brits Voted to Leave the EU. And Why Others May Follow. ........................................ 61
Contents

LINDA RISSO
Harvesting Your Soul? Cambridge Analytica and Brexit .............................. 75

Session V: Brexit and Culture

STUART MACDONALD
The Impact of Brexit on International Cultural Relations
in the European Union ..................................................................................... 91

MARION LÖHNDORF
Brexit and the Art World: From Hope to Despair and Back Again ............... 99

Session VI: Brexit and the Academic World

BRIAN FOSTER
What Does Brexit Mean for Scientific Research? ........................................... 113

GEORG KRAWIETZ
Brexit: Possible Impacts of Brexit on Higher Education .............................. 123

DANIEL UNTERWEBER
Generation Y and the Academic Bubble:
Experiencing Brexit as an Early Career Researcher in Oxford ...................... 129

JEREMY ADLER
“There’s Method in their Madness”: Britain’s National Suicide ..................... 135

Acknowledgements ......................................................................................... 148

Program ........................................................................................................... 149

Impressions ..................................................................................................... 151

Participants at the Symposium ....................................................................... 155
Words of Welcome

Dear Ladies and Gentlemen,
Dear Colleagues and Friends,

It is a pleasure and an honour for me to welcome all of you to our international symposium “Brexit means Brexit?”, here at the Academy of Science and Literature in Mainz.

Brexit stands as a popular term for the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union. Brexit will bring about significant changes in many areas of our life. Important changes are expected not only in society, the economy and the labour market, but also within the European education system and the scientific research communities. My personal area of scientific expertise is engineering, and from my experience and involvement in European education and research programs, I am anticipating significant impact on our future education and research structures. From my point of view, two major changes are expected:

– Impact on student mobility; and,

– Research collaboration

After the UK’s departure from the European Union, free student mobility may be restricted and the Erasmus Programme will need to be re-negotiated. Today’s trends are indicating a significant decrease in numbers of foreign students coming to the United Kingdom in order to study. Since September 2016, the number of foreign students coming to the UK decreased by some 41,000 students, with 31,000 non-EU-countries accounting for 31,00 of these.¹

Brexit also affects current European research programmes such as Horizon 2020, as well as future programmes. British universities today are integrated into European research structures, and they receive a significant amount of funding. In future, national funding might be provided in compensation; however, from a strategic perspective, the United Kingdom would no longer be able to participate in defining future research and innovation paths in the context of the European Union itself. The European Union, on the other hand, will lose high-quality British expertise.

Dear Ladies and Gentlemen,

On Monday 11 July 2016, Theresa May, the British Prime-Minister, declared that “Brexit means Brexit – and there will be no attempt to remain inside the EU”. This has become one of the most challenging political decisions of the last few years. I am very happy that Christa Jansohn has taken the initiative to organize this important and remarkable symposium. We, the Academy of Science and Literature, are very grateful to host it. I’d like to express my deepest appreciation to the organizing team and to all the helping hands involved in making it happen.

I’m looking forward to inspiring presentations and fruitful discussions, and I wish you all a very successful symposium.

Reiner Anderl

President of the Academy of Science and Literature, Mainz

6 December 2017
Dear President,
Dear Ladies and Gentlemen,
Dear Colleagues and Friends,

Welcome to Mainz and its Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur, where we are confident you will join us for the next two or three days in a lively and stimulating debate on a matter that has been of the deepest concern for many of us and, we trust, to many of our guests as well. This Academy has many close links, scholarly and personal, with international cultural exchange. Therefore, it cannot remain unaffected by a such radical step as that taken by the British referendum of June 2016. Many observers, within the UK and abroad, have indeed from the beginning been rather doubtful as to whether the British electorate was genuinely aware of the significance and possible consequences of their choice. And those doubts are reflected in the narrowness of the result. In its wake, we have seen surprise following upon surprise: After David Cameron’s prompt retreat, the courageous Theresa May quickly jumped into the breach and, although hitherto on the opposite side, in the face of several rough winds, insisted both that “Brexit means Brexit” and that her government would make a success of it. So far, however, it seems to have become increasingly unclear what “success” in this context really means. And I am not sure that any of you actually knew, when you received and accepted your invitation to this symposium, what the state of the debate at this present moment would be.

The latest official and authoritative statement of the United Kingdom’s position was presented by the Prime Minister’s speech at the Lord Mayor’s Banquet from the Guildhall in the City of London last week. Listening to Theresa May outlining her strategy and its goals, seemingly with the utmost confidence and optimism, some of us still could hardly forget those most critical obstacles in the way of both a final agreement and unity of purpose: peaceful financial settlement; peace around the future outer border of the EU and between the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom; and, in the end, a clear definition of the eventual status of European citizens living in the UK, as well a British citizens resident in Europe.

Much has happened around the globe since we in this Academy first conceived the idea of this symposium, but in the meantime, each day’s news surprises us with a different outlook. It was only two or three weeks ago that the government of the Republic of Ireland began to topple, which all of a sudden appears to put this far corner of the UK, with its problematic frontier position into an unexpected perspective. Another surprise started to loom with the expected choice of the European City of Culture. For a while, it seemed that the British Liverpool or Nottingham were in the running; yet, the threat of a successful Brexit makes this again invalid. More costly, presumably, will be the already resolved transfer of the im-
portant financial and medical centres from London to Paris and Amsterdam, with expensive buildings and considerable staff, as well as a number of further projects with so far uncalculated financial sacrifices.

Among its members, closely related associates and friends, the Mainz Academy is happy to count many experts on matters British, either working in Great Britain or professionally concerned with the British Isles and therefore deeply affected by the proposed departure from the European Union. It is for this reason that the Academy’s ‘Kommission für Englische Philologie’ felt its duty to seize upon the opportunity of inviting a number of experts to debate this important cultural point of departure; and we are very happy that you have come to join us in our search for advice and moral support.

As a philologist, I would like to finish my welcome address with a poem by Ducan Forbes, a poet and translator as well as former Head of English at Wycombe Abbey School and a Royal Literary Fund Fellow:

NEVERENDUM
You find a complex question
and you simplify it so.
You call a referendum
and you make it YES or NO.
You think of an addendum
and you name it IN or OUT.
You disunite the kingdom
and you think it’s worth a shout.
You hector the electorate,
you posture, lie, deceive,
till many in the plebiscite
can doubt what you believe.
Then you ask them in a ballot
to vote REMAIN or LEAVE
and you’re left with one agendum
and with grievances to grieve.

Christa Jansohn
Chair of the Committee for English Literature,
Academy of Sciences and Literature, Mainz
Session I

Brexit: Constitutional and Strategic Implications for the UK
Let me begin with two nineteenth-century observations. Between 1826 and 1905, immigration to the United Kingdom was not restricted. Unlike in the United States or continental European countries, there were no legal provisions for refusing entry to or removing foreign paupers, criminals, revolutionaries or individuals who required medical care to their countries of citizenship. An Aliens Act permitted the deportation of foreign revolutionaries between 1848 and 1850, but it has not been possible to discover any instance in which it was invoked. If and when British localities sought to remove foreign residents, the courts or the home office routinely prevented them from doing so.¹

Migration within the British Isles, by contrast, was restricted for individuals who required access to relief until the twentieth century. Legally, they could apply for support only at their place of settlement, acquired at birth and difficult to change for those on low incomes, with transferring settlement from one of the United Kingdom’s realms to another (e.g. from Ireland to England or Scotland or from Scotland to England) being a particular challenge. Hundreds, if not thousands of individuals were routinely removed to their settlement, sometimes voluntarily (requesting poor relief and expecting removal saved Irish seasonal workers in Kent the return fare in the 1830s, for instance), but more often against their wishes (Sokoll; Gordon, W. M.; Levine-Clark).

This system of migration control presupposed a degree of control over movement within the country. It had to be possible to reconstruct individuals’ place of birth as well as any fact that affected settlement – initially renting a fairly expensive dwelling or working in a particular location for a lengthy period of time, facts that witnesses would be able to confirm; later spending a year in a new location, something potentially more difficult to check in a large city. By contrast, there was no requirement to document when, where or how individuals crossed the United Kingdom’s external borders.

Fast-forward to the twenty-first century, when things look very different. Now, there are few checks on internal movement. Poor citizens who desire to move from one locality to another face bureaucratic obstacles but are no longer removed back to where they came from. As most relief and insurance systems are – the name says it all – “national” in character, keeping track of internal movement is all but

¹ For detailed references, see Fahrmeir, Citizenship 56-124; Feldman.
irrelevant (though keeping track of identity is potentially important). Hence, it
is possible to dispense with maintaining expensive and intrusive systems of docu-
mentation of internal movement like domestic ID cards or registers of residence
that extend to the entire population, not just to individuals liable for council tax
payments (see e.g. Timmins).

By contrast, external borders – ports and airports – have become key sites of
control, as have consulates and foreign airports, adding a layer of “remote control”
(Zolberg) that has become ever more intensive from the 1980s. The purpose of
entry controls is to ensure that individuals who may require support from public
resources or who present a threat to public order remain outside the country; only
those who are likely to benefit the economy in some way (be it as workers, tour-
ists, or students) or who have a very strong moral claim to admission (close family
members of citizens and permanent residents or refugees) are supposed to pass
(Tholen).

The story of how the United Kingdom moved from one state of affairs to the
other is easily recapitulated, and the principal trajectories are very similar to what
continental European countries experienced: one trajectory involves the transition
of local communities from corporations with a defined membership for whose
economic well-being they were to some degree responsible to administrative units
of a welfare state that may continue to dispense relief payments through localities
but regulates them nationally for all citizens and permanent residents (Lindert);
the second trajectory involves the transition from liberal states that lacked an over-
riding interest in controlling movement across their borders to nation states that
sought to protect citizens against foreign labour market competition and threats
from abroad, at least to some degree (Fahrmeir, Citizenship). There is considerable
debate as to whether and, if so, how these two trajectories are related, but it is
clear what their combined effect was: it was to lower internal and to harden exter-
nal boundaries. Town walls, a very visible means of protecting urban corporations
against outsiders, could be dismantled in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
(including, for example, London’s Temple Bar) because they presented barriers
to the freedom of internal movement and commercial exchange (Mintzker); by
contrast, fences or walls at external boundaries have become an increasingly com-
mon feature of modern states or areas of free internal migration, whether in the
United States or the European Union.\footnote{For a current list, see “Border barrier” on Wikipedia (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bor-
der_barrier).

While these trajectories were similar, they had very different bureaucratic con-
sequences in the United Kingdom and on the European continent. From the late
eighteenth century onwards, continental European states experimented with reg-

isters of citizens and residents. These became near-universal with the French Rev-
olution and its aftermath, and while formats, purpose and content varied in detail,
they created a system based on the interaction of cards and registers. States issued
certificates of identity, privileges and rights to the population or at least the part
of the population that strayed from its place of birth and residence on the basis
of information in registers; conversely, the cards issued to individuals granted the
state access to information about them, including citizenship, residence status, and
places of origin. Provided the interaction of cards and registers worked well – i.e.
in the absence of fundamental political conflicts and in the presence of a reasona-
bles postal service and conventions about what cards would look like – controls at
frontiers were unnecessary and could be replaced by decentralised verification of
identity and status in hotels, local registration offices, or tax offices. Thus, freedom
of internal movement in the EU, in so far as it involves the absence of frontier
controls and the presence of pervasive controls elsewhere is not a novel develop-
ment: migration control in continental Europe functioned in much the same way
during the 1840s, from the 1860s to the First World War, from the 1920s to the
1930s and from the 1950s, though the rights individuals could claim based on
their social rank and citizenship changed considerably over time (Breckenridge
and Szreter).

By contrast, the British system of migration control, from when it resumed
control of international migration in 1905 to the present, remained focused on
external borders and imposed very few – if any – controls on individuals after they
had entered the country – with the exception of the war and immediate post-war
periods (Elliot). To be sure, this did not exclude requirements for police regis-
tration, the existence of work permits (and work prohibitions) or restrictions on
social services available to some or all foreigners; however, given the absence of
systems of registration that documented who was a citizen, and a legal situation
that defines individuals’ names as the ones under which they are commonly known
(not the one under which they were born or registered) (Caplan), keeping tabs on
foreigners was clearly a challenge, particularly outside the brief periods of national
registration. If not entirely intentional, this was not considered a serious prob-
lem. For example, the time available to identify and sanction individuals who had
entered the country unlawfully or overstayed their visas was extremely brief for
British subjects (i.e. citizens of Commonwealth countries other than the UK): 24
hours until 1968, between one and six months in the 1970s. It became longer in
the 1980s, but the number of removals was extremely low in international compar-
ision (Cohen 48, 51f.; Gordon, P. 15f.). Individuals who had entered the country
in defiance of immigration rules were also rarely prevented from acquiring a na-
tional insurance number, to pick but one example (Vogel). The migration control
system was thus based on the assumption that individuals inside the country were
legitimate residents, and that the removal of aliens would occur only in exception-
al cases.

There are clearly geographical and historical reasons for these differences. Un-
less one does build walls, the borders of continental European states are impossi-
ble to control completely; the assumption that everyone in a given country has
undergone some form of immigration control would therefore clearly be naïve.
By contrast, provided that the United Kingdom and Ireland remain united for
migration control purposes, the barriers to entering the region clandestinely are
high, because entry must occur by sea or air. Moreover, the proportion of aliens
(and, more to the point, of poor aliens) in the British population was quite low for
most of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. At 0.8% in 1910, the proportion
of non-citizens in the UK was half that in the German Empire and one third of
that in France. This did not change much after 1945, although immigration to the
United Kingdom picked up. While the figures of residents who were not citizens
of the United Kingdom rose (from less than 1% around 1950 to between 3 and 4% from the 1970s to 2000 – still considerably below the French and roughly half the
[West] German figures), a substantial number of immigrants were either UK and
Colonies citizens, or Commonwealth citizens whose rights, once admitted, were
similar to those of UK citizens: they could vote (and thus immediately became
a political constituency). Immigration did become increasingly difficult for their
relatives or potential spouses and employees from their native country, but polit-
ical integration occurred as a matter of course (Fahrmeir, Citizenship 166-201).

The link between residence and rights for most residents was reduced with the
arrival of high numbers of migrants from the European Union, particularly in the
early 2000s, when EU citizens made up around 6% of the UK population (out of
9% non-UK citizens, with at least 1.5% Commonwealth citizens). This group had
not undergone any form of migration control, imposed from the 1960s on all en-
trants and focused on a combination of earning capacity or family ties (Hansen).
Nor was it able to participate in national elections – or in the referenda on Scottish
independence or Brexit, in which Commonwealth citizens were obviously able to
take part.

In retrospect, and regardless of the importance one attributes to immigration
policy when it comes to explaining the run-up to the Brexit referendum and its
result, it seems clear that this situation affected the legitimacy of the British immi-
gration control regime (and inflated the ability of its opponents among residents
to make their voices heard while denying this possibility to stakeholders from the
EU).

---

3 This data is taken from https://www.ons.gov.uk/.
Migration Control and Brexit

In the future, this may change, probably because – ironically – the United Kingdom has become more likely to make the transition to a continental European-style system of migration control after Brexit. There are a number of reasons for this. Perhaps the most obvious one is that it is difficult to see how freedom of movement between Northern Ireland and the United Kingdom can be assured without some form of internal migration control – be it visible in form of control booths or “invisible” via the interaction of databases. As it stands, the system of migration control is based on similar standards of control at ports and airports in Eire and the UK, much as is the case between Canada and the U.S. This makes it possible to tolerate a permeable border (like the land border between Canada and the U.S. or an air and sea border free of controls between Northern Ireland and the British mainland and a land border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland). Given that not just Irish citizens, but all EU citizens enjoy freedom of access to the UK at present, the fact that no controls are imposed on them in Ireland before they enter the UK via the Irish land border does not make a difference. After Brexit, it will. The only way of preventing individuals from entering the UK via Ireland’s land border (and thus to “take back control” over immigration) would be to impose controls at the border or to control transit from Northern Ireland to the mainland, creating a barrier to freedom of movement in the UK and imposing an internal passport requirement on citizens of the UK who live in or travel to Northern Ireland.

The second problem that suggests a change of system is the problem of ascertaining the status of EU citizens already in the United Kingdom. Changes of name apart, doing so should be relatively simple for individuals who have worked, because they have a “record” at the DWPS – though the difficulties Commonwealth immigrants who arrived in the UK prior to 1971 face when required to offer the proof of legal residence required for access to employment, housing and public services demanded from 2012 demonstrates that this is by no means assured (Gentleman, “Windrush”, “Whistleblowers”). It is also relatively simple for individuals who have rented or owned property, because they appear on council tax registers. It is all but insoluble, however, for individuals who have not worked or appeared on a council tax bill, i.e. children or partners of EU citizens who were not themselves employed in the UK or the owners or renters of property. Imposing some sort of general registration requirement for new entrants would limit the problem by date, but doing so presupposes a general registration of all citizens and residents for it to work in the future; in the absence of such a register, individuals lacking status in the UK could simply claim to have arrived before the cut-off date and to have fallen between the gaps of registers since. Incidentally, the UK has been moving towards such a system for some time in seeking to put pressure on landlords, employers or others to verify the immigration status of individuals on the basis of
a suspicion of non-citizenship. In the absence of simple proof of citizenship, this will likely lead to ethnic discrimination and/or force the vast majority of UK citizens to procure passports as a replacement for an ID card.

Interestingly, this variant of immigration control regime was discussed once before, namely in the 1920s and 1930s. Some of the drafts leaked or circulated recently echo the language of the day, and perhaps this is no accident. The reason such plans were abandoned at the time was the issue of cost: home office officials were sceptical that spending the sums necessary to ensure a close surveillance of migration would be wise, given that any system was likely to have gaps (Fahrmeir, *Citizenship* 150).

The issue of cost was hardly ever discussed on the continent; if a new type of document seemed to be required, it was paid for from citizens’ pockets, often turning a profit for the administration concerned (ibid. 145). However, it is at least interesting to note that the continental system of migration control also appears to be in crisis, or at the very least going through a bad patch. One reason is that the degree of governments’ trust in the administrative control of the population is in decline – clearly, there is a gap between registers and reality, and as the incidence of so-called illegal immigration on the European continent appears to be growing, the paper walls of administrative registers are increasingly supplemented with walls made of wires and concrete that force individuals who seek access to territory to pass through ports of entry. It is highly unlikely that this development will lead to the disappearance of registers – they are still required, much like in the nineteenth century, to distinguish non-citizens who have completed residence and work requirements for local relief from those who can be removed to their country of settlement. It seems odd that the long divergence between migration control systems on the European continent and in Britain – a source of occasional pride to British politicians, authors and administrators from Palmerston via Murray’s Guides, Wilkie Collins and many others – might be reversed, of all times, in the age of Brexit (Fahrmeir, “Making Britain”). But it looks like that might just be what is about to happen.
Migration Control and Brexit

Works Cited


Session II

Economy
I. Economic Consequences – High Uncertainty

The headline of the symposium ends with a question mark. Notwithstanding the ongoing discussion that Brexit may be put to vote a second time, this paper is based on the premise: Brexit means Brexit and Britain will effectively leave the EU.

However, immediately a new question arises. Which kind of Brexit? Hard or soft? Will the final outcome be some kind of European Economic Area like it exists for Norway? Or an arrangement comparable to that between the EU and Switzerland? Or a bilateral free trade agreement (Sachverständigenrat)?

At present, probably nobody could claim to have a clear answer as to which of these or other possible outcomes will eventually materialise. As a result, all judgements on the potential economic consequences of Brexit remain pure speculation. Nevertheless, a number of calculations have been presented. If one excludes a few which even forecasted a positive outcome for the UK, the overall result is the following:

In the short run, Brexit will have minor negative economic consequences for the UK and more or less negligible ones for the EU. In the long run, the negative outcome for the UK could be sizeable. Estimates range from a 1% to 10% negative impact on the UK’s per capita income (Sampson).1 Restrictions on the immigration into the British labour market would reduce potential output and some investments might become obsolete because of the decline of exports. On the demand side, deprecation of the currency will cause negative terms of trade effects and reduce personal income. The decline in the exchange rate might not fully recoup dwindling exports, which would backfire on domestic investments. Foreign direct investment might suffer substantially.

Considering the importance of the financial sector, the biggest negative consequences might result from the dislocation of financial activities from the UK to the continent. This is already visible in the move of the European Banking Authority (EBA) from London to Paris and the ensuing relocation of a substantial number

---

The overall negative long-run economic consequences of Brexit on the EU should remain limited. Some countries with strong trade relations like Germany might suffer somewhat more. This is also true for specific sectors like the car and the chemical industry.

It is not worthwhile to look for more reliable figures. For the time being, any results have a tentative character. As already mentioned, the estimates differ widely. On the one hand, this is due to the fact that studies’ methodologies vary. On the other hand, any assessment must be based on the future institutional arrangement between the EU and the UK, which for some time to come remains an open issue.

II. Brexit – A Turning Point

European – for a long time, Western European – integration started early after the end of World War II. In this context, it is remarkable that Winston Churchill, in his famous speech held in Zurich in 1946, had the vision of a “European Family” – nota bene on the continent – whereas the UK was to play its role as leader of the Commonwealth. This mental distinction has never fully disappeared.

The first step of (Western) European integration was the creation of the European Community of Coal and Steel in 1952, followed by the European Economic Community and finally the European Union, of which nineteen of its member countries later formed the European Monetary Union.

Integration knew only one direction, and so the EU grew from initially six to twenty-nine countries with ever closer economic and legal ties. While the idea of political integration failed in 1954 with the rejection of the proposal of the European Defence Community, later ambitions concentrated on economic integration which (in principal) was achieved by the establishment of the Single Market. However, this process also contained political elements in the field of common policies for trade, agriculture and competition and – not forgetting – the European Court of Justice. And for nineteen countries, integration has gone much further with the introduction of a common currency.

The project of European integration could have been abandoned after the failure to establish the European Defence Community. However, a new initiative

---

2 The European Medicines Agency (EMA) will move to Amsterdam.
3 See ECB – Financial Stability Report, May 2017, on the consequences for financial stability in the euro area.
started with the conference in Messina in 1955, which in retrospect was the start-
ing point for what followed. Looking at UK politics during this process of more
than sixty years, the outcome of the referendum is not so surprising after all.

The UK was invited. It is said that the British delegates left the conference with
a remark of historical significance: These Europeans (!) will never agree on any rel-
evant project. In the unlikely case that they will come to an agreement, they will not
be able to implement their ideas. And in the even more unlikely case they will realise
their plans, these will turn out to be a failure.

Seeing the Economic Community, which had started in 1958, becoming a suc-
cess, Britain as early as 1961 applied for membership. After France’s – to be pre-
cise, de Gaulle’s – veto, the UK re-applied in 1967 and was turned down again.
As a consequence, Britain had to wait until 1973 before it became a member. And
only two years later, membership was put on a trial which ended with 68% of vot-
ers in favour of remaining in the Community.

In the context of post-World-War-II European integration, Brexit represents a
break in this steady development. For the first time ever is a country leaving, dis-
tancing itself from a unique historical process. In the context of the Brexit cam-
paign, concerns were raised that this could mark a turning point in European inte-
gration meaning that other members might follow the British example. Looking at
the – to put it mildly – cumbersome process of the negotiations, the incentive for
others to follow suit – if it ever really existed at all – has decreased substantially, if
not fully disappeared.

There exist two opposite views on the matter of which institutional conse-
quences of Brexit should follow for the EU. One camp asks for decisive steps in
the direction of stronger integration. The other camp sees the cause for Brexit in
an integration or rather centralisation that has gone too far and asks for reforms
that revert this process.

The consequences of Brexit for the EU extend far beyond just losing one major
member. Which direction should the EU take? To give an appropriate answer to
this question, one has to analyse the elements which determine the optimal con-
tent and size of integration.

III. EU – Content and Size

A branch of economic theory deals with the problem of the optimal size of a state
(Alesina/Spolaore). The EU is not a state, but many aspects of that theoretical
framework can also be applied to this entity. External effects are relevant, e.g., in
the fields of foreign or climate policy, which argue for elevating the corresponding
competencies to the union level. The EU as the greatest internal market in the
Otmar Issing

world has a strong negotiating position in international trade issues. At the same
time, size comes with disadvantages like costs of centralisation and bureaucracy.
Common regulation can make markets more efficient, but at the same time, it can
suppress innovation. A big country will have difficulties to satisfy the different
preferences of the people. The secession movement in Catalonia presents a striking
example of dissatisfaction of a region being a member of a large national state and
at the same time reveals all the problems associated with leaving a common state.
This can also be seen as a case for Albert O. Hirschman’s theory of “Vote versus
Exit” – when people are not satisfied with the low influence of their vote, they may
decide to exit, i.e., to leave the house of the state.

This tension caused by centralisation is reflected in the discussion about “sub-
sidiarity” in the EU. Despite many declarations, a widespread notion prevails that
the idea of subsidiarity has constantly been neglected, which is a substantial dan-
ger for the cohesion of the union.

Those aspects might have played a role in the Brexit referendum. Slogans like
“we want control back from Brussels” and about the costs related to Britain’s mem-
bership are an expression of dissatisfaction with what was perceived as a “domina-
tion by Brussels”. However, on 7 May 2016, Lord Griffith explained in the House
of Lords: “The result in this referendum was a response to a single question: re-
main or leave? It did not fudge the issue, and neither did the result. It was clearly a
protest against the power of Brussels over our governance in the countries of ours,
and, for me, a rejection of the sustainability of the European Union in its present
form.”

However, analyses of the motives of voters for Brexit point rather in a different
direction. In regions with lower productivity, a higher share of immigrants, lower
qualification of labour, pro Brexit voices dominated (Sachverständigenrat 139 ff.).
“Overall, the picture painted by the voting data is that the Brexit campaign
succeeded because it received the support of voters who felt left behind by modern
Britain. People may have felt left behind because of their education, age, economic
situation, or because of tensions between their values and the direction of social
change, but, broadly speaking, a feeling of social and economic exclusion appears
to have translated into support for Brexit” (Sampson 18). (It is hard to see why
these people should change their mind in a new referendum.)

---

4 Charles Goodhart clarified to me that it was not the share of immigrants – which is highest
in London which voted strongly for remain – but that the areas that voted for Brexit tended
to have the highest percentage of recent change in the proportion of immigrants – a new and
unfamiliar feature of life that led to a Brexit vote.
IV. Economics versus Culture

In this perspective, membership in the EU is mainly seen as a scapegoat for a general dissatisfaction which is to a large extent due to globalisation and the impression of a world which has a strong and uncontrollable negative impact not only on current welfare but also on the expectations of the future.

This might have been the decisive motivation for the majority of voters in favour of Brexit. But, this would ignore an important factor which goes beyond economics and has represented a long-lasting reservation of part of the British (or rather English?) elite toward European integration.\(^5\)

After the Second World War, Germany was devastated in all respects – economically, politically, morally. European integration gave the country the chance to come back to (or join, for the first time in full respect) the community of Western democracies (due to the division into two parts, this chance was only given to West Germany). Not surprisingly, in the case of Germany, European integration was about much more than just economics, given how it accelerated its recovery from the ruins. Overall, this political aspect was a crucial element driving European integration. Not so for Britain. The UK was interested in the economic advantages of removing trade barriers. The “four freedoms”, free movement of goods and services, business and capital, and – with reservation – of people, were always supported if not propagated by British policies. Margaret Thatcher led the initiatives for the Single Market, whereas she firmly opposed any developments in the direction of a political union. Her main concern about monetary union was – as she saw it – the implicit and inevitable political consequences of joining the common currency.

It was only consequent that the country insisted on the clause in the Treaty “that the UK shall not be obliged or committed to adopt the euro without a separate decision to do so by its government and parliament.”

The position of countries joining EU after the fall of the iron curtain gave them the chance to “go west”, where they belonged to before the war and the Soviet occupation. European integration always also had a cultural dimension. This element was much less developed in Britain if it ever existed at a larger scale. “Britain is not and never was led to be in either the euro or the Schengen areas. UK never shared the political objectives of the rest of the EU” (M. King).

Margaret Thatcher has been much more direct if not blunt on this point. “‘Europe’ in anything other than the geographical sense is a wholly artificial construct. It makes no sense at all to lump together Beethoven and Debussy, Voltaire and Burke, Vermeer and Picasso, Notre Dame and St Paul’s, boiled beef and bouilla-

---

\(^5\) The threat from the Soviet Union also played a critical role.
Otmar Issing

baisse, and portray them as elements of a ‘European’ musical, philosophical, artistic, architectural or gastronomic reality. If Europe charms us, as it has so often charmed me, it is precisely because of its contrasts and contradictions, not its coherence and continuity” (Thatcher 328).

She even went so far as to say: “The concept of Europe has always, I suspect, lent itself to a large measure of humbug. Not just national interests, but (especially now) a great array of group and class interests happily disguise themselves beneath the mantle of symbolic European idealism” (325).

This thinking is widespread in the British elite as became visible during the Brexit campaign. It demonstrates, on the other hand, the deep cultural gap between the island and (most) countries on the continent. On the other hand, it is a warning against the denial of cultural diversities which continue to exist between countries and which should not be neglected when it comes to high political ambitions about future European integration.

V. Brexit – Consequences for the EU

The consequences of Brexit for the budget of the EU and the contributions of the remaining 27 countries are widely discussed. The impact on the voting within the EU is largely neglected although Brexit might have a significant influence (Sachverständigenrat 153).

For a qualifying majority, the consent of 55% of member states which represent 65% of the population is needed. After Brexit, the number of countries which are needed declines from 16 to 15 with a more favourable position of the larger member countries. At the same time, this will give more power to the euro area’s members. In the past, the UK was a strong opponent of more centralisation, regulation and a financial transaction tax and in favour of free trade. Insofar Brexit shifts the power in the other direction. However, considering the probability of a change in government and the overall policy orientation in the UK, the longer run impact might have been very different. All in all, EU after Brexit will be a different animal.

Reactions on how the EU as an institution should react to Brexit go in opposite directions.

One camp sees a strong case for “completing the unfinished house towards a genuine Economic and Monetary Union” (Issing). The Report of the five presidents was a first initiative followed by President Juncker’s message. Lately, President Macron presented his ideas in a speech titled: “Initiative pour l’Europe: Une Europe souveraine, unie, démocratique.”

This is not the place to go into details. But, these proposals favour further centralisation of power at the level of EU institutions. Especially the project of a Fiscal
Union with a European Budget and a European Finance Minister contains elements of political integration. It is hard to see how this could be based on democratic legitimacy without a change of the Treaty. As for the time being there is no chance for a Treaty change, further steps in this direction could be seen as attempts to introduce instruments of mutualisation of debt through the backdoor and to further undermine national sovereignty.

This must be seen as a dangerous process which in the end will erode the support of people for the European integration and strengthen extremist parties on the left as well as on the right in their opposition against “Europe”. Those initiatives also foster resentments in Middle and Eastern Europe. Already in the early days, former Czech President Vaclav Klaus has claimed time and again that his country had not escaped from the Soviet yoke to now be subjected to “Brussels.” Exaggerated as this may sound, this attitude is spreading not only in the East.

Considering this danger for the cohesion of the EU, the other camp argues against further centralisation and bureaucracy and pleads for finally taking the principle of subsidiarity, which is enshrined in the Treaty but mostly neglected, much more seriously than in the past. Responsibility of national policies should not be undermined by moving in the direction of a transfer union. Who remembers anymore that the no-bail-out clause is a crucial principle also enshrined in the Treaty?

VI. Concluding Remarks

Brexit might trigger a process whose dynamics are hard to predict and probably difficult to control. This is true for policies in the UK as well as in the EU. But policies are not exposed to some kind of exogenously driven, uncontrollable shocks. For the time being, the British society is deeply split and politics are a mess. I will not speculate on the final outcome. Considering the overall not so bad performance within the EU and the quite dubious future outside one might remember the words of the Prince of Denmark:

The undiscover’d country, from whose bourn
No traveller returns – puzzles the will,
And makes us rather bear those ills we have
Than fly to others that we know not of?

The EU must find its way to a stable and sustainable arrangement by carefully balancing the need for common actions in fields like security and migration and the need to respect the principle of subsidiarity in other fields much more than in the past. The preamble of the Treaty on the EU asks to “lay the foundations of an
ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe.” This formulation met strong opposition in the UK during the Brexit campaign. However, deliberations on what this would imply – and what it should not – have also started on the continent. European integration cannot go forward in the direction of an ever-closer union without careful consideration. It is true that cultural diversity is a crucial element which characterises “Europe” – and any attempts to “harmonise” or even centralise cultural aspects would not only be a fragile approach but also undermine the idea of European integration.

But, Europe is more than business and money. This can, however, not mean that economic integration is not a key element on which “Europe” is built. Now the challenge is to find the best or least detrimental arrangement between the EU of twenty-seven and the UK.

In her speech in Florence on 22 September 2017, Theresa May said: “Our decision to leave the EU is in no way a repudiation of this longstanding commitment. We may be leaving the EU, but we are not leaving Europe.” Whatever this may mean, culture in its diversity is a European bond and economics must not become a dividing element.

Works Cited


The Likely Economic Effects of Brexit

Iain Begg

THE LIKELY ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF BREXIT: IS THE ECONOMY HEADING OFF THE RAILS?

Iain Begg
European Institute, London School of Economics

“Brexit means Brexit?” Symposium
6 December 2017

THE UK’S BREXIT CHALLENGES

ARTICLE 50
A complex divorce ‘negative enlargement’

REST OF WORLD
Bilateral trade, market access and security deals

WHAT BREXIT REALLY MEANS: 4 DIMENSIONS

NEW EU-UK DEAL
Trade, regulation, courts, in some EU policies, money……

DOMESTIC POLICY
Reassigning powers from EU within UK
The Likely Economic Effects of Brexit

PRINCIPAL UK EXPORT SECTORS
2015, £ billion

- Other business services
- Financial services
- Travel
- Transport
- Telecoms and ICT
- Motor vehicles
- Chemicals
- Mining and quarrying
- Computer, electronics, optical
- Pharmaceuticals
- Machinery and equipment nec
- Other transport equipment
- Food products
- Coke and refined petroleum products
- Basic metals

UK POSITIONS IN FLUX

- PM’s Lancaster House speech of January 2017
  - Clear statement of what is known as “hard” Brexit
    - Meant leaving single market and customs union
    - End to free movement and jurisdiction of ECJ
    - Big reduction (NB: not elimination) of payments to EU
- Since June election: more confused propositions
  - Little overall change in Florence speech
  - Discordant voices from ministers at times
  - But also from Labour party
- This week’s on-off (and on again?) deal
UK INDICATORS: TROUBLE AHEAD?

- From fastest to slowest growth among G7
- Conflicting labour market signals
  - Employment head count at an all-time record
    - And unemployment staying low
  - But decline in real wages and household incomes
- Inflation ticking up — higher interest rates?
  - Risks for still-indebted consumers
- Fiscal vulnerability: rules missed or revised
- External account still uncomfortable
>> Accumulation of (initially?) minor worries

WHAT HAPPENED TO STRONG & STABLE?
The Likely Economic Effects of Brexit

INTERSECTING INFLUENCES

DIRECT BREXIT EFFECTS
- Uncertainty over outcome
- Deters investment
- Prospect of barriers to trade
- Impact on supply chains
- Cost of doing business
- Slowing of growth
- Potential (e.g. via pro-competitive effects)
- Achieved

LONGER-RUN INFLUENCES
- Productivity stagnation
- Skills
- Creaking infrastructure
- Credit dependency
- Persistent external deficit
- Regional disparities
- Talk of transitions
- From what to what?
- Duration and scope

A NEW GROWTH MODEL?
- Redefinition of trading patterns
- Changing mix of sectors
- Financial sector: good or bad?

STRATEGIC CHOICES
- Regulatory preferences
- Industrial strategy
- Regional development
- Research orientations

PUBLIC FINANCES

- Savings on EU budget payments
- Lower tax revenues from GDP loss
  - Financial sector most at risk?
- Transition costs
  - Divorce bill
  - Preparations for Brexit & negotiation
- Public administration increases
  - Customs officers; repatriated competences
WHICH TAKES US TO SOME ‘WILDCARDS’

- Late 2017: Germany turns more eurosceptical
- Most fanciful: Pro-remain forces win new UK election
- Spring 2018: Italy in trouble
- A major investor quits the UK
- The unforeseen in domestic politics on either side
- Late 2018: The Irish rebel

CONCLUSIONS - POINTS TO DISCUSS

- Balance of economic risks is on downside
  - The continuing uncertainty about UK positions
    - One side in UK is bound to be disappointed
- Damaging dilemma for business
  - Why invest if outcome is so hard to judge?
  - But decisions need to be taken quickly
- No prospect of early Brexit fiscal “dividend”
  - Broken promise to voters
- Many economic factors missed in referendum
“A week is a long time in politics”

Harold Wilson, former British Prime Minister

http://ukandeu.ac.uk/

http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europblog/
During the Leave campaign, the funding of the National Health Service (NHS) became one of the key messages to push votes for the referendum. Famously plastered on the side of the tour bus, the promise of £350m to support the NHS became a remarkable picture of the Brexit movement, recognizable worldwide. As outlined on the tour bus, this money would be used to support the struggling NHS in the UK instead of funding EU structures in Brussels. Subsequently to the referendum, the NHS Chief Executive, Simon Steve, demanded the money promised to the NHS without receiving an answer. Given the international ties and the complexity of healthcare, the Leave campaign simplified Brexit as a one-way street into a better, wealthier future for the UK and its healthcare system. The consequences of the Brexit are still largely unclear. However, leaving the EU will have an impact on the NHS, particularly due to the demographic change and the need for more qualified personnel in the health and social-care sector. Moreover, the return of UK pensioners, currently living abroad under the Freedom of Movement Act, to NHS healthcare might hold additional challenges for the UK’s underfunded health and social care system.

I. Changing Health Care Needs

Demographic change, one of the main drivers for a higher demand of healthcare services worldwide, refers to a higher proportion of older people. Related to this are two developments: low fertility rates, with fewer young people entering the population, and lower mortality rates. For more than four decades, the UK experienced low birth rates under the replacement level of 2.1 children per woman (Smallwood 19). In 2016, the total fertility rate in the UK accounted for 1.79 per women, compared to significantly higher rates, in the mid-1960s, of 2.88 per women (Office for National Statistics, “Vital Statistics”). Historically driven by a reduction in infant and child mortality, falling mortality rates amongst the population over 65 is the second main factor contributing to the demographic shift. Currently, life expectancy at the age of 65 is 85.9 for women and 83.4 for men in the UK (Age UK).
Following this trend, the mean age of UK’s society is increasing constantly, which implicates a lower proportion of individuals to work, pay taxes and provide care for those who need it. However, compared to other EU members like Germany and Italy, the UK remains relatively young. Germany, marked as “the land without children”, will be confronted with a strong demographic shift, since the fertility rate stayed under 1.5 for more than three decades (Oltermann). With 31% of its population over 65, Germany will retain the position as the oldest country in the EU by 2035. Although the demographic shift in the UK is not as dramatic, the effect is nonetheless significant. By 2035, 23% of the population in the UK will be over 65 (Office for National Statistics, “Population”).

This implicates changing healthcare needs, particularly for the oldest old – one of the fastest growing age groups in the UK. In the time between 2001 and 2012, the number of disabled older people increased by 400,000, or 8.5%, in the UK (Matthews). In 2030, people living with three or more long-term conditions will increase by 50%, and those with cognitive disorders such as dementia by 80% (House of Commons). The good news is that people in the UK enjoy more healthy life years, but this mostly applies to younger people. Although scientific and societal successes have led to a higher life expectancy, chronic and long-term conditions are common in later life stages. Numbers measuring the Healthy Life Expectancy (HLE) between 65 and 85 are not keeping pace with the general improvement of HLE (Jagger). Almost half of the people over 85 are associated with frailty, disability and crisis admissions to hospitals (Song et al.). Chronic conditions like dementia will become a huge burden for the health and social care system in the UK over the coming years. The current estimated number of people with dementia is 850,000; by 2051, this number will rise to 2 million people (Prince).

Dementia has a considerable impact on patients as well as family and professional caregivers. Over the time, patients lose their ability to live independently, which is often followed by the need for 24-hour care. The total cost of dementia care in the UK is estimated at £4.3 billion for healthcare and £10.3 billion for social care, including privately funded resources (Prince). Unless this trend can be further delayed, the increasing prevalence of chronic health conditions associated with age will become a huge burden for the NHS.

II. Health and Social Care Workforce

The growing number of people with age-related health and care needs will increase the demand for health care services significantly. Given the smaller cohorts entering the job market, hiring a sufficient number of health professionals to face the
increasing demand will become a challenge. Although reforms of the UK pension system were enacted to delay the retirement age, physical changes in later life, negative attitudes towards older workers and a changing labour market still prevent people from working longer, particularly in the healthcare sector. A report published by the European Commission found that 42% of the subjects interviewed regard age discrimination as widespread in the UK. The British constitute the second most likely population, after the French, to see ageism as a problem (European Commission). Associated with this discrimination, the development of the high-tech sector implies additional challenges for older workers. While analysts suggest that 35% of the jobs in the UK are at risk of automation, healthcare workers are facing a workforce shortage following an increasing demand for budget cuts (Sproul).

By far, the biggest job market in the UK is represented by the health and social care sector. With 1.21 million full-time equivalent (FTE) staff working for the NHS in 2017 and a further 1.11 million FTE in the social care sector, health and social care accounts for one in ten of the overall working population (NHS). The increasing demand for health care services, with more chronic conditions and multi-morbidity, is placing pressure on the healthcare workforce. Studies have found a reduced job satisfaction related to higher stress level in the NHS, particularly affecting older healthcare workers; overall, 38% of the NHS staff in England reported having suffered from work-related stress and the sickness absence rate in the NHS is 27%: higher than in the UK public sector average (Royal College of Physicians, “Work”). This pressure is particularly noticeable in the group of older health care workers. Reduced job satisfaction and increased stress levels are contributing to decisions to leave the NHS and to retire early (King’s College London).

Part of the demographic shift in British society relates to an aging workforce that is already seen in the NHS. One in three nurses will retire in the next 10 years; in December 2015, the NHS already had issues with recruiting enough qualified healthcare workers. Figures showed more than 23,443 vacant nursing posts and 6,207 vacancies for doctors in 2015 (Weaver). More than 100,000 nurses registered on the Nursing and Midwifery Council are aged 55 or older (Buchan). Due to a lack of personnel, patients spent 1.8 million extra days in UK hospitals because of delays in their discharge (Royal College of Physicians, “Underfunded”).

Despite the current and future needs of the health and social sector in the UK, the referendum added additional uncertainties to the upcoming demographic challenges. The NHS employs 140,000 thousand people from outside the UK and around 62,000 people from EU countries. The most common non-British EU nationality in the NHS is Irish, followed by Polish, Spanish, and Portuguese. At
87.5%, the vast majority of the NHS staff are British, but a substantial minority of 12.5% are not (Baker).

Recent numbers published by the House of Commons showed some minor effects since the referendum. From the group of healthcare workers with a known nationality, the percentage of EU nurses have fallen from 7.4% to 7.1% since the referendum. With a view to individual nationalities, Spanish EU staff recorded the largest overall decrease. Since June 2016, the NHS recorded a fall from 7,240 to 6,781, or 6%, of all Spanish healthcare workers (Baker). The regions with the highest proportion of non-British EU staff members working for the NHS are London and the South East of England. Up to 14% of the nurses and doctors are EU citizens form outside the UK (House of Commons).

The recorded fall of Spanish healthcare workers may be associated with a lack of certainty produced by the referendum. As stated by the Chief Executive of NHS Employers, Danny Mortimer, NHS employers are not seeing the same volume of applications since the referendum – particularly in southern Europe (House of Commons 15). The UK healthcare system does not train enough healthcare staff to face the increasing demand. Although the average number of nurses per capita is slightly higher in the UK compared to the EU (870 vs. 850 per 100,000 people), the average number of doctors remains below the EU average (278 vs. 347 per 100,000 people) (Cylus et al.). This also has an impact on the country’s capacity for training medical specialists, which requires many years of training. To fill this
Ageing UK and Brexit

gap the NHS relies on importing doctors from other countries, including the EU. Alex Scott, a medical consultant at the Calderdale and Huddersfield NHS Foundation Trust, told the British Medical Journal:

Our regional major trauma and transplant centre has already [before Brexit] had to shut beds and cancel liver transplants because of staffing crises. I now hear rumours from hospital managers in West Yorkshire that our EU recruiting drive has been sabotaged by the referendum result and we will not get the staff we recruited because of very reasonable fears for the future. British patients will lose out. (Iacobucci)

UK hospitals are unable to fill their open positions: two out of five consultant physician positions stay vacant due to a lack of suitable candidates. In order to address this issue, the Secretary of State for Health provided £100 million to fund 1,500 extra medical student positions from 2018. Before becoming a junior doctor, training takes at least 5 years, followed by 8 years of postgraduate training to become a specialist. The Secretary of State’s programme will take years to show its effects, given the long training times of medical students. Furthermore, it is probably underfunded: since the cost of training a doctor is estimated to be £160,000, the total is more like £240 million, which leaves a gap of £140 million.

At the time of writing, there is no evidence on EU doctors leaving the NHS. However, the recorded data must be treated with caution. The information about nationality is self-reported, including the 6.5% of NHS workers with unknown nationality (Baker). If doctors, nurses, and other healthcare workers were to choose to leave the UK because of the referendum, this would have a serious impact on patients, including longer waiting times, delays in hospital discharge, restricted access to medical treatment, and probably closed doors.

Compared to the NHS, adult social care relies even more on EU workers. Although a recent publication from September 2017 reported just minor effects of the referendum, the impact of a potential workers drain would be difficult to digest. Around 7% or 95,000 workers of the adult social care workforce are from EU countries. Comparable to the distribution of the NHS workforce, the biggest proportion of foreign workers is located in London and the South East of England. The two ‘top nationalities’ for non-British adult social care workers are Polish and Romanian (Skills for Care).

Although its value to society is immeasurable, adult social care remains a low-pay sector. To fill in the gaps associated with the demographic shift, a well-designed immigration system is vital. Formal national immigration systems are characterised by bureaucratic procedures and financial barriers, particularly in contrast to the achievements of the European Economic Area (EEA) and its free-movement privileges. The Brexit process will likely cause disruptions to the current recruitment pipelines, with a potential loss of EU citizens working for the NHS. There
is some evidence already indicating minor effects of the Brexit referendum: the number of nurses leaving the NHS increased by 298 from 1,017 to 1,315, and the number of EU nurses joining the NHS fell by 173 from 1,409 to 1,236. However, due to the demographic shift, the health and social care sector will grow exponentially, entailing a higher demand of healthcare professionals than is currently seen. It is unlikely that the UK will be self-sufficient in the supply of its health and social care workforce. Upholding the recruitment streams would require a tailored immigration system to cover the demand of health and social care workers. Considering the leading figures on the current British political landscape, it seems unclear whether such contrasting positions regarding immigration would allow for a system designed for the health and social care sector in the UK.

Another way to fill recruitment gaps might now be open with the Brexit referendum: the cut of the 48-hour limit as part of the European Working Time Directive (WTD). The 48-hour limit implies that staff cannot be forced to work more than 48 hours a week within a standard reference period of 17 weeks. But there are exceptions: if employees agree in writing, they can opt out of the 48-hour limit – some specialties are now calling for a more widespread use of the ‘opt-out’ option. The Royal College of Surgeons expressed its concerns about the ways in which WTD limit can impair the appropriate training of doctors (Weaver). While the Royal College of Surgeons sees the difficulties with the WTD, the Royal College of Physicians argued that overtime already has a negative impact on the quality of care in the NHS. The average doctor-in-training works an excess of 5 weeks a year, which has an impact on patient-safety and the poor staff morale (“Underfunded”). If the WTD dropout were used to raise working hours in general, the staff might be at risk of more stress related exhaustion. The WTD will be on the table after the Brexit. This may provide a chance for more flexibility but uniting the different positions will constitute a challenge between the different partners and their interests.

III. Reciprocal Healthcare

Related to the freedom of movement arrangements, the reciprocal healthcare act allows citizens of the EU and EEA to receive health and social care in any of the member nations. The care is provided under the same terms as local residents, while the cost is covered by the recipient’s home country. Numbers from 2014/2015 showed that the UK Department of Health paid out £674.4 million, around £500 million for the care of pensioners living outside the UK. Overall the department recovered £49.7 million from countries in the EEA receiving NHS treatment. Approximately 900,000 British citizens are resided in EU countries
outside the UK, the biggest proportion in Spain (309,000), over a third of whom are aged 65 years and over.

While approximately 900,000 British citizens living in EU member states, there are more than 3.57 million people living in the UK from the EEA. The countries with the largest numbers are Poland (1,002,000), Ireland (335,000), Romania (328,000), and Italy (233,000) (Hawkins). Considering these numbers, it seems remarkable that just £49.7 million are recovered by the reciprocal healthcare arrangement while £500 million are spent for the care of UK pensioners living abroad. Evidence suggests that the refunding under the reciprocal healthcare arrangements was neglected in the NHS; hospitals treated patients without charging them and/or bills had not been paid.

To address this imbalanced situation, the Department of Health has set a target to collect money for the treatment of overseas patients (EEA and outside): £500 million a year by 2017-18. Forecasts based on the amount collected at October 2016 predicted £346 million by 2017-18 (Office). Though this number is less than the goal, it can be considered a huge success following a new strategy implemented by the Department of Health. The strategy contained incentives for the trust staff to identify and charge overseas patients, as well as the implementation of clear role descriptions for the responsibilities in this procedure.
If British citizens would have to return to the UK for health and social care, there would be a significant impact on the NHS. At the same time, many EEA residents in the UK may have to return to their home country. Considering the real healthcare cost of overseas patients, as so far underestimated by numbers published before 2014, this may partly balance cost for the health and social care system in the UK. However, whether or not this exchange would be a good deal for the UK remains unclear. British pensioners in countries such as Spain and France have low incomes, and replacing their existing healthcare arrangements with private insurance might not be affordable. If they return the UK, they might be destitute as described by Prof McKee, Professor of European Public Health at the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine:

Many will come back in a state of poverty because they bought properties in Andalusia and other places. The massive glut in the market already will be exacerbated by all the British people leaving, so that property will be essentially worthless. They will be throwing themselves on the mercy of the state when they come back. (House of Commons 33)

Overall, 10.7 million British people can expect inadequate retirement incomes. A cancellation of the reciprocal healthcare arrangements may boost this tense situation and would also lead to major changes in the UK job market. Of a total of 3.57 million EU citizens in the UK, around 2.3 million are currently employed. Of these individuals and a total of 25.4% are employed in British households, most likely also providing social care for older family members (Hawkins).

Keeping the reciprocal healthcare arrangements in place would prevent the need to shift health care costs to the patients. Bilateral negotiations with EU countries, as required if a ‘Hard Brexit’ is the result, would leave patients in an uncertain position, probably keeping them away from timely and appropriate treatment. The statement made by David Davis, the leader of the Department for Exiting the European Union, who confirmed an agreement between the UK and the EU regarding the reciprocal healthcare arrangements, was clearly a source of relief, particularly for pensioners. Many EU citizens take their privilege of a European Health Insurance Card as naturally assigned, a system built on human rights, trust between the countries, and years of conceptual work. Given the relevance of health and social care, this aspect should remain a priority during the Brexit negotiation process. However, there is a substantial risk that this societal achievement is at risk on account of rising nationalism in the European Union.
Works Cited


Session III

Scotland, the UK and EU
Scotland and Europe: The End of the UK’s Other Union?

Mariot Leslie

Introductory Remarks

I am sorry that Professor James Mitchell could not be here today. His paper on sovereignty would no doubt have brought out how fragile and contested the British constitutional settlement is at present, not only between the nations within the UK’s plurinational union but also throughout the UK in terms of the principles, assumptions and conventions which underpin our democracy. The two most recent referenda in Scotland – on independence in 2014 and on the EU in 2016 – shone a searchlight on these deep-rooted political fractures. But, more than that, the referenda and the campaigns which preceded them were themselves political acts, with consequences. I shall concentrate on Scotland, Europe and Brexit. But let me very briefly recap what happened in Scotland in the two years before the Brexit vote.

The campaign for Scottish autonomy or independence goes back for decades. The most recent twist was the 2011 election to the Scottish Parliament in which the Scottish National Party won an overall majority on a manifesto which committed them to seeking an independence referendum. That referendum was held in 2014. In it, Scotland voted by 55% to 45% to remain in the United Kingdom. The result was unambiguous, but much closer than the British Government had assumed. Far from closing down the independence debate in Scotland, the referendum campaign gave it further impetus. Despite their being on the losing side, there was a surge in membership of the Scottish National Party immediately after the referendum, then an unprecedented landslide victory for them in the 2015 General Election to the British Parliament: 56 out of 59 Scottish seats. Since then the pro-independence vote has consolidated around the SNP and Scottish Green Party, with the SNP remaining by far the largest Scottish party in both the 2016 Scottish parliament elections and in this summer’s snap election to the British Parliament.

But anti-independence opinion has also consolidated in the last year, with the Scottish Conservative leader, Ruth Davidson, successfully presenting herself as the guarantor of unionism, thereby displacing Labour for the time being as the leading opposition party in Scotland. By the time of the Brexit vote in June 2016 there was a precarious stalemate on this question in Scotland, with neither the unionist
nor the nationalist cause able to command a decisively large majority in the opinion polls. In other words, Scotland has become a politically alert, divided country, with strong feelings on both sides. Independence versus remaining in the UK has become the prism through which all Scottish politics is now refracted.

You know what happened in the Brexit referendum last year. The United Kingdom as a whole voted to leave the EU by a majority of 52% to 48%. The highest Leave vote was in England. In Scotland, however, a solid 62% of voters voted to stay in the EU, with only 38% voting to leave. There was without exception a positive vote to remain in the EU in every single local authority area in Scotland from Shetland in the north to the English border in the south.

Why? Why should Scotland be so different from England and Wales in its positive attachment to the EU? And there’s a further apparent paradox. Elsewhere in Europe the rise of national parties tends to be associated with a populist rejection of globalisation and with scepticism about the EU. So how do you explain the reality that in Scotland nationalism and internationalism go hand in hand? I should like to argue that there are two main reasons for this, of which the lesser one is Scotland’s experience of history, and the larger one is Scotland’s current political culture.

Bear with me for a brief and very selective history lesson. Scotland is one of Europe’s oldest nations. It has been united within more or less its present borders since the early Middle Ages. As a maritime country, from its earliest days it had extensive contacts – both inward and outward – with other Europeans.

There were Scottish trading colonies in the Baltic, Black Sea, Mediterranean and deep into Poland and Russia. Dynastic royal marriages with Norway, Denmark and France. Settlements in Scotland of merchants from the Low Countries seeking wool for their textile manufactures and bringing with them new banking and commercial practices. Courtiers from France seeking leverage against the common neighbour to Scotland’s south, and bringing in their train Italian architects and painters and musicians.

There were exchanges of scholars and clerics between the great medieval abbeys and centres of learning in Scotland and elsewhere in Europe. Scotland’s four oldest universities were established by the 15th and 16th centuries with close ties to Bologna, Paris and later to Leiden. The Scots College at the Sorbonne was founded in 1335 and not disbanded until the French Revolution. The Pontifical Scots College in Rome was founded over 400 years ago and is still in operation today. The Reformation reinforced links with the Protestant communities in Switzerland, Germany and the Netherlands. Scottish mercenary soldiers fought for centuries in just about every skirmish in Europe – often on both sides, I’m afraid. Renaissance Scotland was relatively poor and relatively peripheral, but it was a country in the European mainstream.
Fast forward: in 1603 the English Queen died without a direct heir. Her relative, the King of Scotland, was invited to take over the throne of England. For over a century after that the two Kingdoms shared a common monarch but remained separate sovereign states. After a period of violent religious and political upheaval in both countries the Parliaments in London and Edinburgh approved a treaty which in 1707 united their two kingdoms into a single state, the United Kingdom of Great Britain, with a single Parliament in London. This Union brought new security to mainland Britain. It was the backdrop for the agrarian and industrial revolutions and the rise of a great trading empire which for a time made the UK a global superpower. At the height of the 19th century industrial revolution, lowland Scotland had moved from being one of Europe’s poorer regions to being one of the most capital-intensive and developed places in the world.

The Act of 1707 ratifying the treaty between Scotland and England remains one of the key written components of the UK’s Constitution today. But this new United Kingdom – and I’m coming to the point, now – was not and never has been homogenised by some Britannic version of the Code Napoléon. In 1707 Scotland was already a country with what historians recognise as characteristic attributes of a modern state. Its separate government and parliament disappeared. But Scotland kept, and still has today, anchored in the Act of Union, a separate civil and criminal legal system based on Roman Law, separate law courts, a separate established national religion, separate local government, and a separate education system. It also retained, and has added to since, many civic or private institutions set up on distinctive national lines, including a flourishing press and publishing industry.

As the domestic functions of government increased in the 19th and 20th centuries, separate administrative arrangements were made for Scotland, with the Westminster Parliament passing laws which applied only in Scotland and were implemented by a Scottish Secretary of State with his own budget and civil servants. When a Scottish Parliament and elected government were re-established in 1999 they did not start with a blank sheet of paper. They inherited mature institutions, experienced staff – and a nation whose identity is coloured by a long sense of distinct history.

That Scottish identity does not have at its core disdain for other Europeans. I was struck by a wise remark of Federica Mogherini’s when she introduced the EU’s Global Foreign and Security Strategy last year. She said that Europe has two sorts of countries: small countries which know that they must work with each other to cope with the big global challenges, and countries which do not yet realise that they are too small to deal with them on their own. Scots know they come from a small country: other Europeans throughout our history have been a stimulus and a resource, and potential allies rather than rivals for power.
Since the UK joined the European Communities in 1973, Scotland’s experience has been positive. In the 1970s and 80s, EU Structural Funds made a real difference to communities in our remote rural areas or in towns which had been suffering from the decline in heavy industry. And Scots knew where the money had come from. Scottish Ministers (unlike their Eurosceptic counterparts in some other parts of the UK) complied with the Commission’s requirement that EU projects bear the EU flag. Individuals and institutions took up with enthusiasm opportunities offered by other European programmes. Scotland today, for instance, accounts for a disproportionately large share of the UK’s participation in Erasmus student exchanges; and Scottish institutes are disproportionately involved in Horizon 2020 joint research projects.

So am I claiming that the strikingly different result in the Brexit referendum in Scotland can all be explained by Scotland’s distant and enduring history as a European-minded nation? No; though I do think that the mental image which Scots have of their own history has a bearing on the question.

Nor do I believe that any collection of people who happen to make up a nation can somehow by their nature be better than others – more open to pooling and sharing, to welcoming strangers, or to compromising for the common good. There are no genes for liberal internationalism; no inherited gene for virtue or wisdom. These qualities are perishable and have to be worked at afresh in every generation, as I fear we are finding out across the Western world. So I make no claims for Scottish exceptionalism.

The main reason for the overwhelming Scottish vote to remain in the EU lies, I suggest, in Scotland’s current political culture and circumstances. We have a relatively young Parliament in Edinburgh where party differences are sharp but the tone of debate is serious-minded and mostly avoids personal abuse. In contrast to the instability in Westminster in recent months, Scottish political leaders are secure and their parties are, on the whole, cohesive. The First Minister leads a stable minority government and enjoys high public approval ratings. The next Scottish Parliamentary elections are not due before 2021. Extremist views on the far left and far right exist in Scotland as they do elsewhere in Britain and Europe, but they have failed to make any breakthrough into mainstream politics. The anti-EU UK Independence Party is perceived in Scotland to be an English nationalist party, and struggles to get a hearing among the social groups to which it appeals in England. None of the main political parties in Scotland has leaders who tolerate or condone the sort of socially-divisive language which disfigured the US Presidential elections or the Brexit debate in England. Individuals who behave like this are publicly disowned. The leading proponents of Scottish independence – the Scottish National Party and the Scottish Green Party – make it very clear that the nationalism which they represent is a civic, social-democratic project belonging
in the moderate centre-left of European politics. They unambiguously reject any ethnic basis for Scottish nationalism and advocate a vision of an open Scotland, explicitly attached to European values, which welcomes European immigration and wants to find multilateral solutions to common global problems in solidarity with other nations. The leader of the Scottish Conservative Party, Ruth Davidson, was for her part a vocal advocate for remaining in the EU in the UK-wide campaign before the Brexit referendum.

Against this background, all five of the parties in the Scottish Parliament campaigned for the UK to remain in the EU. At the start of the referendum campaign, all five leaders appeared together on the same platform to underline their unity on this issue. The Eurosceptic right-wing British press toned down the anti-EU rhetoric on the pages of their Scottish editions, and above all cut out most of their anti-immigrant stories in a country where the issue has much less salience than in England. The Scottish electorate has become rather weary of elections and referenda but remains politically alert and engaged. People took their cue from whichever party they supported and voted massively to stay in the EU.

The day after the referendum, it seemed that the Scottish First Minister, Nicola Sturgeon, was the only one who had had a plan for dealing with a Leave vote. She stood sombrely in front of the Scottish and EU flags. Her first words were to EU citizens living and working in Scotland: you remain welcome here; this is your home and your contribution is valued. She acknowledged that the majority of the UK had voted to leave the EU but warned that the strength of the Remain vote in Scotland had to have political consequences. She recalled the terms of the manifesto on which her SNP government had campaigned for re-election earlier that year: that the Scottish Parliament should have the right to hold another independence referendum if there was a significant and material change in circumstances, such as Scotland being taken out the EU against its will. She committed herself to seeking ways to keep Scotland as close as possible to Europe, and announced a series of initial consultations, including in London and Brussels, and other measures to steady the impact of the Brexit vote on business confidence. And she announced that she would introduce legislation in the Scottish Parliament to leave open the option of another independence referendum if the Parliament should eventually judge that it was the best or only way to protect Scotland’s place in Europe.

This speech had a significant impact outside Scotland. One of Theresa May’s first acts on becoming Prime Minister was to visit Scotland and assure Nicola Sturgeon that Scotland and the UK’s other devolved governments would be fully involved in developing a UK-wide approach to Brexit.

So what has happened in the 18 months since the Brexit vote?

It has become increasingly clear that Brexit will have a particularly severe impact in Scotland. There are demographic reasons for this: Scotland’s population is aging
faster than the British average and its economically active population is declining. Unlike the UK as a whole it is entirely dependent on net immigration for any increase in its working age population. Citizens from other EEA countries already account for about 5% of the Scottish workforce, and much more than that in key sectors including public services, health, food and agriculture, financial services and tourism. Loss of European free movement would have a devastating effect.

Then there are geographic reasons why Scotland will be hard-hit. It has about one third of Great Britain’s land mass but less than 9% of the UK’s population. Support from the EU’s CAP and Structural Funds has been critical to sustaining the farming, rural and coastal communities which shape so much of Scotland’s character. There is little prospect of an equivalent level of financial support after Brexit. And there are structural reasons why Brexit will hit Scotland particularly hard. Its universities, academic research, the digital and bio-tech industries, and the creative industries and arts all play major and prominent roles in Scotland’s economic and social life. All are deeply integrated with the rest of Europe through both people and projects, including the Erasmus and research programmes.

In December 2016 the Scottish Government published a policy document setting out its approach to Brexit (SG, “Scotland’s Place”). Nicola Sturgeon made clear her own preference for Scotland to become independent and join the EU in its own right, but nonetheless presented the paper as an attempt in good faith to find common ground with the UK Government on a solution which would protect Scotland’s place in the European Single Market while remaining within the UK. The paper had three main elements:

1. a call for the UK as a whole to remain in the Single Market and Customs Union through membership of the EEA;
2. failing that, a request for a “differentiated” solution whereby Scotland could remain in the Single Market even if other parts of the UK left the EEA;
3. and a request for significant new powers to be devolved to the Scottish Parliament and Government in order to mitigate the effects of Brexit and allow continuing compliance with EU regulations.

Having been on the Standing Council of experts which advised the First Minister on this paper, I believe that Nicola Sturgeon was and is sincere in this attempt to find a compromise which would acknowledge the Brexit vote, minimise the damage which it would cause, and avoid piling a further massive disruption – the break-up of the United Kingdom – simultaneously on top of the massive task of managing the UK’s exit from the EU.

The Scottish Single Market proposals received strong support from the Welsh Government, which subsequently made similar proposals of its own. Both papers
were formally remitted to the Joint Ministerial Committee which brings together the leaders of the British, Scots, Welsh and Northern Irish governments to discuss issues affecting their respective responsibilities. Theresa May had undertaken that there would be regular ministerial meetings in this format to involve the so-called devolved administrations in shaping the United Kingdom’s approach to Brexit. However, the Scottish and Welsh proposals were dismissed without substantive discussion either bilaterally or in the Joint Ministerial Committee. Meanwhile the collapse of the coalition government in Northern Ireland meant that Northern Irish views were obscured.

By March 2017 relations between the Scottish and British Governments were at a low ebb, personally and politically. On 28 March the Scottish Parliament passed a motion mandating the Scottish Government to seek from the British Government and Parliament new enabling legislation for a referendum on independence, citing Brexit as its motive (“Minutes”). The following day the British Prime Minister’s letter triggering the Article 50 withdrawal process was despatched to Brussels. She told Nicola Sturgeon that “Now was not the time” to pursue constitutional change. A couple of weeks later, she announced that there would be a General Election to the Westminster Parliament on 8 June. Since then, Theresa May has made a series of announcements about her Government’s approach to Brexit – no Freedom of Movement, no jurisdiction for the Court of Justice of the EU, no remaining in the Single Market or Customs Union, a free trade agreement, an implementation period – without consulting the Scottish or Welsh Governments, nor indeed giving them much if any advance warning. No Ministerial meetings of the Joint Committee took place at all between February 2017 and October 2017 despite insistent requests from the Scottish and Welsh Governments.

You will know in broad terms where the Brexit process now stands. EU member states – the EU 27 – have held together and given the Commission’s negotiator, Michel Barnier, clear guidelines. We will all know next week whether they judge that sufficient progress has been made on settling the main issues arising from the UK’s withdrawal, so that talks can be started on the framework for its future relationship with the EU. There are rumours that agreement is close on the principles for dealing with Britain’s financial obligations and the status of EU citizens, but that there remains a wide gap over future arrangements for Northern Ireland.

This autumn an EU (Withdrawal) Bill was introduced in the British Parliament. Its main purpose is to provide continuity and legal certainty by carrying current EU law over into British domestic law with a view to its being kept, amended or repealed after the UK has left. There are many aspects of this Bill which are constitutionally controversial. Its clauses on devolution, in particular, have the potential to trigger a constitutional crisis between London, Edinburgh and Cardiff. As it stands, the Bill would reverse aspects of the devolution settlement for Scotland
and Wales by allowing the British Government and Parliament to take much more restrictive control than the EU institutions have at present over the Scottish and Welsh Governments’ powers to act in devolved areas of policy such as agriculture or the environment. The Welsh Government is furious. So are most of the parties in Scotland. At present there is no prospect of the Scottish Parliament’s passing the Legislative Consent Motion which would normally be required before this EU (Withdrawal) Bill can become law. There has never been a stand-off of this sort since the Scottish Parliament was created.

Meanwhile, as you will know, Brexit has proved a deeply divisive issue in Britain as a whole. Bitter divisions within Theresa May’s Cabinet and Party appear to have paralysed the British Government, to the astonishment and growing irritation of our EU partners. The pound has fallen sharply, official forecasts of British growth and tax revenue have been revised downwards, inflation is increasing, and businesses and other organisations are demanding clarity so that they can plan ahead. EU citizens are beginning to vote with their feet: labour shortages are already appearing in key sectors. And all that was before this week’s debacle over Northern Ireland.

So does this mean that a pro-European Scotland is on the brink of demanding independence and rejoining the EU?

Well, my own view is that Scotland will indeed become independent and join or rejoin the EU quite soon. But, like everything else in British political life at the moment, the timing and route to that outcome are completely unclear.

So far Brexit has not produced any significant or sustained shift in overall support for independence – contrary to the hopes of the SNP and the Greens. The General Election in June 2017 was a disappointment to them. In stark contrast to what happened to the Conservative Party in England, the Scottish Conservatives gained both voting share and Westminster Parliamentary seats, mostly at the SNP’s expense. I read this, however, as a consolidation of unionists and nationalists into two entrenched camps, rather than a shift between them. Opinion polls continue to suggest that the Scottish electorate remains divided roughly half and half on the independence question, with the gap tending to narrow. A poll a few days ago, for instance, showed support for independence going up to 47% and support for the Union dropping to 53%, with a majority for independence as high as 60% among people under the age of 40. However, after the June 2017 election results Nicola Sturgeon put the demand for another independence referendum on the back burner to allow a period of reflection until the nature of the terms for Britain’s exit from the EU become clearer (SG, “EU negotiations”).

I said earlier that all issues in Scottish politics are now refracted through the prism of nationalism versus unionism. That is also true of Brexit. However the relationship between leaving the EU and leaving the UK cuts across habitual po-
Political loyalties and creates dilemmas and paradoxes for individual Scottish voters and for party leaders on both sides of the unionist/nationalist divide. In the 2014 independence referendum, as a crude generalisation, support for Scotland staying in the UK tended to come from older people, and from people in prosperous communities. There was a majority for independence among the young, and in more deprived areas. Yet in the EU referendum it was the young, the more prosperous and the better educated who opted to stay in the EU, while the Brexit vote in Scotland tended to come from older people and disadvantaged areas. The nationalist parties and the unionist parties now all have among their normal supporters substantial groups who do and groups who do not wish to remain in the EU. Meanwhile the manner in which the British Government is handling the aftermath of the Brexit vote is causing dismay even among those who normally support the Conservatives or those who do not feel strongly about the EU.

The Brexit vote appears to make it impossible to remain both in the UK and in the EU, so at some stage Scottish voters are likely to have to decide which is their higher priority. There is some polling evidence that attitudes towards the EU have caused small numbers of people to switch sides – in both directions – in their attitudes to the union with the UK. But most voters are sitting on the fence and waiting to see what the final Brexit deal looks like, and there is no reliable evidence about the things which will eventually drive their decisions.

So I shall conclude, tantalisingly, there, and leave you with an analogy rather than a prediction. The forces of unionism and nationalism in Scotland seem to me like two huge boulders which have rolled down a mountainside and become lodged against each other. Neither at present has the momentum to make the other one move out of the way, so they rest, precarious but immobile. But the mountainside on which they rest is itself unstable, and the next flood or landslide will set them in motion again. That unstable environment is British politics and Brexit. It is not only in Brussels that the United Kingdom has lost its credibility and power to command respect. It hasn’t happened yet, but I expect the consequences of the Brexit process as it unfolds to provide the external impetus which finally breaks Scotland away from its union with London.

Works Cited

Mariot Leslie

“EU Referendum Result Press Conference at Bute House.” YouTube, uploaded by First Min-


---. “EU negotiations and Scotland’s future: First Minister’s speech.” 27 June 2017,
https://beta.gov.scot/publications/eu-negotiations-and-scotlands-future-first-minis-

The Scottish Parliament. “Minutes of Proceedings: Parliamentary Year 1, No. 90, Session
Session IV

Brexit and the Media
The Personal, the Political and Populism: Why Brits Voted to Leave the EU. And Why Others May Follow

Henrik Müller

I. Introduction

Why a majority of the British electorate voted to leave the European Union on 23 June 2016 is still a mystery in many aspects. It should not have happened. Hardly anybody expected it to happen. Yet, it did happen. Days before the referendum, markets – betting markets, bond markets, foreign exchange markets – were calmly expecting the British to do the obvious thing: vote Remain. For all the travails of the EU and all the anti-EU discontent in the United Kingdom, that had been simmering for many years, the road to “independence” was all but unclear. The risks involved were considerable, and possibly huge. Still, a majority of voters was willing to take them.

The ongoing debate on what caused this outcome has focused on a broad range of issues, as this conference volume impressively shows. Social, economic, and cultural factors have been cited as well as the role of certain types of media, particularly aggressive British tabloids (e.g. Cross; Barnett). This contribution aims at putting the Brexit decision in perspective by highlighting the implications of structural changes that have shaken up public spheres in Western democracies. The conditions that led to the Leave outcome prevail elsewhere too.

Theorists of democracy assume that people make some kind of rational choice, on average, at least. Individuals are deemed to vote for what’s in their own and their societies best self-interest. Most of all, they strive to avoid risks and, even more so, they’re supposed to shy away from genuine uncertainty, i.e. from situations whose consequences they cannot gauge at all.

In light of these considerations, weighing the odds of Brexit should have been an easy exercise. Access to the common market provides cheap, abundant, and diverse imports while securing jobs in industries ranging from high-tech to tourism to financial markets. London, Europe’s financial capital which has profited enormously from marketing its services throughout the EU and from corresponding foreign investments, should keep its ties with the continent. In terms of interna-

---

1 Risk, in this context, describes a future state of the world that can be predicted with some probability, while uncertainty implies that no such predictions can be made (Knight).
tional politics, the EU, for all its shortcomings, provides institutional stability as well as leverage in international negotiations, ranging from trade to financial regulation to affairs of internal and external security.

In contrast, a Britain outside the EU would enter a new era of high uncertainty, potentially diminishing its political cloud and hurting its prosperity. At the same time, it would risk the integrity of its own union with Scotland where a pro-Europe majority threatened to strive for independence from England and for re-joining the EU. So why vote for Brexit? To convert British contributions to the EU budget to the National Health Service, allegedly £350 million week, a figure put forward by the Leave campaign (Henley), but rejected by government officials? To reduce immigration, even though parts of the British economy rely on foreign labourers? To defeat the “fear-mongers”?

From a strictly rational perspective, the answer to the question ‘Should we stay or should we go?’ clearly should have been: stay. Still, Brits decided differently. But why?

This paper stresses the significance of contemporary media landscapes and their interplay with politics. As Mazzoleni (2003) observes, populism cannot thrive without some degree of “media complicity”.

Section 2 provides some empirical evidence on the public mood in Britain and in other European countries on the eve of the referendum. Section 3 shows to what extent new technologies have altered media markets as well as political markets. Competition for attention has become fierce and fast, a feature populist politics are set to exploit.

The transformation of British politics after the referendum, with both major parties drifting to positions that used to be rather extremist ones, confirms the severity of these structural changes; meanwhile, the economic consequences of the coming Brexit are beginning to be felt, as section 4 highlights. Section 5, finally, draws some conclusions.

II. I’m doing well, but ... – Narratives vs. Facts

A standard explanation for the discontent with globalisation in general, and with the EU in the UK in particular, is that economic integration has led to a divergence of incomes. One study shows that vast parts of the population have experienced flat or falling market incomes in the decade after 2005 (MGI). According to these findings, 70% of UK citizens belonged to groups of households that were subject to income stagnation or deterioration; a high percentage, though some of these market-induced tendencies have been diminished by government transfers and progressive tax regimes. Still, if only a small fraction of people profits from
international or European integration, the argument goes, while a substantial majority loses out, the openness of societies and economies may not be sustainable in the long run.

While such long-term trends may certainly not be dismissed entirely, a closer look at survey data raises some doubts regarding the erosion-of-income-argument. A few weeks before the referendum took place, the Eurobarometer (2016), a biannual survey conducted for the European Commission, asked EU citizens a set of standard questions, among them the simple item whether they were satisfied with their lives in general. The red bars in Figure 1 show the net-results. Net-life satisfaction in all the countries depicted is positive, the UK, with a net-value of 88%, is scoring one of the best results. Thus, at first sight, Brits do not appear to be a globalisation-weary, materially deprived people. These findings are confirmed by another question in the survey, namely on the financial situation of the respective household, that 82% of Brits describe as “rather good” or “very good” (Figure 2).

These results stand in stark contrast with the answers concerning the overall state of nations and of the EU as a whole. Majorities of citizens in most of the countries depicted in Figure 1 felt that their respective country was “on the wrong track”, with figures for the EU being even greater.

Figure 1: Net optimism (personal life satisfaction, nation on the right track, EU on the right track – positive minus negative answers; Data: Eurobarometer, May 2016)
What to make of these findings? Obviously, there are striking differences between individual experience and the perception of the state of the nation or of the EU. While individuals are able to judge their own well-being, and their friends’, families’, or neighbours’, from first-hand experiences, they cannot verify how their country, economy, or society is doing by themselves. These are abstract concepts that are built on statistics, national accounts, and social narratives, primarily spread by the media (Müller, “Funktion”). These narratives are often biased towards negative sentiments, as media tend to focus on problems and nuisances.

As the survey data show, the disconnect between personal experience and political perception is not confined to the UK. At the eve of the Brexit vote, Britain was by no means the most pessimistic EU country. Had similar referendums been held elsewhere, it is not far-fetched to assume that the possibility of other nations voting to leave the Union as well would have been non-negligible. Where similar conditions prevail, consequences may be similar, too. The next section is going to look into these conditions in more detail.

Figure 2: Financial situation of households (answers “rather good”, “very good”, per cent of respondents; Data: Eurobarometer, May 2016)
III. Populism & Super-Democratism – New Media Landscapes and the Spiral of Noise

When personal experience and political perception collide, as the survey data presented in section 2 show, populist narratives may play a role. “Support for populism appears foremost as a consequence of a very negative view of the evolution of society – declinism – and of the feeling belonging to a group of people that is unfairly treated by society,” Elchardus and Spruyt found with regard to Flemish populism (11). It’s not necessarily withering standards of living that cause populism to flourish, but the perception that society is on the wrong track. As noted above, political systems and media landscapes have undergone profound structural changes that shape collective decision making and help explain political outcomes such as the Brexit vote. Particularly, two trends can be traced back to these developments that are present throughout Western democracies: the rise of populist politics and negative sentiments towards globalisation and Europeanization.

Following Stanley, populism can be described as a “thin ideology”. Typically, populism is not underpinned by comprehensive theories, but generally embraces some set of shallow beliefs that come in different varieties, from hard-left to far-right, that share a certain style with four common characteristics (Müller, “Populism”):

1. simplification (offering simple answers to complicated problems);
2. virtual collectivization (the construction of a grand “we” of the common people);
3. the construction of archenemies (there is always some antagonistic group of the common people, whether it are “the elites”, minorities or another nations);
4. negativism and dramatization (populist narratives are built to raise attention).

These characteristics work quite well in modern media landscapes. Populists are making an intriguing offer: simple causes, simple cures – and there is always someone to blame.

Attention-rousing simplistic, negativistic narratives, that focus on (real or imagined) problems and offer seemingly straightforward explanations and remedies, have become commonplace in political communication. Brexiteers, for instance, were able to convince voters they would be better off if Britain would only be able to “take back control” by leaving the EU and to limit immigration; in a similar vein, Donald Trump claimed that “American carnage” could be reversed simply by protecting the US from foreign immigrants and imports – by building a wall at the Mexican border and by introducing tariffs on imported goods, respectively.
One may ask why ever better educated citizens\(^2\) are willing to put up with these obviously insufficient explanations and policy proposals. Why are so many people willing to support highly risky policy choices put forward by populists? One answer lies in the nature of modern politics. Due to globalisation and digitisation, many issues have manifold causes and implications. Understanding what is going on, what is at stake, and what to do about it has become a cumbersome undertaking. In other words, staying informed is costlier today than it used to be (Müller, “Populism”).

What has changed in recent years is not only that the complexity of political issues has greatly increased, a feature that populist style exploits by radically reducing complexity, it is also the number of communication channels in society that has multiplied, with online and social media adding to traditional media, which, in turn, has greatly increased competition for the audience’s attention. In sum, the amount of information that citizens need to process to stay informed about the most important policy areas has greatly increased.

One obvious way of coping with this situation is the classic notion of *rational ignorance* (Downs), i.e. people use information according to cost benefit calculus. Since it is costly to gather and process information, knowing everything would be irrational. Rather, they make rational choices about their intake of information. They willingly remain partly ignorant.

In a social context, the effects of rational ignorance may be mitigated if there is some kind of division of labour concerning the spread and use of information. Models in communication studies hold that information spreads from the well-informed to the less-informed in cascades; people follow elites whose social status is partly derived from their consumption of sophisticated elite media. By relying on these elites, the rationally ignorant can afford to economize on information.

These hierarchical structures, though, are long gone. Modern media systems with their various transmission channels, including user-generated content spreading social media, have changed the nature of information flows; they don’t resemble cascades anymore but rather torrents with occasional swirls and maelstroms. An overall loss of trust in elites and institutions has been observed throughout Western democracies for many years. Confronted with vast amounts of real news and fake news, with evidence-based commentary and opinionated viewpoints, people end up distrusting virtually everybody but people similar to themselves. Majorities in Western countries claim that they have trouble telling fake news from real news (Edelman 2018). These developments cause echo chambers effects (Sunstein 2017) where like-minded people stick together in digital fora reinforc-

---

\(^1\) 80% of citizens in OECD countries now completed upper secondary level education; 28% even hold a university degree (OECD 2016).
ing each other’s beliefs rather than having them confronted by dissenting points of view, or having them corrected by facts and scientific evidence.

As a result, parts of the electorate rely on, what I call, thin knowledge, to the effect that populists have been able to gain a competitive edge. Thin knowledge implies that voters take political decisions based on little information. As Hirshleifer (1993) shows, people with little relevant information take a particular decision (i.e. buying a particular product or asset, voting for or against someone or something) based on their observations of the decisions taken by others who seemingly have more information on the particular issue. For instance, if consumers see people queuing in front of a store, passers-by might assume that those standing in line know about some attractive offer inside. Some may deem it worthwhile to join the queue. But this may prove to be the wrong decision; it is very well possible that the people in the first rows of the queue have very little additional information. In such a setting, many people may end up following the wrong beliefs (in the example, that something attractive can be bought inside the store). In markets, this effect induces herd behaviour, helping to explain fads or financial market bubbles. In politics, the prevalence of thin knowledge tends to lead to surprise outcomes; if people’s convictions are based on very little information concerning a particular subject, say Brexit, their position and voting behaviour is likely to be influences by the observable decisions taken by other people. For instance, if you see many people following anti-Brexit hashtags on Twitter you may join the crowd, particularly if there are people among those followers whom you know and trust. You cannot be sure that they are really better informed than you are. But who knows?

Thin knowledge and herd behaviour tend to produce unstable equilibria. Under these conditions, the occurrence of tiny bits of additional information has the power to shift the direction of entire crowds quickly. Undecided voters may take last-minute decisions that pollsters did not expect. Hard facts information may be trumped by seemingly convincing narratives that are not firmly rooted in facts. In the end, political decisions tend to be taken without sufficiently grasping the consequences. Brexit is a case in point. During the campaign, lies and half-truths prevailed even though they were publicly corrected, only to prompt one prominent Brexiteer, former Justice Secretary Michael Gove, to quip that “people in this country have had enough of experts” (Mance).

Changing media systems have brought considerable change to political systems. Unstable equilibria in politics have become the biggest factor of uncertainty for the economy. While financial market-driven “super-capitalism” (Reich 2007) was deemed to be the biggest factor destabilising societies, super-democratism now seems to have taken that role, with the Brexit vote and the election of US president Trump being prominent examples. At the heart of these changes is a feature of modern democracies that has attracted little attention so far: Traditional positions
of power have become contestable; barriers to market entry have been lowered; new players can enter the arena quickly and cheaply. What may sound as an all-good development is associated with serious downsides.

Consider the set-up of Western democracies since the 1950s: Oligopolies, or monopolistic competition, prevailed in politics (major parties, trade unions, major churches, employers’ associations etc.) as well as in the media (major broadcasting networks, elite newspapers, magazines). Public spheres were structured by elites in charge of these institutions. In politics and in the media, competition was limited to a more or less fixed set of players and institutions who competed by displaying first and foremost credibility. In both realms, the pretence of competence was of the essence. Accordingly, personal demeanour had to be serious and composed. Gaining the public’s attention was not a prime objective, since the number of media outlets and channels was limited. Competition for eyeballs and for recipients’ limited time was not yet fierce.

All this has changed dramatically. The internet, and social media in particular, have lowered barriers to entry. The amount of attention-demanding media content has exploded, most of it being some kind of entertainment or soft-news, to the effect that the costly and cumbersome consumption of hard-news is under pressure. To gain public attention swiftness, loudness and negativity have become prerequisites. Breaking taboos by making outrages claims can serve as an effective strategy but have to be ever more outrages if they are to kick-off the next round of attention, resulting in a spiral of noise (Müller, “Populism”) where rudeness and wrongness prevail.

In a social media-free world, the formation and effectiveness of the Brexit campaign would have been hardly imaginable. There might have been a number of tabloids supporting the Brexiteers’ causes. But traditional broadsheet papers and broadcasters could have been expected to channel the debate in ways that no highly risky outcome would result in. In times of super-democratism, though, negativity tops balanced reporting. In social media, topics tend to raise big-time attention only if and when they are negatively framed. Persistence of a certain framing over time is common; once a certain spin has emerged, it is there to stay due to follower and hashtag structures that create asymmetries of influence. Traditional journalism tends to follow trending topics and frames on social media, albeit with a time lag (Nordheim et al.). Instead of countering citizens’ herd behaviour, as described above, journalism is tempted to reinforce it; following the crowd can be interpreted as a profit maximizing strategy; costs of producing another story along the lines of the trending topic is associated with low production costs and high degrees of attention (and revenues).

Figure 3 shows the overall mood in Brexit-related tweets on Twitter; values above zero imply that a majority of tweets is pro-Brexit; values below zero imply
mean sentiment tends towards the Remain position. Before the summer of 2015, the overall mood in the Twitter sphere was rather balanced. It is noteworthy that during this period, the number of tweets was rather small. All this changed in the summer of 2015 when the refugee crisis shook Europe. An, at times, uncontrollable influx of people via the Balkans route to central and northern European countries, such as Austria, Germany, and Sweden constitutes a key event providing the Leave campaign with a powerful anti-openness narrative that helped it gain traction among the electorate. Correspondingly, the number of tweets increased rapidly. Due to persistence effects, mean sentiment stayed in positive (i.e. pro-Leave) territory all the way to the referendum in June 2016 (Müller and Porcaro 2016).

IV. So, how are you doing today? – Facing Brexit Realities

At the time of writing, one and a half years after the Brexit referendum, polls show that little has changed since in public’s mood; the Remain and the Leave camp have about equal numbers of supporters. While the outcome of the exit negotiations between Britain and Brussels is still unclear, the associated costs remain highly uncertain, as is the burden to be borne by ordinary citizens. The Eurobarometer survey conducted a year after the referendum shows that overall sentiment is much the same as it was on the eve of the vote (section 2); net personal life satisfaction remains high at 84%, majorities still believe that the UK and the EU are “on the
wrong track” (Eurobarometer 2017). For the time being, Brits remain pretty satisfied with their personal lives, but are still rather gloomy for their country and the EU. The effects of Brexit are not being felt – yet.

Looking forward, this is bound to change. The prospect of exiting the EU has affected foreign exchange markets with Sterling trading substantially below pre-referendum levels. The depreciation may help exporters in the short to medium term, but it is already taking its toll on consumer prices and standards of living.

The OECD forecasts:

Economic growth will continue to weaken in 2018 and 2019 [...] with private consumption [...] to remain subdued as higher inflation, pushed up by the past depreciation of sterling, holds back household purchasing power. [...] The unemployment rate is at a record low, but with slower growth this is unlikely to persist. [...] High consumer debt growth, coupled with stagnant household incomes, is a major financial stability risk. (Outlook 2017)

Whether the forecasted deterioration of economic and social conditions, together with the already present political turmoil in domestic politics, is bound to change public sentiment, remains an open question. As can be observed elsewhere, the side-effects and consequences of populist politics may be attributed not to the very policies that caused them in the first place, but to perceived adversaries (Müller, “Populism”). The pro-Brexit camp could, for instance, blame the tough stance of
the EU 27 and the Brussels bureaucracy during the negotiations for any hardship that may result from leaving the EU. Given the properties of super-democratism, a hardening of public opinion towards the EU would hardly be surprising.

V. Conclusions

This contribution set out to seek explanations for the seemingly irrational decision of British voters to leave the EU in the referendum of June 2016. It focussed on the structural changes that have shaken up media spheres and political structures in recent years. Long-held positions of concentrated power in media systems as well as in politics have been put under intensive competitive pressure. Digital communication technologies have lowered barriers to entry considerably. Both, politics and the media market, have become contestable. Being open to new entrants has led to intense competition for attention in both realms, an exercise in which populists particularly excel. Formerly stable structures have become fluid. Political systems are now prone to rapid swings in public opinion that may result in surprising and erratic outcomes.

Therefore, the Brexit vote can be understood as a result of super-democratism, a system where virtually everyone can voice her or his opinions in public, but which lacks safeguards that are able to protect the system against harmful polarisations. No democratic country with freedom of speech and a free press is immune from developments akin to the ones that have occurred in Britain. The debate about how to protect public spheres and politics, for instance by regulating the likes of Facebook, Google and Twitter in similar ways the press is regulated by laws, has only just begun.

Works Cited


Henrik Müller


Knight, Frank. Risk, Uncertainty and Profit. The Riverside Press, 1921.


Why Brits Voted to Leave the EU. And Why Others May Follow


Harvesting Your Soul? Cambridge Analytica and Brexit

LINDA RISSO

In December 2016, Das Magazin credited an obscure election management firm that had been involved in Donald Trump’s campaign with having “turned the world upside down” (Grassegger and Krogerus, “Bombe”). The article was translated by Vice and shared more than 350,000 times in a short period of time (Grassegger and Krogerus, “Data”). The company, Cambridge Analytica, allegedly used sophisticated psychological tools to manipulate voters and swing the electoral result. It also emerged that the same company had worked with the Leave group on the Brexit campaign. Conspiracy theories spread like wild fire and boosted the myth of the firm’s unlimited power to control our lives. One commentator called it a “weaponised AI propaganda machine” (Anderson).

Rather than shrinking away from the controversy, Cambridge Analytica rode the wave and ripped the benefits of what was in fact a free promotional campaign. The company fed the reputation of its own alleged immense power by mixing reticence about disclosing its methods with hints about its detailed knowledge of our most intimate fears and desires.1

This article investigates Cambridge Analytica’s involvement in the Brexit referendum by examining how psychographic profiling works and what role the firm played in the referendum campaign. It is important to note that at the time of writing, several investigations and inquiries are underway in the UK and in the US. More up-to-date information will therefore become available in the near future.

I. “Psychographic” Profiling and Behavioural Micro-Targeting

By its own definition, Cambridge Analytica is a “global election management agency” that “uses data to change audience behaviour” because “by knowing your electorate better, we achieve greater influence while lowering overall costs”.2 Cambridge Analytica specialises in “psychographic” profiling. In simple words, it uses

1 The best example is provided by Alexander Nix’s presentation at the 2016 Concordia Annual Summit in New York; see “The Power of Big Data and Psychographics” on YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n8Dd5aVXLCc. Accessed on 1 February 2018.

2 Cambridge Analytica’s website: https://cambridgeanalytica.org/.

data collected online to create personality profiles of voters. The information is then used to target voters with individually tailored content, which is adjusted in real time to reflect the debate that develops around critical electoral issues.

Data mining and profiling are widespread practices in the fields of marketing, research and development, and political communication. Data brokers routinely collect data about individuals (gender, age, race, occupation, browsing history, location data, friends and family connections, etc.). This data allows companies to develop detailed psychological profiles of their target audience, may they be customers, internet users or voters. Most crucially, thanks to sophisticated algorithms, companies can infer additional information about the users (what they are going to buy next, the chances of them being conservative, their current emotional state, etc.). The more data points a company has, the higher the predictive power of its algorithms. Cambridge Analytica markets itself as unique and innovative because it combines what is alleged to be the largest collection of data points in the world with incredibly accurate psychometric profiles of users.

Psychometrics, sometimes also called psychographics, focuses on measuring psychological traits through the so-called “Big Five”: openness, conscientiousness, extroversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism (also known as the OCEAN scores). Based on these dimensions, researchers can make a relatively accurate assessment of the kind of users they study. Psychometrics has been in use since the 1980s. For a long time, however, the key problem that prevented large-scale studies was data collection. Psychometrics involved filling in detailed, highly personal questionnaires.

Social media has opened radically new possibilities. It allows data miners to collect an unprecedented number of data points about users. It is not only a matter of quantity but also of quality. Each user’s action is recorded: how often they check their social media feeds, every click on a ‘Like’ or ‘Favourite’ button, every comment they read and write, how many seconds they spend on a post, etc. This means not only that the number of data points increases exponentially each day but also that the data is updated in real-time. Companies can measure individual responses to the news and adjust the adverts and notifications users are exposed to instantly.

The article published in Das Magazin credited Michal Kosinski and David Stillwell for developing the model at the basis of Cambridge Analytica’s work. As part of their doctoral research at the Psychometrics Centre at the University of Cambridge, Kosinski and Stillwell developed a small application, MyPersonality app, to enable users to fill out different psychometric questionnaires. Based on the evaluation, users received a “personality profile” and could opt-in to share their Facebook profile data with the researchers. The app became very popular and before long hundreds of thousands of people revealed their innermost convictions (Grassegger and Krogerus, “Bombe”).

76
Kosinski and Stillwell suddenly owned the largest psychometric scores dataset in the world. They developed algorithms to link the subjects’ Facebook likes with users’ OCEAN scores to combine social psychology with data analytics on a massive scale. While each piece of such information is too weak to produce a reliable prediction, when hundreds of data points are combined, the resulting predictions become accurate. This is called “psychographic” profiling.

The strength of the modelling is measured by how well it can predict a subject’s answers. In 2013, Kosinski and Stillwell demonstrated that Facebook ‘likes’ successfully predicted whether someone voted Democrat or Republican 85% of the time, sexual orientation in 88% of men and whether someone was African American or Caucasian American in 95% of cases (Kosinski).

Companies like Cambridge Analytica do not limit their search to the most famous social media platforms, like Facebook and Twitter. Motion sensors on our phones and Wi-Fi connections reveal how far we travel and how fast. Companies can buy data about how often we unlock the phone and for how long we use each app. As Kosinski himself put it: “Our smartphone is a vast psychological questionnaire that we are constantly filling out, both consciously and unconsciously” (Grassegger and Krogerus, “Data”).

Data collection is not limited to our smartphones. Companies also purchase data from third-party organisations and data brokers, which include television preferences, airline travel, shopping habits, church attendance, magazines subscriptions and so on. Crucially, not only can psychological profiles be created from users’ data about each individual, but once they have been collated, data can be used to search for specific profiles: anxious white males, stressed young mothers, angry teenagers, undecided voters. In other words, companies like Cambridge Analytica are potentially in a position to build their own people search engines.

Aleksandr Kogan became interested in Kosinski’s work and developed a similar app called thisisyourdigitallife. Kogan obtained permission from Facebook to launch the app on the platform to collect data for ‘academic research’. Kogan was – and still is – an academic employed by the University of Cambridge. He used his university title to give clout to his work and to justify the harvesting of private data for research purposes. Yet, the development of thisisyourdigitallife app was done separately from his work at the University. Kogan did so through his private company Global Science Research in collaboration with Cambridge Analytica (Cadwalladr and Graham-Harrison, “Revealed”).

Thousands of users were paid to take a personality test and agreed to have their data collected for academic use. What users did not know was that the app also collected the data from all users’ friends, who never gave their consent. This led to the creation of a massive database that allegedly consists of up to 50 million
people. In 2016, Alexander Nix, the CEO of Cambridge Analytica claims to have “somewhere close to 4 or 5 thousand data points on every adult in the US” (Illig).

At the time, Facebook’s policy allowed collection of friends’ data only to ‘improve user experience’ and for academic research and barred it from being passed on or sold to third parties or to be used for advertising. *The Observer* has seen a contract dated 4 June 2014 which confirms that SCL, an affiliate of Cambridge Analytica, entered into commercial agreement with Kogan’s GSR entirely premised on harvesting and processing Facebook data. Cambridge Analytica paid nearly $1m.

In March 2018, it emerged that by late 2015 Facebook had become aware that users’ private data had been harvested on an unprecedented scale and that the data had been passed on to third parties. The social media platform failed to alert users and took limited steps to recover and secure private information of more than 50 million users (Cadwalladr and Graham-Harrison, “Revealed”).

There are therefore two kind of policy breaches: first, Kogan had access to the data on the basis of academic research while he was in fact aiming to use the data for commercial purposes. Kogan built possibly one of the most extensive personality databases ever produced. He also passed it to third parties who allegedly used it for micro-targeting and political communication.

The psychographic database allows companies like Cambridge Analytica to develop communication programmes and electoral campaigns that triggers inner fears and exploit deep-rooted bias. In simple words, “behavioural micro-targeting” is advertising that is tailored to the individual. It is a highly effective and extremely powerful tool that has opened new avenues for political communication. Rather than assuming, for example, that all working-class white males respond to the same message in the same way, behavioural micro-targeting targets individual voters with emotionally charged content that touches upon their fears, concerns and bias. As Nix explained, “If you know the personality of the people you are targeting, you can nuance your message to resonate more effectively with those key groups” (Concordia, “The Power”).

It is interesting to consider in what ways the methods and tools used by companies like Cambridge Analytica mark a departure from long-established practices in public relations, political communication and propaganda. Kosinski’s database and algorithms – upon which Kogan wrote his own app – are technically innovative but the idea that in electoral campaigns emotions are twice as important as facts is also a well-established fact that has been around for decades. Political communicators have always tried to know as much as possible about their target audience. There is an intrinsic need to understand the cultural environment, the audience’s concerns and fears as well as their hopes and desires. An effective political campaign has always been based on an in-depth understanding of the elec-
torate. Key messages and mottos must resonate with the public by relating with ingrained and deep-rooted cultural tropes and bias so to be able speak to a variety of audiences within the same community (McNair).

II. Computational Propaganda

The power of behavioural micro-targeting on social media lies both in the fact that communication is tailored to the individual as well as on the fact that it adapts in real-time to determine which messages resonate where and how. The content, quantity and speed of communication are adjusted to respond to changes in the way in which users react.

Today, social media are key platforms for political engagement and communication. For sectors of the public, social media are the primary channel through which people get their news, engage with current affairs, and develop their political identities. Even in countries where only a small portion of the public has access to social media on a regular basis, these platforms are nevertheless a fundamental part of the information infrastructure and are key channels of communication for journalists, commentators, civil society leaders, and political elites. Social media platforms can therefore become primary tools for the manipulation of public opinion (Howard and Parks; Bond and Messing).

There is a rich body of research on how political groups, governments, and activists around the world employ both people and automated accounts to artificially shape public life and the political debate (World Economic Forum; Woolley and Howard, “Automation”; Forelle et al.; Kaminska et al.). Researchers at the Oxford Internet Institute run a project on computational propaganda. Computational propaganda is the way in which the public can be manipulated on social networking applications. The most powerful forms of computational propaganda involve both algorithmic distribution and human curation – bots and trolls working together. This is a “phenomenon that encompasses recent digital misinformation and manipulation efforts,” and it “involves learning from and mimicking real people so as to manipulate public opinion across a diverse range of platforms and device networks” (Woolley and Howard, Propaganda).

Bots are automated programs that operate social media accounts through automated interaction with other users to manipulate the debate. They perform simple, repetitive tasks but they can also communicate with people and systems. They can deploy messages, interact with other users’ content, and affect trending algorithms and therefore influence to what kind of information users are exposed. A small group of people that controls an army of political bots on Twitter, for example, can give the illusion of large-scale consensus. Bots are even more effective, as
they react instantly to trending topics on Twitter and Facebook, producing targeted posts and hijacking conversations. Users usually do not realise that a bot is behind the account and engage and amplify the bot-produced content thus propagating misleading or false information (Howard and Kollanyi).

There is of course an important overlap between computational propaganda and the spreading of fake news. This is a complex topic that lies beyond the scope of this article but it is important to explain that research has shown that the manipulation of the information environment though misleading or outright false news is becoming an increasingly crucial factor in political communication campaigns. Investigative journalists like Andrew Grice have amply demonstrated how, for example, the Leave.EU’s adverts on the Turkey’s EU membership and on the effects of unrestricted immigration had on the British public (Grice). These adverts were designed to exploit and stoke widespread economic anxiety as well as racism, xenophobia, anti-Muslim resentment.

III. Cambridge Analytica and Brexit

Investigation into the role and involvement of Cambridge Analytica in the Brexit debate is on-going. What is known at this point is that Cambridge Analytica worked on behalf of the Leave campaign. It did so via AggregateIQ, a data analytics company owned by Robert Mercer, who also owns Cambridge Analytica. AggregateIQ is based in Victoria, British Columbia, Canada and is therefore outside British jurisdiction. Vote Leave allegedly paid AggregateIQ £3.9m to “micro-target” voters on social media during referendum campaign. Vote Leave also gave Veterans for Britain and BeLeave, a youth Leave campaign, £100,000 and £625,000 respectively, which they duly spent with AggregateIQ. If these claims prove to be correct, it would mean that the Leave campaign group breached funding rules (Cadwalladr).

The Oxford Internet Institute looked at social media in the days before the referendum. They monitored 313,000 accounts. Out of 1.5 million tweets between 5 and 13 June 2016, 54% were pro-Leave; 20% were pro-Remain; and 26% were neutral. A third of the tweets, around half a million, came from less than 1% of the accounts. No human can manually generate so many tweets at such speed. According to researchers Philip Howard and Bence Kollanyi, the sheer volume of the messages signals that many accounts were automated. In the weeks leading up to the referendum, political bots dominated Twitter accounts. They continuously retweeted posts with hashtags that supported the leave side and they specifically directed the attention on immigration and lack of control of the borders (Howard and Kollanyi).
At this point it is not possible to establish a link between computational propaganda and companies like Cambridge Analytica. One thing is to use Big Data to understand the electorate and in formulating campaigns to tug on emotional biases to achieve a specific outcome. Another is to manipulate political debate via the spreading of misleading or incorrect news or by using automated accounts to shift the attention of voters on to specific themes.

According to the research carried out by Howard and Kollanyi, it is clear that social media campaigns, which were highly likely based on data provided by Cambridge Analytica, helped to fuel anti-EU sentiment. Crucially, evidence shows that the campaigns on social media actually increased in the days and weeks after the referendum result, and thus cemented public support for Leave at a time in which the result could have been interpreted less as a clear mandate for exit from the EU (Howard and Kollanyi).

As this chapter goes to print, three strands of investigation focus on the role of Cambridge Analytica in the Brexit referendum: one investigation is looking into whether electoral funding regulations have been breached. In November 2017, the Electoral Commission launched an investigation into whether loans and donations from Brexit campaigner Arron Banks and one of his companies broke campaign finance rules. The investigation must also assess whether all appropriate steps to identify the source of all funds had been taken by Leave.EU.

The second line of investigation is run by the British Information Commissioner’s Office and involves the collection, use and sale of personal data to third parties. At this point, the Information Commissioner is looking into whether Dr Kogan and Cambridge Analytica breached Facebook privacy policy and what steps the social media platform took once it was made aware that users’ data had been passed on to third parties in 2015. The Information Commissioner’s Office also investigates into whether personal data where sold to other parties (Cadwalladr and Graham-Harrison, “Revealed”).

The third line of inquiry involves the role of Cambridge Analytica in spreading misleading information. The House of Commons Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee is running an inquiry into ‘Fake News’ and Cambridge Analytica, as well as major social media platforms have been asked to provide evidence and to attend meetings of the Committee.

On 27 February 2018, the UK’s Fake News Inquiry took evidence from Alexander Nix, CEO of Cambridge Analytica. For a video recording of the entire session, see http://parliamentlive.tv/Event/Index/28bd490ee556-485f-bf1a-264b8a0b902e.
In a letter sent to the Committee's Chair, Damian Collins, prior to his testimony, Nix defended his firm in the most strenuous terms. He spoke of “factually inaccurate claims” and was particularly incensed by the claim that his company had access to Facebook likes and that this data was stored by Cambridge Analytica to build personality modelling of voters. In his letter, Nix also rejected any claim that Cambridge Analytica had any involvement whatsoever in the Brexit referendum. Yet, when acting as a witness, Nix was confronted with evidence and with his own statements made elsewhere in which he had confirmed repeatedly that the opposite was the case. Damian Collins led a robust cross-examination and challenged Nix’s statement that Cambridge Analytica had no involvement in the EU referendum and read public statements made by Nix himself claiming association with Leave.EU as well as passages from an article published by Nix, in which he confirmed his company was working with Leave.EU and had already “supercharged” their operation. The committee also viewed footage of Cambridge Analytica’s Brittany Keiser at the official launch of Leave.EU’s campaign, in which she explained that they would be targeting “first time and apathetic voters.” The Committee went on to review tweets from the Leave.EU campaign’s manager Andy Wigmore, in which he confirmed Leave.EU had brought in “US Data Firm Cambridge Analytica.” Finally, the Committee also produced extracts from Arron Banks’ book *The Bad boys of Brexit* in which Banks writes that they had hired Cambridge Analytica. As a coup de grace, Collins pointed out that Cambridge Analytica were officially listed documentation submitted by Leave.EU to the Electoral Commission as part of their investigation.

Despite the overwhelming evidence, Nix reiterated that Cambridge Analytica did not carry out paid or unpaid work for Leave.EU. When questioned on the ethical implications of preying on voters’ emotions and bias, Nix responded that the micro-targeting of voters is “beneficial to democracy” as it gets citizens involved in the debate. In the course of the session, Nix confirmed the company regularly acquires large datasets that include location, consumer and lifestyle data but explained that the company collects a large proportion through online surveys and polls. Nix clarified that the datasets held in the UK are not as substantial as those the company holds in the US. While he continued to be adamant that Cambridge Analytica could not access Facebook mentions and likes, he confirmed that the company does use Facebook to advertise and to gather data through surveys and through activity monitoring to adapt campaigns in real time.

The evidence uncovered only a few weeks later by Carole Cadwalladr of *The Observer* and by *Channel4News* proves the extent of Nix’s lying. As explained above, thanks to Kogan’s work, we now know that Cambridge Analytica had access to a massive database, which included private data of almost 50 million Facebook users. The evidence is damming and is confirmed by documents provided
by Christopher Wylie, a Canadian data analytics expert that work for Cambridge Analytica at the time in which the company acquired Kogan’s database. Wylie has passed evidence to the National Crime Agency and the Information Commissioner’s Office. The evidence also confirms that Facebook was aware of the harvesting of users’ data and their sale to third parties (Cadwalladr and Graham-Harrison, “Facebook”).

In the meantime, Alexander Nix – who has been suspended as CEO of Cambridge Analytica – has been asked to appear before the Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee to explain “inconsistencies” between Nix’s testimony and the new evidence (BBC News, “Cambridge”).

Speaking in the Commons, Culture Secretary Matt Hancock said that the revelations represented a “turning point” in the debate on the use of personal information stored online and argued for forceful legislation and regulation. “This Wild West free-for-all of the internet companies has got to come to an end” he concluded (BBC News, “Facebook”).

IV. Feeding the Myth of Their Own Power

All campaign managers and political consultants throughout the political spectrum purchase as much data as possible. It started as early as 1998, when Alan Gould worked on the Peter Vallone campaign and paid for targeted ad banners to appear on The New York Times to target specific audiences and to monitor responses. In 2008, Obama was the first candidate to use social media on a massive scale in a $22.5m campaign. Yet, the 206 campaigns have marked an explosion. Brad Parscale, the digital media director of the Trump campaign in 2016, allegedly produced 50,000 variations of Facebook ads to target voters on an almost individual basis. According to Julia Carrie Wong, Vote Leave spent almost all its entire budget on Facebook with almost a million targeted ads in 10 weeks (Wong). What appears to be new in the case of Cambridge Analytica is the size of the database they have created. The lack of clarity about who else had access to the data is, of course, another important concern that will need to be addressed in the investigations that are currently underway.

As far as the predictive power of the algorithms used, employees who worked directly with Cambridge Analytica told BuzzFeed News that the company never provided evidence that it the ability to execute accurate predictions on a large scale (Taggart). However, studies on the impact of micro-targeting in advertising suggest that psychological micro-targeting can be used covertly to attract up to 40% more clicks and up to 50% more purchases (Matz). There is no reason to believe that similar results could be achieve in selling a political message.
It should not be forgotten that Cambridge Analytica feeds the mystery around its own power and potential. The level of secrecy and the carefully selection of information that is realised is designed to magnify the impression that the company knows everything and that it is all-powerful. The myth and reality may well be radically different and perhaps Cambridge Analytica is nothing more than a data processor agency for social media platforms, but at this point, the company clearly wants authorities and the public to believe otherwise. In March 2018, Channel4News broadcast a series of episodes, which include footage of meetings with high echelons of Cambridge Analytica that had been secretly filmed. The company purported to have worked in countries in South-East Asia, Africa and Central Europe. At one point, Mark Turnbull claims that in the case of the Kenyan elections, Cambridge Analytica carried out 50,000 surveys, wrote the speeches, the manifestos and all electoral material. Allegedly, they entirely and single-handedly run the campaign. In other excerpts, they spoke brazenly of entrapment operations to smear opponents and of subcontracting work to ex-secret service personnel. These claims will surely be investigated by the multiple agencies that are currently working on this case. However, it is important to remember that the footage was part of a sale pitch and that it was in the interest of Cambridge Analytica to portray itself as all-knowing and all-powerful. It is important not to lose sight of what the evidence is.

The idea of a powerful agency that can manipulate voters and consumers is nothing new. Already in 1957, Vance Packard spoke of “hidden persuaders” who could condition consumers with subliminal messages to make them buy anything their clients were selling. Advertising companies then and audience management agencies today thrive precisely because it is impossible to assess and define exactly how much their insight into the audience is indeed reliable. Clients – may they be soap companies, political parties, or activists – can only rely on what these companies promise they can do and for this reason, there is a continuous attempt on the part of the advertisers and propagandists to refer to new sophisticated analytical systems and ground-breaking targeting tool and to surround themselves with an aura of mystery. It was true in the 1950s as it is true today.

The overestimation of the power of advertisers, propagandists and audience management consultants is also an integral part of the effort to build an information environment in which voters no longer know who to trust, who is saying what and to which end. The insecurity, distrust and the sense of chaos push voters and consumer towards comfortable messages that reinforce their bias and given them hopes and reassurances.
V. Conclusions

As mentioned above, three lines of inquiry are being followed in the United Kingdom: one on alleged breach of electoral funding regulations; one on the harvesting and sale of private data without users’ consent; and one on the use of social media to spread fake news. In addition, an investigation into the potential Russian involvement in the US elections of 2016 that is currently under way in Washington has – again – called into question Cambridge Analytica as well as the role of social media platform like Facebook and Twitter. It will be interesting to follow these developments as they unfold.

Ethical issues about users’ consent to the sale, use and storage of personal data are key to this debate (Lane et al.). It is clear that lawmakers are lagging behind and that there is an increasingly wider gap between the current status of technology and the focus of the law. It is crucial that national governments come to grips quickly with the ethical and legal challenges posed by social media, computational propaganda and data protection. Since 2017, EU data protection rules mean that personal data can only be processed in certain situations and under certain conditions (European Commission 2017). However, the question of how this will work in practice remains open.

Works Cited

Unless indicated otherwise, all online sources have been accessed on 1 February 2018.


Harvesting Your Soul? Cambridge Analytica and Brexit

Kosinski, Michal, et al. “Private traits and attributes are predictable from digital records of human behaviour.” *PNAS* vol. 110 no.15, April 2013, pp. 5802-5.


Session V

Brexit and Culture
The Impact of Brexit on International Cultural Relations in the European Union

Stuart MacDonald, FRSA

SYM Consulting London/Brussels

September 2017 (updated January 2018)

The report:

- Was commissioned by ifa in 2017;
- Survey to gather data on the current status of international cultural relations between Germany and the UK;
- Assesses the impact of Brexit;
- Sketches out, as far as possible, a baseline that can be used to assess the impact of Brexit both in terms of numbers and in policy (political and qualitative) aspects;
- Includes an appendix of updates (January 2018).
This presentation:

- Impressions and assumptions about what is happening today
- Known and unknown unknowns...
- What can cultural institutions do
- Updates on attitudes and issues

How did we get to this point? Impressions and assumptions about why Brexit happened

- Part of an international upsurge of anti-cosmopolitan, anti-globalising, anti-immigration sentiment fuelled by inequalities, and a sense of loss of (national) identity and control;
- These feelings were mostly felt by older and less educated people;
- The referendum outcome was affected by the use of new campaigning tools and techniques which bring private finance together with big data to influence sentiment and avoid democratic scrutiny;
- Brexit has many specifically British features which derive from a long history of relations between the UK and the “Continent”; the UK experience of EU membership, and decisions taken by UK Governments in the medium-term past (e.g. allowing unrestricted immigration by people from accession states in Eastern Europe);
- Brexit therefore raises many questions which impact directly on future policies and practices for international cultural relations.
The Impact of Brexit on International Cultural Relations in the European Union

Impressions and assumptions about what is happening today – it all seems like a mess...

The negotiations – knows (and some unknowns)...

- The negotiations are in two parts:
  - The “first phase” of the negotiation (orderly UK withdrawal from the EU) is now complete;
  - The second (the framework of the future UK-EU relationship) is about to start;
- Scope limited to those matters which the Union considers to be “strictly necessary to ensure an orderly withdrawal.” The UK may of course consider other issues are also necessary;
- The withdrawal agreement will be concluded by the Union, not the Union and its Member States. The decision will be made by “super” qualified majority, i.e. at least 72% of the 27 Member States representing 65% of the population; and with the consent of the European Parliament;
- Phase 1 included:
  - Citizens’ rights;
  - Settling the accounts – including UK participation in specific funds and facilities related to Union policies, but not clear if this can or will include funds relevant to cultural relations H2020, Erasmus+, etc.;
  - The Irish border;
  - The EU will want the UK to take over its share of commitments under agreements with third countries (again unclear what is included);
- Fresh negotiating directives, dealing with the future relationship and possible transitional arrangements will only be adopted once the European Council has decided that “sufficient progress has been achieved.” This approach gives flexibility but risks a dispute, and even the breakdown of the talks, if the parties cannot agree when this point, has been reached.
Known unknowns (about the negotiations)

- There are three main “known unknowns”:
  - First, the negotiations themselves* – are the sides posturing? Are they practically possible?
  - Second, events in the wider world;
  - Third, the unpredictable effects of whatever deal is struck, particularly if no deal is struck...

- Money matters - there will be a bill to pay: UK is a net contributor to the EU budget: Brexit means a hole of some €6 billion in EU budgets which support innovation, higher education, culture and external relations. A percentage of that hole will have to be filled (or not) by the 9 other countries which currently are net contributors;
- But, there is a great deal of common ground and existing collaboration between the UK, the EU and Germany...

*The key objectives appear to be first, to protect the unity and integrity of the Union and its legal order; secondly, to ensure the UK’s withdrawal requires full settlement of all financial obligations due by the UK; and thirdly, to maximise the Union’s leverage in the negotiations over the future relationship.

The risk in the EU’s approach is that making progress in the first phase may prove to be so difficult that there is insufficient time to complete the (very complex) second phase, and the parties fail to reach any agreement at all. Such an outcome would be highly damaging for both sides.

Unknown unknowns (about the negotiations)

- There is a great deal of anxiety caused by uncertainty, even in areas where the UK and EU both stand to lose from Brexit:
  
  But no-one knows what will be the impact of that anxiety on decision making by organisations and institutions...

- The uncertainty impacts on the UK, the EU and on individual Member States:

The Union wants to avoid a hard border on the island of Ireland “while respecting the integrity of the Union legal order”. But it gives no indication of how this might be achieved other than through “flexible and imaginative solutions”, (§ 9 of the negotiating directives).

But we do know that Brexit impacts differently on different places and sectors. These differences are putting a strain on existing political, economic and cultural practices... The problem is that these effects are unpredictable...
What can cultural institutions do (there are no magical insights here...)

- Assumes that some shared UK-EU positions are seen as desirable aims by both sides (risk of “cherry-picking”) and can be agreed through the decision-making process;
- Advocate for the preservation of UK access to existing frameworks for collaboration: Erasmus+; H2020; Creative Europe: ERC;
- Scale up personal, scientific and educational and cultural exchange between the UK and the EU;
- Focus on young people:
  - Counter negative perceptions of the UK among young people in the EU (7% drop in EU students applying to study in the UK);
  - Support young people in the UK to develop their awareness of other cultures and languages through education, cultural exchange, work opportunities and via civil society;*
- Support efforts to develop new, imaginative, channels for dialogue and collaboration;
- Build new frameworks for collaboration where possible which target the groups who stand to lose most from Brexit – including young people from areas and socio-economic groups which stand to lose most;
- Engage beyond their comfort zones... the arts in the UK were the most fervent pro-remain sector even in places with large pro-exit populations...

* Evidenced (June 2017 – i.e. since the main report) in “From the Outside In”, IPSOS MORI for the British Council.

2018: The current state of play: Attitudes to Brexit

Since the referendum, more of the public now tend to think:
- Brexit was the wrong decision rather than the right decision;
- They would vote against it in a referendum, but
- Brexit should go ahead.

(source: YouGov UK Polling Report)

Many reports on polls are misleading.
When a poll comes out that appears to show public support for Brexit it is excitedly retweeted and shared by lots of pro-Brexit voices.
When a poll comes out that appears to show public opposition to Brexit it is excitedly retweeted and shared by lots of anti-Brexit voices.

There are three different questions about current attitudes to Brexit that people often treat as being measures of public support for Brexit which do not always show the same answers:
1) Questions asking how people would vote in a Brexit referendum tomorrow;
2) Questions asking whether people think Brexit was the right or wrong decision;
3) Questions asking whether people think we should now go ahead with Brexit or not.

Question 1: Typically, polls have shown a small lead for Remain between one and four points. Any question asking about voting intention in a referendum or election is really two questions – it’s working out who would vote, and then how they would vote.
Not much net movement among Remain and Leave voters, the Remain leads are down to those who did not vote in 2016. This raises all sorts of questions about whether those past non-voters would actually vote, and whether they are actually representative of 2016 non-voters, or are too politically engaged and likely to vote.

Question 2: YouGov regularly asks a direct “Bregret” question, asking whether people think voting for Brexit was the right or wrong decision. The results here are quite similar to referendum questions, but because it is a question about public attitudes as a whole rather than voting intentions concerns about likelihood to vote do not arise. There has again been a slow movement towards Regret, meaning that for the last three or four months the poll has consistently shown slightly more people thinking Brexit was the wrong decision rather than the right decision.

Question 3: YouGov have a semi-regular tracker that asks how the government should proceed with Brexit, which, in this month, found that 52% thought that the government should go ahead with Brexit, 16% that they should call a second referendum, 15% that they should stop Brexit and remain in the EU. The reason for the difference in these questions is that a substantial minority of people who voted Remain in 2016 consistently say that the government should go ahead and implement Brexit (presumably because they see them as having a democratic duty to implement the referendum result).
Britons’ concerns over immigration were a prime factor in their vote to leave the EU.

In England and Wales, voting areas that experienced faster growth in foreign-born population tended to coincide with those expressing stronger support for Brexit.

In the last two decades, Britain experienced a historically unprecedented wave of immigration, which intensified after 2004, the year Britain opened its labour market to workers from new, poorer members of the EU, such as Poland. The number of Britain’s foreign-born residents went from 5.3 million in 2004 to 9.2 million in 2016.

Net migration to the UK – the number of immigrants settling in the country minus the number of people moving out – posted its largest drop on record in the year after the Brexit vote.

The exodus of migrant workers, while welcome for some, further squeezes the UK’s already tight labour market. Britain’s unemployment rate recently hit a four-decade low of 4.3%, with the number of unfilled vacancies rising to a record high. This is a source of anxiety for some businesses.

Evidence shows attitudes to immigration are mostly pragmatic. People want control and lower numbers while they value international students and high skilled workers.

The current state of play: Attitudes to immigration

- Britons’ concerns over immigration were a prime factor in their vote to leave the EU.
- In England and Wales, voting areas that experienced faster growth in foreign-born population tended to coincide with those expressing stronger support for Brexit.
- In the last two decades, Britain experienced a historically unprecedented wave of immigration, which intensified after 2004, the year Britain opened its labour market to workers from new, poorer members of the EU, such as Poland. The number of Britain’s foreign-born residents went from 5.3 million in 2004 to 9.2 million in 2016.
- Net migration to the UK – the number of immigrants settling in the country minus the number of people moving out – posted its largest drop on record in the year after the Brexit vote.
- The exodus of migrant workers, while welcome for some, further squeezes the UK’s already tight labour market. Britain’s unemployment rate recently hit a four-decade low of 4.3%, with the number of unfilled vacancies rising to a record high. This is a source of anxiety for some businesses.
- Evidence shows attitudes to immigration are mostly pragmatic. People want control and lower numbers while they value international students and high skilled workers.

The current state of play: Higher education and young people: More heat than light... And we are still; waiting for a position paper...

This alleged pragmatism is leading “Liberal Tories” such as “Bright Blue” (http://www.brightblue.org.uk) to make arguments that there are incentives for the UK to continue to support EU-origin student flows post-Brexit.

They quote ICM polling data that 76% of the public wants the number of international students to stay the same or increase. (Source: https://capx.co/theres-no-good-reason-to-include-students-in-migration-numbers/)

Needless to say, as with much Brexit polling, these figures are wrong. The correct (2014) figure is 59%. (Source: http://www.universitiesuk.ac.uk/policy-and-analysis/reports/Pages/international-students-uk-immigration-debate.aspx)

The statistics also show that Brexit may not have quite the impact claimed:

- 81% of students studying in HE in the UK are from the UK;
- Only 6% are from the rest of the EU, with 14% from the rest of the world;
- The country sending most students to the UK is China;
- However, impacts would be different across the UK:
  - England has the highest proportion of non-EU students;
  - Scotland has the highest proportion of EU students (9%).
The current state of play: Innovation

Business as usual up to March 2019.

UK Government policy: "...one of the UK’s core objectives is to ‘seek agreement to continue to collaborate with European partners on major science, research, and technology initiatives’.”

Meantime, continued lack of clarity.

Specific areas of continuing uncertainty (relevant to this report):

- Higher education: could lose access to EU funds for research, mobility and strategic collaboration, resulting in a serious erosion of the UK’s science and innovation base;
- Universities urging UK Government to negotiate access to, and influence over, the next EU research and innovation programme;
- Data privacy: will the UK still be regarded by the EU Commission as a ‘safe third country’ outside the EU so that personal data can continue to be transferred to the UK from the EU?
- Consumer protection law and commercial law: large number of Directives covering e.g. Services and e-Commerce;
- Intellectual Property Rights: (a) patent rights; (b) trade mark rights; (c) design rights; and (d) copyright.

The current state of play: International Cultural Relations (ICR)

- The key issue is whether the UK continues to play a part in the EU’s international cultural relations activities through the British Council;
- The British Council is the world’s largest ICR organisation, so its networks and expertise could arguably be seen as a loss to the EU;
- Impact on the EU’s ICR activities of Brexit could be greater cohesion vs. loss of capability;
- British Council’s position is ambiguous – clearly uncomfortable with Brexit, but looking for a new global role:
- Priority is advocacy for their “Our Shared European Future” recommendations, i.e.: residency rights; ease of movement; continued and enhanced participation in multilateral programmes; young Europeans and future generations; and intellectual property, qualifications and regulatory framework;
- Specifically:
  - Young people: Continue full UK participation in the Erasmus+ programme;
  - Modern languages: A post-Brexit plan in education to ensure the UK produces sufficient linguists to meet its future requirements;
  - Protect the arts: Issues are: funding, ease of movement, legal and regulatory frameworks and trade with the EU and other countries;
  - Protect the creative industries: Seen as key to the UK’s international reputation and economy;
  - Protect science: Continued investment and access to talented students and researchers
- All for discussion in stage 2 of the negotiations.
How was it for you? That was the question I was most often asked in the immediate aftermath of Brexit. And that was the question I was most eager to answer. When I heard the news of Brexit early in the morning of 24 June 2016, I couldn’t believe my ears. I was not one of those who had seen it coming all along, who knew how the English public ticked. I was bluntly shocked. And with me, nearly all of those who came from abroad to work in England; immigrants who had fled their countries and so-called ex-pats like myself whose choice to live in England was not born out of urgent necessity.

Whoever I talked to at the moment of the initial decision and some weeks after, we all felt unwanted and not sure what the future in this country would hold for us. More importantly, whether there would be a future at all. Now, more than a year later, not many of those questions have been answered, but that’s a different topic altogether. In my talk which doesn’t aspire to be rooted in academic methodology, I’d like to give you an overview of what I have heard and learnt in the course of my work about the art world and Brexit. It is a little tour d’horizon, from my personal point of view.

As I am working as an arts correspondent for a Swiss newspaper, the Neue Zürcher Zeitung, people also asked me: How was it for them? “Them” being the members and movers and shakers of the arts world – artists, gallery owners, museum directors. On the very day of Brexit, I was called by a Swiss radio station and they were curious about how the arts people in the UK were handling the decision. I told the listeners that their reactions were three-fold: personal, political and moral (SRF).

J. K. Rowling, the author of the Harry Potter books, tweeted: “I don’t think I’ve ever wanted magic more” (@jk_rowling). The writer Nick Hornby was so frustrated that he wrote on Facebook: “I’m just going to post angry and sarcastic shit all day.” Theatre director Mark Ravenhill posted – also on Facebook – that he was just at the bookshop Foyles. Would any of his friends join him for a cry over a coffee? Salman Rushdie tweeted: “Old Farts: 1 The Future: 0. Well done England. Maybe lose to Iceland next & get out of Europe properly?” (@SalmanRushdie). The music producer Tony Visconti – probably most famous for his David Bowie
connections – wrote on *Facebook*: “What would we be without jingoism?”1 And the writer Ian McEwan wrote a few weeks later: “The country you live in, the parliamentary democracy that ruled it, for good or bad, has been trumped by a plebiscite of dubious purpose and unacknowledged status” (“Britain”).

People, who were normally very calm and level-headed, reacted uncharacteristically. Emotional, unguarded, angry, deeply sad even. When it came to the political dimension, most artists and art managers seemed to focus on isolationism and xenophobia which they thought – and probably still think – went hand in hand with the Brexit decision.

Probably the strongest reaction came from the late Martin Roth, the German director of one of the world’s largest museums, the Victoria & Albert Museum in London. He took a dramatic step: He resigned soon after the Brexit result as a director of the institution that he had led with enormous success for five years. He had been passionate in his views on Brexit and the tone of the debate. He had been particularly upset to hear aggressive “war rhetoric” during the referendum campaign. In one interview with *Deutsche Welle*, he said: “What happened to tolerance, solidarity and charity? And I’m not a dreamer. I’m just talking about basic values – manners that are part of our upbringing and connect us. Where are they now?” (Dege).

Emotions apart: **What financial and practical impact would Brexit have on the arts world?** This was one of the first things people wanted to know about. Theatre, opera and film production companies will have to negotiate customs, copyrights and immigration rules in the future. 21% of the musicians playing in British orchestras for instance come from EU countries. 59% of the international activities in the creative sector of Great Britain were concentrated on Europe (Sheffield). And culture relies on fresh talent: Will it be more difficult in view of the coming departure from the EU to attract talent from Europe? A thriving creative sector is also an image factor and an instrument of international communication, a so-called soft power.

But there is more: Arts and heritage remain the UK’s most attractive features, and major reasons why people visit, study in or do business with the UK. The British creative sector is an important growth area and contributes 84.1 billion pounds to the budget in Great Britain (*Her Majesty’s Government*). And: Europe is its biggest key market. So, there will be a lot to be compensated for by the British Government or other sources.

Then there is the problem of subsidies. One of the most important sources of financial support from the EU comes from the “Creative Europe Programme”. Be-

---

1 References for quotes from *Facebook* cannot be given as the posts are not available without having an account and do not have their own URL like Tweets do.
Brexit and the Art World: From Hope to Despair and Back Again

tween 2014 and 2015, 230 British cultural institutions received funds from the “Creative Europe” budget. The UK receives 12.47% (€40m) of the Creative Europe budget, compared to its 10.7% estimated contribution. The UK gets more out than it pays in. It is not clear what will happen when these wells run dry (ibid.).

Another blow just came some days ago: Great Britain was told by the EU Commission that it is not allowed to take part in the Europe Capital of Culture scheme any more (Löhndorf, “Rache”). The programme allowed cities to apply for subsidies for urban regeneration and projects that benefited culture. To be Capital of Culture means urban regeneration, a huge energy boost for the arts and music scene, a focus of international attention and last but not least – tourists. A number of cities in the UK had applied to become Capital of Culture in 2023, among them Dundee, Belfast/Derry, Leeds and Nottingham.

Two UK cities held the title in the past, Glasgow in 1990 and Liverpool in 2008. Both enjoyed their moments in the limelight, and both had lasting positive effects. So it doesn’t come as a surprise when Dundee’s bid team said: “It’s a sad irony that one of the key drivers of our bid was a desire to further enhance our cultural links with Europe” (BBC). The Scottish First Minister Nicola Sturgeon said she was “absolutely dismayed” (Eighteen). Arts minister John Glen called it a “crazy decision”. And he added: “We’re leaving the EU – not Europe!” (@JohnGlenUK).

Whenever I talk or write about the consequences of Brexit and the UK culture scene these days, one frequent response – by readers or listeners – is: oh, the arts people are only interested in the subsidies that they have been receiving from the EU and now they are disappointed. This is, as I have pointed out, indeed an important factor. But, of course, the problem runs much deeper than that.

Over the last year, I have spoken to a quite large number of people in the creative industries in the UK about Brexit: young and old, famous and unknown, British and non-British, artists and culture managers. In my following remarks, I will quote a number of them – you will certainly miss some famous names, which is probably unavoidable. I found some of the quotes in papers and magazines; in each of those cases I will mention the source. In my conversations there are a number of emotions and reactions, which I kept hearing about again and again in different phases in the aftermath of the result over the course of the last year. Here is what I found out.

At the beginning, there was, as I said, the shock. And then there was a feeling of: We’re all in this together. One of the busiest and liveliest of London’s art managers, Hans Ulrich Obrist, co-director of the Serpentine Gallery, told me: “There is a feeling of absolute solidarity in the art world, which is summed up by Wolfgang Tilmans in his poster campaign. Everyone is aghast. There are multiple factors: nationalism, polarising, xenophobic remarks. This is the opposite of what art
stands for and has been standing for in the past” (original quote). Of course, not the whole the art world was united in shock. As always, there were exceptions, to which I will come later. But the majority was very unhappy indeed.

**What about the future?** Along with the shock came a sense of disappointment and fear of the unknown. In the summer of 2017, I spoke to a number of young Swiss artists who all live in London. None of them are famous yet, but all of them are highly driven and successful in what they are doing – designers, theatre actors and producers, musicians, photographers, a radio presenter and so on. I wanted to know how being a young non-British artist in this city felt, and particularly after Brexit. A graphic designer said: “Everything is the same but everything has changed. We always felt as a part of Europe. It is scary, because we don’t know what is going to happen” (original quote). Charlotte Hug, a musician, added:

> There are so many discussions going on in the art world at the moment. People are very vigilant. At the same time, there is a lot of confusion, even in practical terms, in matters of long-term planning. How can a Spanish artist for instance plan to come to Britain for a concert series in the future? (original quote)

The situation in the pop music industry seems complex. The radio presenter and journalist Hans-Peter Kuenzler told me:

> The pop music business is so international, that xenophobia is impossible if you want to survive and be successful. The ‘harder’ Brexit will be, the more difficult it will become for Great Britain to maintain international relationships. At present, London is the centre of infrastructure of the European pop music business. On the other hand, though, there is already a trend towards more regionalism in pop music in Europe: due to the internet everything becomes more global, but it also enhances local cultures, as everyone has a platform to express themselves more easily. Looking at it from that point of view, the British could be in danger of being left behind by Europe. (original quote)

Many of the fears seemed to crystallise in the question: **Will London stay relevant as a culture hub and as a cutting-edge trendsetter?** London as a capital of the arts – it hasn’t been always thus. Jacques Herzog from the architecture firm Herzog & de Meuron, who designed the Tate Modern and also its celebrated extension last year, still vividly remembers the times when the London art scene was rather provincial:

> Before the Tate Modern was opened 17 years ago, London didn’t have a platform for modern and contemporary international art. London’s institutions and the audience were focused on British art. The Tate changed this radically. London became the mecca of a vibrant art and architecture scene. (original quote)

Deyan Sudjic, the director of the Design Museum in London, wrote to Jacques Herzog: “I hope the Tate is not going to be the monument of a lost golden age for London” (original quote). Sudjic and Herzog and DeMeuron, the world-famous
architects, were wondering – along with young and less established members of the UK art world – if all this was going to change.

**I did question why the reactions in the arts and entertainment sector were so extraordinarily strong.** Hans Ulbrich Obrist explained: “It was so deeply shocking because we believed that Great Britain is a tolerant, inclusive country, more successful in its integration politics than it is the case in France for instance” (original quote). It was clear: Everyone seemed to have had misconceptions about the mood of the British voters. But why had we – in particular those of us who come from abroad – been so ill-prepared for the result? Maybe part of the ensuing “Brexit of the hearts” (as I called it in one of my newspaper commentaries) – of those of us who watched the decision with the aforementioned feelings – was due to a romantic idea of Great Britain, although Remainer Julian Barnes said, probably in a fit of self-hate after the Brexit result: “We have our sentimental vision of how others see us: as correct, humorous, eccentric, polite, tolerant, phlegmatic and so on – ‘très British’. But historically, they have equally – if not more often – thought of us as cold, arrogant, violent, self-interested, racist and hypocritical” (*London Review of Books*).

In general, though, I feel that the tradition of celebrating and/or romanticising Great Britain is and always has outweighed the criticism by far: Many people all over the world and across the centuries are and were joined in this sentiment, from Thomas Mann to Madonna, from TS Eliot (who probably was more of a Europhile) to Bill Bryson. Voltaire had already been enthusiastic about the island in his *Lettres philosophiques* (1733/34). His book so angered his French countrymen that it was forbidden in his own country. Thinkers of the French enlightenment like Voltaire exported their esteem of the British Empiricism of the 18th century to Germany. Montesquieu *De l'esprit des loix* (1748) was regarded as the most important work of the political anglophilia of his time and it worked as a trendsetter. In addition to that, there was a growing, deeply rooted – and by the way mostly unrequited – love for all English things, for the country’s high culture and its pop culture, in many parts of the world. All of which was of course created, fostered and ready-made for export by no one else than the Brits themselves, who were very much in love with their nostalgic idea of their own past. They were and are great masters at communicating this idea.

This more or less speculative digression into the past leads me right back to the present. Post-Brexit, the Remainers wondered: **Why didn’t we see it coming?** The answer is: because everyone was busy looking at the wrong people – probably people like themselves – or, more to the point: ourselves. Anna Pfab, a young photo agency owner and university lecturer for master studies in photography, told me: “I was half aware of the fact that we lived in a kind of liberal bubble. But it was a wake-up call and created uncertainty” (original quote).
But of course, there were other voices, too. The polemical novelist and journalist Julie Burchill, herself a happy Brexiteer, and in this regard one of the few exceptions among artists, analysed the Remainers’ mindset in the conservative magazine *The Spectator*:

The pathetic petulance which has come from the Remnants in the face of our victory stems from the fact that many of those who prided themselves on being rebels were, actually, just a differently styled part of the status quo-embracing establishment all along. And it is for robbing them of their illusions about themselves that we Brexiteers will not be forgiven. (Burchill)

And the equally provocative pop-singer Morrissey said, just over a week ago in an interview with *The Sunday Times* about Brexit:

I thought it was a fascinating strike for democracy because the people said the opposite of Westminster, and that was extraordinary. [...] The unfortunate thing is that politicians only speak to other politicians. They don’t speak to the people, so on that day, their bubble burst. (Iley)

The musician Brian Eno came to a similar conclusion, but from the point of view of those who Burchill called “Remnants”. He told the *The Guardian*:

My feeling about Brexit was not anger at anybody else, it was anger at myself for not realising what was going on. I thought that all those UKIP people and those National Fronty people were in a little bubble. Then I thought: ‘Fuck, it was us, we were in the bubble, we didn’t notice it.’ There was a revolution brewing and we didn’t spot it because we didn’t make it. We expected we were going to be the revolution. (Hattenstone)

The question: “Why didn’t we see it coming?” goes more or less hand in hand with another one: **Have we done enough to confront the Brexit decision?** I’m not sure if people in the creative sector really posed this question. Had they done so, the answer should have been: no.

Where were all the plays about Brexit? So were the thoughts of *Daily Telegraph* critic Dominic Cavendish the day after the EU referendum. “What a squandered opportunity by the theatre establishment to take a proactive role?” he tweeted (Trueman). To the defence of the British theatre I would say that it had become increasingly interested in political subjects in recent years. And, of course, you can argue that theatre is no substitute for a campaign and it is not necessarily a platform for information. It is probably at its best to comment after the event from a distance. At least that’s what it did, as I will point out later.

The most spectacular undertaking to confront Brexit was an open letter signed by 300 artists and intellectuals. The list of the people who signed it read like the *Who’s Who* of the art world: the actors Benedict Cumberbatch, Keira Knightley,
Brexit and the Art World: From Hope to Despair and Back Again

Helena Bonham Carter, Bill Nighy, John Hurt, Jude Law; the fashion designer Vivienne Westwood; the writers Tom Stoppard, Hilary Mantel, John Le Carré, Ian McEwan; the architects David Chipperfield and Richard Rogers; the directors Steve McQueen and Mike Leigh. They called the EU referendum the “biggest democratic decision of our time” with far-reaching repercussions (The Telegraph). The country should ask itself what kind of nation it wanted to be.

They vented their fears, namely if Great Britain would be able to maintain its worldwide success after Brexit. They wanted their country to keep on playing a leading role on the world stage and not to become an outsider shouting from the wings. They were mostly talking about their own profession i.e. about themselves. Which would, as they were to find out, be part of the problem.

Is there any hope left? After a lot of introspection, people were determined to roll up their sleeves and make up for what they missed out on in the years before the referendum. This year in January, when the Victoria & Albert Museum was still looking for a successor for Martin Roth, the BBC art critic Will Gompertz showed huge optimism and said that anyone who had the chance to be the head of one of London’s great museums should be over the moon. Because this was the time for artists and art managers to get up, barge in and to show how art can help to overcome division. Brian Eno, equally fierce and defiant, said, and not to everyone’s delight: “Actually, in retrospect, I’ve started to think I’m pleased about Trump and I’m pleased about Brexit because it gives us a kick up the arse and we needed it because we weren’t going to change anything” (Hattenstone).

Anna Pfab, the young agency owner in Dalston told me: “In countries that are not as prosperous and peaceful as Great Britain, there is a rich cultural scene. It is very well possible, that people will use art to express themselves politically.” Livia Rita, a 25-year-old Swiss, London-based theatre actress, director and producer of a play about Brexit, professed: “Many young people only now registered how strongly politics influences the future. I never before felt such a vivid interest in politics and I have never been so involved in politics before. The challenges are huge, but so are the possibilities” (original quote).

Many artists were finally determined to see the failure as an opportunity. Everyone I was talking to expressed the possibility – or the conviction – that the arts will become more political in the future. And that young people will become more interested in politics. I asked the author John Le Carré, who I met in June: “Do you think Brexit will change the cultural climate in England?” And he answered: “It has already changed. 72 percent of young people voted. That is extraordinary.” He thought we have to thank Jeremy Corbyn for that and added that he hoped

---

2 By the time this article was written, the original source for this quote could not be found online anymore.
that a spark of radicalism – of decent radicalism – had been ignited and that it wouldn’t die down:

I hope it will turn into the refusal to accept that the wealth of the country is not reflected in the lives of most of his citizens. [...] The result of the referendum was a decision of discontent people who did not know about the consequences of their vote. They had no idea what they voted for. (Löhndorf, “Leute”)

John Le Carré thought that it might be possible that “we will see a kind of artistic response like in the sixties with the Theatre Royal in Stratford, Joan Littlewood, Brendan Behan – a more triumphant kind of protest” (ibid.).

Rufus Norris, the director of the National Theatre demanded fearlessness and spoke of a “crusade of the arts in the course of which we understand who we are as individuals, societies and nations” (original quote). Of course, there was optimism amongst the few of those in the creative sector who favoured Brexit, for instance the actor Michael Caine and Roger Daltrey from the band The Who. And there is Patrik Schumacher, the German director of one of the most famous architects’ firms in London, Zaha Hadid. He told me: “I see Brexit as a chance. Without the EU there is more room for political experiment and we need this freedom, this space to give radical reforms a chance. I think the EU’s tendency to submit more and more aspects of society to their rules is paralysing and outmoded” (original source). Schumacher, who together with the late Zaha Hadid designed the highly acclaimed Aquatics Centre for the Olympic Games in London in 2012, thinks that “Europe should focus more on free markets, free entrepreneurship and individual responsibility, also in terms of culture and people in the creative industries. I do want to distance myself though from the anti-immigration motives of the Brexit campaign” (original quote).

**Will there be any action after all the reflection?** The artists and arts managers decided to have a closer look at Leave-voters. They made up their minds to try to understand and to get in touch with the 52% of the voters whose opinion differed from their own. Some examples: Rufus Norris, the National Theatre’s director, declared that the arts should not veer towards escapism or pure entertainment. Accordingly, the National Theatre traveled the country and got into conversations with people from the ages of 9 to 97. The poet laureate Carol Ann Duffy juxtaposed the peoples’ voices with politicians’ speeches and put them in a play called *My Country: a work in progress* which toured Great Britain from March onwards. The play ended with the question: “Are we listening?” (Duffy and Norris).

The newspaper *The Guardian* partnered the theatre company Headlong to create *Brexit Shorts*, a series of original dramas that they launched online in June 2017. The set of short films represented diverse views from around the country. They consisted of dialogues about the causes and consequences of Brexit, written
Brexit and the Art World: From Hope to Despair and Back Again

by leading playwrights including David Hare and Abi Morgan. The monologues were supposed to be from the perspective of their home region.

This touches on a major problem in British cultural life, which will, in all probability, not improve after Great Britain has left the EU: London, the capital will profit and the provinces will fall behind again. London’s creative scene will go on to attract the crowds. Whether it will remain relevant and innovative is another question, on which I touched before. After Brexit, 10% more tourists came into the country, one of the reasons was the weak pound. The Brits themselves spend their holidays increasingly in their own country and London shows rising numbers of restaurant and theatre visits since the summer of 2016.

Institutions like the British Council and the Goethe Institute have been dealing with the changed cultural landscape from the start. The British Council wonders if home-grown talent should be championed and says: “Given the arts subjects to improve confidence and critical thinking, can Brexit create the impetus to nurture these skills?” (Sheffield). Georgia Herlt, the Deputy Director and Head of Language Department North West Europe at the Goethe-Institute London, said:

Until now we always approached educated people or those interested in education. Now we need to get into a conversation with those who are far from these classes. A lot of people felt neglected. We need to enter a dialogue with them. Our work is always accompanied by the thought: How can we meet the situation in this country adequately? (original quote)

Conclusion

Reflection and action are still ongoing in the arts world at the moment. The bubble which we heard so much about has certainly burst. But after opening up, the debate has become more aggressive, its tone more confrontational. This can be expected to continue.

There are TV and theatre plays about Brexit, exhibitions which stress the connections with Europe and some comedians have picked up the subject. Brexit has established itself in everyone’s mind in the theatre, in TV, literature and the other arts – but it remains to be seen whether there will be a profound change in thinking in the long term. British artists are already closer to their audiences than is the case in many places on the continent. But as the cultural establishment reaches out to those they previously disregarded, it needs a positive response. Only time will tell if this will be forthcoming.

Every great political shift means uncertainty, questions and new adjustments to a changing reality. In this case, it can be a rejuvenating impulse for the arts world. It can also be an opportunity for the audience who like to turn to the arts in times
of crisis, as they seem to promise a certain degree of guidance or direction, a way of looking at them from different angles, providing inspiration and – last but not least – some hope.

Works Cited


Brexit and the Art World: From Hope to Despair and Back Again

@JohnGlenUK. “Crazy decision by European Commission over Capital of Culture 2023. We’re leaving the EU — not Europe! My team at DCMS are speaking with the 5 cities right now on the way forward.” Twitter, 23 Nov. 2017, 8:01 a.m., https://twitter.com/johnglenuk/status/933727235378466816. [Accessed 29 Mar. 2018.]


Session VI

Brexit and the Academic World
What Does Brexit Mean for Scientific Research?

Brian Foster

I. Introduction

For academic researchers in general, and scientists in particular, Brexit is akin to turning back the clock by 100 years. My life as a research scientist began in international collaboration at CERN with other European scientists and has carried on at DESY in Hamburg with scientists from all over the world. The distance from which my collaborators came seemed to increase monotonically with the years. Now, I am paid by both UK and German institutions to research in an environment which is completely international and in which English is the universal argot. The intellectual thrust of Brexit is to reverse this process, to “take back control”, to turn inward and look backwards. Nothing could be more damaging to UK science if this mind-set were also to be applied there. I am now going to give my bottom line up front: I am here to assure you that all scientists in the UK are committed to renewing our ties to our European colleagues and re-emphasising our determination to deepen our international collaborations.

I talked about turning back the clock by 100 years. It is instructive to look at the situation in science then. The German-speaking scientists were cut-off from their Anglo-French-Italian colleagues by the horror of the First World War. Most German scientists, with one or two notable exceptions, such as Einstein, vociferously supported the German war effort; an analogous situation pertained in England and France. In 1922, Einstein had had to be more or less smuggled into the Collège de France in Paris to lecture on General Relativity in order to avoid nationalist protests. However, his theory had been established by a famous example of international collaboration. On 29 May 1919, there was a total solar eclipse, visible from the Island of Principe, off the west coast of West Africa. Two British astronomers, Arthur Eddington and Frank Dyson, both, like me, Fellows of the Royal Society, travelled there in an attempt to confirm a key component of Einstein’s general theory of relativity, the prediction that light from stars close to the Sun would be shifted or ‘bent’ by our star’s gravity. Eddington’s and Dyson’s successful observations, with their accompanying photographs, were published by the Royal Society, providing validation for Einstein’s great work. The event was reported in newspapers all over the world, including on the front page of The Times in London.
Why? True, it was a wonderful demonstration of scientific method, but it was something more. In the aftermath of the First World War, this was a moment where the international nature of scientific research and co-operation reasserted itself. British observational pragmatism was placed at the service of German theoretical genius. After years of bloody conflict, these Europeans showed that they were defined by a common purpose of scientific enquiry and not by national divisions or pride in their past. The headline in *The Times* read: “Newtonian ideas overthrown”. It was a new world and not just in physics: By 1921, Einstein had been awarded a Nobel Prize and was elected a Foreign Member of the Royal Society.

The Royal Society, which is the world’s oldest national scientific society, played a key role in this scientific revolution. As the UK National Academy of Science, it is playing a key role now as we feel our way forward to a future in which Brexit holds many challenges as well as the occasional opportunity. I am a member of the Council of the Royal Society and bring with me greetings from our President, Sir Venki Ramakrishnan, who regrets that he cannot be with us today. He is a member of key committees relating to Brexit that are advising the UK government at the highest levels.

Fostering international collaboration is one of our key strategic aims, and Brexit is therefore an important issue for the Royal Society, which is working for the best outcome for science from the negotiations. We can’t do this alone. We need our European partners to work with us for the best outcome overall. As Venki put it last week in his annual Anniversary Day address:

Science has been a global enterprise for many centuries, and one reason the UK has maintained its strength as a scientific nation is its openness to ideas and talent. The Society had a foreign secretary before the UK government and from our very earliest days we sought information from scientists residing abroad as well as travellers and explorers who journeyed to foreign lands. Their findings were often first reported in our journals. We have been open not just to ideas, but also to people. I have often pointed out that three of the last five Presidents of the Royal Society were immigrants – including myself. Scientists by the very nature of their work tend to be international in their perspective, and perhaps this is why the science community was so strongly in favour of remaining in the EU. (Ramakrishnan, Anniversary)

II. A Reminder – What Is Science?

Venki’s predecessor as President of the Royal Society, fellow Nobel Laureate Sir Paul Nurse, used his Anniversary Day address a few years ago to define science:
Good science is a reliable way of generating knowledge because of the way that it is done. It is based on reproducible observation and experiment, taking account of all evidence and not cherry-picking data. Scientific issues are settled by the overall strength of that evidence combined with rational, consistent and objective argument. Central to science is the ability to prove that something is not true, an attribute which distinguishes science from beliefs based on religions and ideologies, which place more emphasis on faith, tradition and opinion. Good scientists are inherently sceptical, particularly of their own ideas. If an observation or an experimental result does not support a specific idea, then the idea has to be rejected or modified and then tested again. (Nurse)

Our report “Knowledge, Networks and Nations” gives some salient statistics:

As science has expanded in the late 20th and into the 21st century, it has become increasingly interconnected. Today, less than 26% of scientific papers are the product of one institution alone, and over a third have multiple nationalities sharing authorship. Collaboration can enhance the impact of research and bring together a diversity of experience, funding and expertise. One of the fundamental tensions at the heart of today’s science is between the motives of national governments and the choices of individual researchers. National governments often fund scientific research to boost national prestige, to stimulate economic growth and to gain competitive advantage over other nations. Academic researchers are driven by curiosity and competition. These individuals often move and collaborate to access funds, resources and data, and to ally with the most talented researchers. (Royal Society)

Although naturally I and my colleagues in the Royal Society are most concerned by the possible damage Brexit might do to UK science, we are also troubled because we know that UK science is important to the rest of the world in general and Europe in particular.

The UK research workforce is truly international: 29% of academic staff in UK universities are non-UK nationals, with 17% coming from other EU countries and 12% from the rest of the world. The proportion of staff from other EU countries in UK higher education institutions (HEIs) increased by 92% from 2005/6 to 2016/17. Furthermore, and remarkably, the EU-wide talent pool provides over two thirds of the founders of UK based start-up companies.

In 2015, over half of the UK’s research output was the result of an international collaboration and these collaborations are increasing – both in absolute terms and as a proportion of the UK’s research output; 60% of the UK’s internationally co-authored papers are with EU partners, an increasing share of the UK’s international publications. Looking at individual countries, UK-based researchers most frequently partner with scientists from the US, with seven EU countries also among the UK’s top ten strongest collaborators.
Research will be better able to address the global challenges that we face – such as climate change and antimicrobial resistance – through collaboration. Sharing of infrastructure, knowledge and people can improve the efficiency and effectiveness of research and share costs. We are celebrating the important role of international collaboration through the #togethersciencecan campaign. The Society is working with partners including the Wellcome Trust to launch and support this. Designed to celebrate and protect international collaboration, the campaign’s aim is to unite activities that celebrate and showcase the impact of collaboration and mobility in research. So far, the launch video has had over 200,000 ten second views on Facebook and is “going viral”.

III. Framing the Debate on Brexit and Scientific Research

Let me preface this section by quoting from Venki’s article in Nature:

My biggest concern is making sure the United Kingdom remains open to talent, traditionally one of its strengths. Science depends on a rapid exchange of ideas, facilitated by the movement of people. I came here from the United States because I knew the MRC Laboratory was the best place to ask big and important questions, and I would be given the freedom and funding to pursue my goals.

The perception of Britain as open and welcoming is now under threat as a result of Brexit. But there are reasons for scientists to be optimistic.

The UK government has declared science one of its twelve Brexit priorities – on a par with protecting workers and cooperating for free trade and against terrorism. It clearly aspires to maintain strong scientific links with the EU after Brexit. Our EU counterparts, from academy presidents to heads of funding programmes, agree. We will all be better off if the United Kingdom remains active in EU research programmes (Ramakrishnan, Nature).

Over the past eighteen months, the Royal Society has been focusing on three issues which we think are crucial for scientific research:

a) Mobility and Collaboration

We believe that progress must be made, in the upcoming Immigration Bill and across the government’s work, to develop long-term migration arrangements and any transitional plan. These arrangements must be evidence based to address the needs of the UK economy.

The longer that uncertainty persists, the greater the risk of damaging the UK’s reputation as an open and outward facing country. It is vital that unambiguous guarantees on the rights of EEA nationals are confirmed as a matter of urgency.
We have called for student numbers to be removed from the immigration target numbers to send a strong, positive message that our educational institutions welcome talent from all over the world. The government has outlined a three-phase process. The first phase was the setting out of an offer to EU residents currently in the UK in June. The second phase will be an implementation period with a third phase confirming the long-term arrangements covering the migration of EU citizens. On 27 July, the government commissioned the Migration Advisory Committee (MAC) to examine the role EU nationals play in the UK economy and society. They are required to report by September 2018. MAC published their call for evidence on 4 August and the Society is submitting evidence. The government has also written to MAC to ask them to assess the impact of international students in the UK. In August, the Office for National Statistics (ONS) published a new analysis estimating that less than 6,000 foreign students overstayed their visas each year, far less than the 100,000 previously claimed by the government (Office for National Statistics 21).

A White Paper (draft legislation emanating from the UK government) on immigration is expected soon. Conversations at the UK political party conferences included discussion over whether now is the time to drop the commitment to reduce immigration to the tens of thousands that was restated in the most recent Conservative manifesto: “It is our objective to reduce immigration to sustainable levels, by which we mean annual net migration in the tens of thousands, rather than the hundreds of thousands we have seen over the last two decades” (Conservative Party Manifesto 54).

An immigration Bill will follow the White Paper as was outlined in the Queen’s speech. It is expected early in 2018. It is likely that this will provide a legal basis for UK control of EU migration but will not contain detail of how a future system will operate.

The government’s Future Partnerships paper provides a number of references to the value of mobility of bilateral and multilateral collaborations and states that “the UK will discuss with the EU future arrangements to facilitate the mobility of researchers engaged in cross-border collaborations” (Her Majesty’s Government 8). It goes on to highlight the role of the European Research Area in creating an open labour market for researchers and EU measures designed to facilitate the movement of researchers – including those from third countries – across the EU.

b) Funding and Infrastructure

We are calling on the government to commit as soon as possible to full participation in Horizon 2020 until its conclusion, as a bridge to seeking the closest possible association with Framework Programme 9. The UK must renew its commitment
to being a good international research partner, by continuing to fund world-class, collaborative research facilities wherever they are located, and ensuring that UK and EU researchers have access to these shared facilities.

The UK government’s “Future Partnerships” paper on Science and Innovation outlines the UK’s ambition to agree a far-reaching science and innovation agreement with the EU that establishes a framework for future collaboration. There are a range of existing precedents for collaboration that the UK and the EU can build on, but our uniquely close relationship means there may be merit in designing a more ambitious agreement. The UK hopes to have a full and open discussion with the EU about all of these options as part of the negotiations on our future partnership.

The UK would welcome dialogue with the EU on the shape of a future science and innovation agreement, reflecting our joint interest in promoting continued close cooperation, for the benefit of UK and European prosperity. (Her Majesty’s Government 16)

c) Regulation and Policy

Until now the Royal Society has stated that it is critical that UK experts continue to be able to influence/inform EU policy development where continued alignment with EU rules is most important for research.

However, there is no simple solution to untangling EU regulation and UK science. Reviewing regulation on a case-by-case basis will require significant resource and scientific expertise. At the same time, the UK must balance regulatory alignment with the freedom to pioneer new regulatory approaches on emerging technologies, and to take a leading position on international markets. The case of EURATOM is a highly relevant one since it illustrates how cases cannot be taken in isolation; one decision can have knock on effect in other areas. For example, the withdrawal has impacts on nuclear science, the continued viability of the UK’s current and future nuclear power programme as well as related issues such as cancer screenings and radio-carbon dating for archaeology. The final shape of the UK’s future relationship with EURATOM has not yet been decided, and is probably a decision for future negotiations, but the UK government has indicated that it would like to continue working with EU partners on nuclear research.

The UK government’s “Future Partnerships” paper makes one direct mention of regulation and science:

The UK and the EU start from a position of close regulatory alignment, trust in one another’s institutions, and a spirit of cooperation stretching back decades. The agreement on science and innovation should provide a framework for future
cooperation, with channels for regular dialogue between leading researchers and innovators in the UK and the EU. (Her Majesty’s Government 7) Regulation is not planned to change immediately upon Brexit, but the government plans to make it possible for changes to be made to existing laws relatively easily for two years following exit to deal with problems that would arise on exit in retained EU law. The European Union (withdrawal) Bill includes provisions to move EU law into domestic UK law upon Brexit and enable changes to these by regulation for the next two years. These changes will be enacted through a device called statutory instruments. These largely cannot be amended, parliament can simply choose to pass them or not, and not all are automatically entitled to a parliamentary vote and debate. These regulation-making powers would negate the need to bring new bills to make changes to legislation, even where this had not previously been delegated to a regulation-making power and are intended to enable ministers to deal with problems that arise on exit in retained EU law. As can be imagined, many see this as a “power grab” by government to annex to itself significant legislative powers outside normal parliamentary scrutiny. These provisions are currently subject to scrutiny by both Houses, so may be subject to change. We have heard at this conference about the possible conflicts here with the devolved administrations in Scotland and Wales.

Trade negotiations may influence the UK’s approach to regulation and pressure to align with EU law. It is not yet clear when discussion of the UK’s future trading relationship with the EU will begin.

Some regulatory alignment may also be required for access to Framework Programmes regardless of the UK’s future relationship with the EU. For example, adhering to EU policy governing, animal research is a necessity for all countries that wish to access Horizon 2020 funding, whether or not they are EU Member States.

IV. What Is Needed for the Best Outcome for European Science?

Political negotiations are taking place on a different timeline, but certainty is crucial. Students are currently making decisions about where they want to go to university, researchers are making decisions about who they want to collaborate with, and decisions are being taken on what the next EU Research Framework Programme should look like. Certainty about the future relationship between the UK and the EU is important in order to inform these decisions. I was heartened by the fact that in July, a high-level EU group on maximising investment in EU research and Innovation chaired by Pascal Lamy recognised the importance of future UK-EU scientific engagement in its LAB FAB APP report (Lamy).
Building on this issue of certainty, the Royal Society is working to inform the debate on what the UK government must do to send a strong signal of the UK’s intention to be a global, outward-looking nation; this includes addressing perceptions. To this end, unambiguous guarantees on the rights of EEA citizens currently resident in the UK must be given. Students must be removed from the immigration target numbers (lowering the numbers has been a priority of the current government). There must be a strong commitment to full participation in Horizon 2020 until the conclusion of that EU research programme as a transition to the closest possible association with the successor, Framework Programme 9.

We must also be aware of particular pressure points. Over 40 years of membership of the European Union has created an interlinked UK and European scientific system, and disentangling this is not an easy task. There are specific areas of research in the UK which are particularly vulnerable as they are dependent on EU funding, such as archaeology. The social sciences are particularly dependent on ERC grants.

There are some reasons to be positive. For example, the UK government has stated that it would like to continue to take part in those specific policies and programmes which are greatly to the UK and EU’s joint advantage, such as those that promote science, education and culture – and those that promote our mutual security. The Lamy report, an independent review for the Commission, was published in July 2017. It made recommendations for future EU research and innovation programmes which stated that “full and continued engagement with the UK within the post-2020 EU R&I programme remains an obvious win-win for the UK and the EU.” (Lamy 21)

V. Working Together

So much excellent science is built on the foundation of working together, and we must take the same approach to this particular issue of Brexit, and work constructively to demonstrate to politicians and policy makers what conditions European science needs to be world leading.

The Royal Society is currently working with the Welcome Trust on a pan-European project to define what an ambitious future partnership between the UK and Europe on research would look like. We would really welcome your views, and I encourage you to get in touch with our policy team on this.
VI. Conclusion

I want to conclude by underlining that whilst the title of this conference is ‘Brexit means Brexit’, there is still a possibility for academic researchers in all fields to define what Brexit really means for research, and to reinforce that this is a vitally important relationship. The gains for both the UK and the EU are too big to lose. Scientists collaborate naturally, and there is not one specific way of collaborating. It can happen informally, through meetings at conferences, connections made through other links, personal relationships, etc. The EU has provided a regulatory system with joint opportunities for funding which has made a difference. We will continue to press as hard as we can, as the “official” mouthpiece of scientists all over the UK, for a relationship between UK and EU researchers that maintains the most important advantages that have been so vital to European scientists over the past decades. Finally, I should say that we in the Royal Society work very closely on these issues with our Fellow National Academy for Arts and Humanities, the British Academy. I am sure that Sir David Cannadine, the President of the British Academy, would permit me to practice interdisciplinarity by using a quote from Henry IV, Part 1, Act 2 Scene 3, by William Shakespeare, which I think encapsulates the Royal Society's approach to the many dangers and uncertainties inherent in the Brexit process: “Tis dangerous to take a cold, to sleep, to drink; but I tell you, my lord fool, out of this nettle, danger, we pluck this flower, safety.”

VII. Acknowledgements

I would like to express my gratitude to the staff of the Royal Society, in particular Rapela Zaman and Laura Wilton, who did the hard work on which this contribution is based. I am grateful to Christa Jansohn and her colleagues for their hospitality and organising a most informative and enjoyable conference.

Works Cited


Brexit: Possible Impacts of Brexit on Higher Education

Georg Krawietz

Soon after the general election in May 2015, Universities UK, Britain’s rectors’ conference which has 134 members from higher education institutions, launched the “Universities for Europe” campaign, which was also supported by the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD). The campaign’s main arguments focused on the benefits of European cooperation; the financial benefits gain for British higher education institutions from various EU programmes, especially in research, were merely a secondary line of reasoning.

To avoid losing these and other benefits, some universities went as far as to send out e-mails asking their staff and students to take part in the referendum and, more or less openly, to vote “Remain” – an unusual step that demonstrated how serious the impending decision was.

There were some dissenting voices in higher education and research, but these were far fewer in number. They argued that Britain was home to world-class research regardless of EU funding programmes, and leaving would open up paths to other, non-European research centres. A further argument was that leaving the EU would allow the money saved by the UK as a net contributor to be allocated directly to British academia at a national level, without the obstacles of EU bureaucracy – which apparently doesn’t exist in the UK, or only to a lesser extent, though this would make one wonder.

The consequences for EU-funded research projects began to emerge just a few weeks after the referendum. Some reports indicated that British participants in the EU Framework Programme for Research and Innovation, “Horizon 2020”, were requested to switch from previously intended senior to (more easily replaceable) junior roles. In some cases, they were even said to have been advised to resign altogether.

Research not only has to be funded, it also has to be carried out, and Europe’s internal freedom of movement creates excellent conditions for doing so. With their relatively limited hierarchies and flexible structures, British higher education institutions offer attractive potential for development. 61,500, or around 30%, of those who teach and conduct research are from outside the UK. Almost 34,000 of them are EU citizens, accounting for just under 17% of all staff at British uni-

1 This article is the written-out version of a talk held on the 8th of December 2017.
According to data from the Higher Education Statistics Agency (HESA) published in 2016, nine out of fifteen most common countries of origin of international researchers are EU member states.

According to the same figures, 5,540 Germans make up 16.5% of all EU citizens researching and teaching in the UK. Not only do they form the highest EU proportion, they also top the overall ranking of international personnel with individual employment contracts at British institutions, here accounting for a proportion of around 9%. The majority of them have been working at British institutions permanently for many years.

For German and other EU citizens, nothing will change in the two years after the British Government’s official application to leave the EU. In light of their medium-term prospects to stay in the country, insecurity and varying levels of no longer feeling welcome have nonetheless begun to appear. Institutionally, the changed political circumstances in the referendum’s aftermath were said to have caused fundamentally agreed employment contracts with EU citizens to be deferred. On the other hand, many researchers have been receiving support from the universities where they work, for example by providing legal advice regarding the application process for permanent leave to remain.

Uncertainty is now also the constant companion of students from the EU. Erasmus (+) students do not have to pay tuition fees in the UK. Outside of Erasmus, EU citizens who complete a Bachelor’s degree programme currently pay “home fees”. In England, the part of the country with the highest number of higher education institutions, these generally came to £ 9,000 annually and recently have risen to £ 9,250, provided the respective university performed well in the newly introduced “Teaching Excellence Framework” (TEF); the same fees have also been negotiated for students from Switzerland, which is not an EU member state. All other international students pay the far higher “overseas” or “non-EU” fees.

For them, the average annual tuition fee for a Bachelor’s programme comes to £ 13,400 (+ 45 %) for classroom-based programmes, £ 15,000 (+ 62 %) for laboratory-based programmes and £ 24,200 (+ 162 %) for clinical courses. These percentages are in comparison to “home fees” of £ 9,250 according to “THE” Magazine’s annual tuition fee data collection for 2016/17.

The British government meanwhile has assured eligible EU citizens that they can continue to pay “home fees” and request student loans from the government’s Student Loans Company (SLC) from the 2017/2018 and 2018/2019 academic year onwards. This concession applies for the entire duration of their degree programme and beyond any completed departure from the European Union. Thus,
students on a usually three-year Bachelor’s programme and starting in 2018/19 would retain their entitlement until the summer of 2021.

And then? Once the UK has left the EU, what reasoning would allow international students from the EU be treated differently than those who come to study from parts of the world beyond the EU’s borders? Is a “Switzerland arrangement” imaginable for the entire EU with its 27 member states, which would then continue to merely pay “home fees” after Brexit? There is certainly room for doubt, as the government’s policy of largely withdrawing from academic funding means British higher education institutions depend on income from tuition fees, which can account for, as we have heard, 45% and more of a university’s budget.

Under equal treatment rules, EU students currently have access to government-funded loans from the SLC to cover their tuition fees; they are also subject to the same subsequent repayment conditions, which are designed to be socially responsible. Since the 2016/17 academic year, they have moreover been eligible for tuition fee grants of up to £10,000 for Master’s programmes, usually lasting one year in the UK. Whether these two options will be available after a completed Brexit seems doubtful.

In my and the DAAD’s opinion, this is a significant issue from the point of view of many academics who do not view students primarily as fee payers. Around 125,000 or close to 30% of the 440,000 international students currently enrolled at British universities for a complete degree programme are from EU member states. This includes around 13,500 Germans, who at 11% make up the largest group from a single EU country. EU students may pay lower fees, but they are valued for their intellectual contribution and the resulting “classroom balance” with British students and the other around 70% “non-EU internationals” (including more than 90,000 Chinese students). Will Britain’s departure from the EU and significantly higher tuition fees cause the EU numbers to drop?

That would also present disadvantages for the “internationalisation at home” of British students, who are less likely to study abroad for a range of reasons such as insufficient foreign language skills, tightly structured Bachelor’s programmes and often only one-year Master’s programmes with limited mobility opportunities. The strong presence of international students, who make up on average around 19% of the student body, and their intermingling currently compensate for this to some extent.

The good news is that the willingness of young British students to gain academic experience abroad has increased over the past ten years but still remains below comparable quotas in other European countries. And the numbers have gone up mainly in the Erasmus (+) programme. That some 45% of overall student mobility
in the UK takes place within this programme does also explain why British higher education institutions would like to continue to participate in it after Brexit.

Additionally – and this perhaps needs to be seen in the context of persisting insecurity about whether Erasmus+ will be viable in future time – UUK has launched the “Go international: Stand out” campaign in November 2017. It aims at doubling the current 6.6% UK domiciled undergraduate students, who study, work or volunteer overseas for two or more weeks during their studies. By 2020, a proportion of 13% of students at this level should gain international experience and thus contribute to the political agenda setting of a “truly global Britain” post Brexit.

Many UK universities I have spoken to think that leaving the EU offers hardly any opportunities but many challenges. True, there is moaning about EU bureaucracy. Nonetheless, the UK is about to leave one of the financially most attractive and competitive research areas, in which it did extremely well. So, if it leaves, where is the UK heading for? To my knowledge, there is no “Global Horizon 2020” waiting just at the next bus stop and anybody who knows a thing or two about international co-operation will agree that it doesn’t happen by merely pressing the button from “Off” to “On”.

If we look at ERC Grants, they have been very important for British researchers, or to be more precise: researchers at British HE institutions. In recent years, 22% of all such grants went to the UK (the figures are: ca. 1660 with Germany getting 1120 and France 990). Individuals who receive such grants are likely to publish in high Science Citation Index (SCI) journals. This in turn is relevant for international university ranking results, be it “QS”, “Times Higher Education” or the so called “Shanghai Ranking”, all three predominantly focusing on research outcome. Here, the UK alongside the US does very well. Whatever one might think about those rankings, they exist, and serve at least as one highly visible international benchmark for academic excellence – and which universities’ marketing people of course use extensively.

Remaining in Horizon 2020 is fine and seems to be secured, but non-official talks on the succeeding RFP 9, which is to start in 2021 and will last for seven years, are beginning right now. The UK’s voice is or will be less audible than before – at least, this is what a considerable number of HE institutions fear. By the way: this is also bad news for Germany because both our countries have been strongly advocating excellence and international competitiveness as the most important aspects within European research programmes.

Within the EU, not only people but also research facilities and equipment can move from one country to another without restrictions. Collaborative research, particularly in science subjects, relies heavily on this flexibility. It is unclear whether such barrier free movement will apply to the UK once it is outside the Un-
ion. For the moment, let’s hope for “regulatory alignment” with the EU. Whether Brexiteers like this term or not, this must not be an argument for anybody dealing rationally with the implications of leaving the EU for science and research.

Horizon 2020, ERC grants and Switzerland – is this a potential model role for the UK? I am here referring to presentations and talks given by a representative from the Swiss Embassy in London, who spoke on various occasions over the last one and a half to two years. In a nutshell: bilateral agreements are good, but European programmes are much better and cannot be easily replaced.

Due to the Swiss experience, a “third country”-status within Horizon 2020 is definitely not desirable. The “associated member”-status is far better and, depending on the terms which would need to be negotiated, can even get close to full membership status. However, there is a problem here: As the UK is a real heavy weight in the arena, which is highly appreciated within the given programme setting, it could have negative implications if the UK were to gain “associated member”-status only. It could mean that a country without being a full member would – at least from some member states’ perspective – absorb disproportionately large sums of money out of the programme’s budget. This would result in a sort of “imbalance”, as yet to my knowledge unprecedented in Horizon 2020 or any predecessor programme. I am not going into politics here. However, it is difficult to say how far reaching full member states’ altruism might get. This is even more so when taking the specific case of the UK “defecting” from the EU into account, whereas other Horizon 2020 associated countries have never held member status.

In the aftermath of the “referendum against mass immigration” in 2014, it wasn’t the lack of European money that caused the Swiss headaches but a loss of opportunities to co-operate with European partners. Not to have the possibility to apply for European Research Council (ERC) did have a negative impact on the HE and science sector as a whole in Switzerland. Thus, for very good reasons, did the Swiss government negotiate for a re-entry to Horizon 2020 and was successful by doing so until the end of 2016. This came to effect in January 2017.

At this point, I would like to mention a quite recent case study when it comes to bilateral researchers’ mobility fostering programmes. DAAD runs such a scheme with more than 30 countries worldwide. The national counterpart on the other side may be a government department, a university consortium or a DAAD-like organisation. This sort of programme, which allows for scholars from the two countries to co-operate on mutually agreed and quality assessed research projects, did also exist between Germany and the UK. In 2010, it was finally scrapped by the British side, apparently in order to spare money. The narrative at the time was that there is no need for a bilateral programme with European partners, when UK’s HE institutions were acting successfully and punching above their weight at EU programme level.
There is a clear connection between fostering academic mobility and academic co-operation. Because and evidently: it’s not science or research as such which collaborate but people who do science and research. The DAAD would be extremely happy if this could persist in the future, because it benefits all sides – from undergraduate and postgraduate students to fully fledged academics. And even Brexit shall not stop the DAAD to be a reliable future partner in this field.
Although I hoped my stay in Oxford would be an eye-opening experience, I did not foresee its political dimension. While working on my research project in microbiology, I witnessed the historic decision of the United Kingdom to leave the European Union: the triumph of Leave over Remain. Living in the UK courtesy of my EU Passport from Germany, I suddenly found myself in a country that no longer sees its future inside a political union that is built on values like freedom, democracy and equality. Belonging to a generation that voted against Brexit and working in an academic sphere that benefits tremendously from the EU, I was deeply troubled by this decision. In this article, I would like to share my thoughts on what made Brexit such a disturbing experience.

Like many others, I was not expecting the referendum to conclude as it did. I still vividly remember the 23rd of June. I had lunch with colleagues at the University Club in Oxford, which was serving as a polling station for the day. Although I was aware of the polls, I was optimistic that the majority of votes would favour the UK to remain in the EU. The rising value of the pound in the days preceding the referendum and the reactions to the murder of Jo Cox earlier that week helped fuel this optimism. In fact, I was so confident in the vote to Remain that it did not even occur to me to check the results of the referendum before going into the laboratory the following morning. It soon became apparent that my confidence had been ill conceived. I remember being surprised that even after several hours at work, I was the only person to have made it in. Only then did I check the online news websites just in time to watch David Cameron’s resignation.

Once the initial shock had subsided, the prospect of the UK outside the EU forced me to think hard about the reasons why I have such a deep appreciation for the EU. Belonging to an age group that voted by majority for Remain, I was able to share my troubles with my disappointed peers. On a more personal level, I directly benefit from the support that the EU gives to science and so my thoughts turned to the effects of this decision for research and academia.

Returning to a status without EU membership is hard for me to imagine. I grew up with an EU Passport. Traveling between countries by car was associated with changes in language and culture but not with border controls. When I lived in Germany, the EU was omnipresent in the form of the Euro. Although I faintly
remember the “Deutsche Mark”, most of the money I spent in Germany by now was in Euros. I was taught about the EU at school, though the debates we had were not about potentially leaving the EU but rather about its expansion towards Eastern Europe. Participating in a student exchange with our partner school in France made me experience life in another European country at an early age. Only when I first lived outside Europe in North America did I fully realize that Europe, with the EU as its political representation, is part of my identity.

The vote of my age group in the Brexit referendum left me with mixed emotions: pleased, because the majority voted for Remain yet disillusioned because the percentage of voting peers was smaller than the percentage of voters of older age groups that voted by majority for leave (BBC). The generation I belong to consists of people born between 1980 and 2000, and is often referred to as “Generation Y”\(^1\). Various studies indicate that this generation differs from previous generations in its optimism and priorities (Ball/Clark; Eurostat). Cheap travel has meant that many of us belonging to Generation Y have experienced other countries from an early age (Eurostat). The high percentage of young people that speak English across Europe facilitates interactions between people, which are reinforced by the widespread use of social media. Student exchange programs like ERASMUS, (the EuRopean Community Action Scheme for the Mobility of University Students), specifically target young people and encourage an experience in another European country as part of their studies (European Commission). These possibilities help make many of the benefits of the EU, such as free movement and a multi-cultural community of shared values, particularly accessible for the young generation.

The referendum also sheds light on the “academic bubble” that I am aware of yet often overlook. The “golden triangle” of universities in Oxford, Cambridge and London stands out by its overwhelming vote for Remain (BBC). This makes me wonder about the long-term impact of the campaign and the result of the referendum for scientists and academic institutions.

Research in the UK has benefitted tremendously from EU funding. The UK received an estimated €8.8 billion of research funding from the EU between 2007 and 2013 (Cressey 141). In the recent round of European Research Council consolidator grants, the UK has received more grants than any other EU country. Furthermore, many young scientists have the opportunity to get part of their professional training in the UK. EU-funded fellowships support individuals to join laboratories in the UK, learn new skills and gain exposure to new environments. I myself benefitted immensely from an EU-funded postdoctoral fellowship from the European Molecular Biology Organization at the time of the referendum.

\(^1\) See https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/generation_y.
Now, it is an open question whether the young scientists of the future will still have this multitude of options available to them.

The bottom line is that EU funding enables thousands of UK scientists to carry out basic and applied research that will yield huge benefits for humankind and the planet we live on. In my case, I am able to use highly sophisticated imaging equipment to better understand what community living is like for bacteria: one of the most numerous life forms on Earth and one that demands our attention. It is scarcely believable that as a result of the referendum, the continued funding of research like this may well be in doubt.

In the months leading up to the referendum, a leading figure of the leave campaign, Michael Gove, was informing us all that people in Britain “have had enough of experts” (Mance). Although my area of expertise in microbiology was not specifically referred to in the campaign, I was concerned by the perceived scepticism of the public towards academic pursuits. By their very nature, scientific experiments provide data that are critically discussed and can form a valuable basis for a variety of decisions. Yet this narrative of the successful Brexit campaign leaves us questioning whether there will be long-term consequences for science as a profession.

Universities and the academic communities they house are places of inspiration and have helped spark ideas on the EU since its conception. Indeed, it was at the University of Zurich where Winston Churchill proposed his idea on the “United States of Europe” in 1946. Roughly 40 years later, two dominant figures of today’s Leave campaign, Boris Johnson and Michael Gove, served their tenures as Presidents of the Oxford Union, a debating club at the University of Oxford (Kuper). Who knows what ideas on the future of the EU and Britain will arise from universities given these current unprecedented circumstances?

Despite the benefits from the EU that the university has attracted to the region, a proportion (29.7%) of people in Oxfordshire voted Leave and three of its four neighbouring counties voted Leave by majority (BBC). This makes me question how much those without academic affiliations know about the direct and indirect EU benefits that are channelled through universities. On a personal level, these include: financial benefits when I regularly spend the money from my EU-funded stipend at various local shops; educational benefits for the UK students that I teach; and the cultural benefits that arise from international networking between students and researchers. Perhaps, we need a new form of outreach that not only showcases the academic research itself, but also the training of scientists and the origins of their funding?

I found out about the result of the Brexit referendum on the morning of the 24th of June when I was sitting in our office alone, wondering why nobody else had come into work. I still remember that quiet. Eventually, I heard one other
person come in, a DPhil student who also worked in our laboratory. He is trained as a medical doctor, a little older than myself and was born here in the UK. I can still picture him standing in the doorway, hesitant to enter, his face pale, telling me that he felt sick.

The poor medical doctor I think somewhat resembles the overall situation. As we all know after this symposium, there are two patients to treat in this case: the UK and the EU. Our goal in medical research is to prevent, treat and ultimately cure a disease. Will there be a cure for Brexit? Iain Begg laid out potential events that could lead to a reversal of Brexit, one of them being a second referendum. It is not up to me to judge how likely this is. All I can say is that in medical research, finding the cure is never straightforward.

So, is it too late for prevention? Yes: Brexit is Brexit as the title of this symposium says. However, I think there are important lessons to be learned, for people in the UK but also outside of the UK. I do not think that any country is entirely “immune” to campaigns for an exit from the EU. Learning from the UK might be helpful for the development of a vaccine.

What about treatment then? It is obvious that treatment is urgently needed for both the UK and the EU. This is where I see a key role for universities and the young generation. The science we do does not know borders and the research questions we ask are equally relevant to people around the world. Independent of what we do professionally, it is the young generation that will have to live with Brexit the longest. Let us not be constrained by a political union and instead be active and live the idea of what the famous Brit Churchill once referred to as “the United States of Europe, or whatever name it may take.”

Conflict of Interest

This article reflects my personal thoughts and views. At the time of the referendum, I was an EMBO postdoctoral fellow in the Department of Zoology at the University of Oxford. I worked in laboratories in Germany and the UK that received ERC grants. I was not eligible to vote in the referendum.
Figure 1: The referendum is not yet forgotten. This modified poster of the remain campaign in a window on Holywell Street in Oxford summarizes the majority of votes in Oxfordshire.

Works Cited


“There’s Method in their Madness”: Britain’s National Suicide

Jeremy Adler

Although Britain’s national suicide may seem surprising, it becomes more comprehensible in light of the historical precedents. No less a thinker than Arnold Toynbee anticipated the case when he observed that the civilization of the Greeks and Romans did not end because of a murder but because of suicide (227). Brexit is perhaps the last gasp of the British Empire and may well lead to the fragmentation of the Union.

Writing in his *History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, Edward Gibbon, to whom Toynbee is alluding, attributes the self-destruction of the Roman Empire to a decline in morals, the invasion of the barbarians, and the rise of Christianity. He observes:

This long peace, and the uniform government of the Romans, introduced a slow and secret poison into the vitals of the empire. The minds of men were gradually reduced to the same level, the fire of genius was extinguished, and even the military spirit evaporated. (vol. I 65)

Gibbon might have been predicting what Tom Nairn long ago called “the breakup of Britain”. The wise Augustan continues:

[The Romans’] personal valour remained, but they no longer possessed that public courage which is nourished by the love of independence, the sense of national honour, the presence of danger, and the habit of command. [...] [and] the deserted provinces, deprived of political strength or union, insensibly sunk into languid indifference [...]. [If we accept the inimitable Lucian, this age of indolence passed away without having produced a single writer of original genius [...]. (vol. I 66-7)

The populace clamoured for bread and circuses. They gave themselves over to erotic adventures. And they preferred to display their wealth conspicuously than to pursue honest deeds and salutary actions. Does this not seem a pretty fair description of Brexit Britain? Indeed, the picture Gibbon paints of the island race in the fifth century still rings true:

The independent Britons appear to have relapsed into the state of original barbarism from whence they had been imperfectly reclaimed. Separated [...] from

---

1 This paper is based on my article: “Ist dies schon Töllheit, hat es doch Methode”, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 8 August 2016.
the rest of mankind, they soon became an object of scandal and abhorrence to the [...] world. (vol. IV 113)

To the causes for this modern collapse today we may count the general decline of values, the departure from the model of good government, and an antiquated constitution.

Britain’s long-standing constitution proved to be inadequate to the situation. The plebiscite revealed a constitutional deficit, a political vacuum, which was filled by demagogy, an abhorrence that had previously been kept in check by Britain’s parliamentary democracy. In the process, the designs of the great political philosophers and constitutionalists from Thomas Hobbes and John Locke to Edmund Burke and A. C. Dicey, which had enabled Britain’s rise to greatness, became its undoing.

The lawgivers shaped the British constitution with one overriding aim: the establishment of peace by the exercise of sovereignty. They intended to keep two dangers at bay: firstly, a civil war, of the kind that had internally riven society in the seventeenth century; and secondly, externally, a war of invasion by continental powers, such as was last threatened by Napoleon or Adolf Hitler, which might endanger British liberty. This means, in effect, that Britain entered the referendum of 23 June 2016 with a constitution which by its design was inherently antagonistic to Europe. Hence from the outset there was a strong likelihood that there would be a negative result. According to Michael Heseltine, the former Deputy Prime Minister under John Major, this dilemma, built into the very foundations of British constitutional law, led to the greatest political crisis within living memory (BBC Newsnight); namely, to what may perhaps be the deepest division in Society since the Civil War; and, certainly, to the greatest tensions with Europe since World War II. Thus, the much-admired but sadly dilapidated British Constitution, which Trollope jovially calls “the liberty to growl” (Phineas Finn 223), enabled the kind of problems to arise that a clear, logical, modern arrangement should have been able to prevent.

For Britons, Shakespeare affords an image of just government. The battle between chaos and a wise ruler appears in a clear light in his plays. No other national literature since the ancient Greeks has presented such a canon of political possibilities. The catastrophe that follows Lear’s division of the realm is a permanent reminder of what happens when a ruler renounces absolute sovereignty and divides up the kingdom into equal parts. Whether during the Civil War, in the French Revolution, or in the Chartist Riots, there was always the danger of an apocalyptic turn. Britain has learned to live with political danger by means of a highly differentiated system of government.
The personalities in the Brexit dispute resemble characters from Shakespeare. They are just like his cautionary characters: Lady Macbeth (Gisela Stuart), Iago (Michael Gove), Richard III (Nigel Farage), and Falstaff (Boris Johnson). Even the surprising turn at the end of the campaign, when all the actors fell down dead, like the people in *Titus Andronicus*, resembles an Elizabethan drama.

Above all, it is Shakespeare’s Falstaff who comes back to life again in Boris Johnson, as a fool, a rake, a liar, and an agitator. Sigmund Freud took Falstaff for a figure of fun. He didn’t recognize the wicked, destructive side of the bloated old devil. Johnson’s scorn for any kind of justice recalls Falstaff’s mockery of “old father Antic the law” (1H4 I ii. 57), and his pathological dishonesty recalls Falstaff’s chain of lies. Johnson’s populism finds a parallel in Falstaff’s “[I]t was always yet the trick of our English nation, if they have a good thing, to make it too common” (1H4 I. ii. 225). His demagogical humour recalls Falstaff’s “A good wit will make use of anything” (2H4 I. ii. 90). Finally, Johnson’s boundless egoism can be traced back to Falstaff’s speech:

> I have a whole school of tongues in this belly of mine, and not a tongue of them speaks any word but my name. And I had but a belly of any indifferency, I were simply the most active fellow in Europe. My womb, my womb, my womb undoes me. (2H4 IV. iii. 18)

The political narcissism that lies at the heart of modern populism and its rank opportunism, lies, deceit, and demagogy, have nowhere been better defined than in Shakespeare’s plays.

The two plays dealing with the reign of Henry IV demonstrate the social necessity of restraining chaos in the shape of Falstaff and his crew. At the end of *Henry IV, Part II*, the new king expresses his view:

> I know thee not, old man. Fall to thy prayers. How ill white hairs become a fool and jester!
> I have long dreamt of such a kind of man,
> So surfeit-swelled, so old, and so profane,
> But, being awaked, I do despise my dream. (2H4 II V. v. 48-52)

The English Crown has always seen its duty in the taming of chaos, madness, and folly. Hobbes’s social contract theory restricts misrule and civil war (90 ff.); and Blackstone asserts the Royal Prerogative, stating that “the King is irresistible and absolute” (251). The wise ruler will understand his people, as does Prince Hal, and knows, in his role as King Henry, that he must suppress the forces of anarchy to create a just society. As Alan Bloom observes in his book on *Shakespeare’s Politics*:

> It is in ruling and being ruled that men exert their highest capacities. There may be situations in which men have no chance to be rulers, but, to the degree to which
they are excluded from the political life, they are less fully developed and satisfied. (9)

The political life provides a possibility for men and women to grow and develop; or to reveal their baseness and folly. This is a lesson of Shakespeare’s History Plays. It can be observed in the doctrinaire fanatics of Brexit. When Nigel Farage was criticised in an interview for having spread chaos, he laughed out loud, and said that “there could not be enough chaos”. In the Brexit vote, victory went to the wreckers, who broke the social contract. The retrospective attempt by Theresa May to legitimise the referendum by stating that the British people had voted with “quiet resolve” (Sands) is preposterous. If I remember rightly, Quiet Resolve was a Canadian racehorse, who had to be put down in a mercy killing. Is this perhaps Mrs May’s intended reference? It seems somehow appropriate to a campaign marked by lies, threats, intimidation, and even by naked violence, all of which undermined the result’s validity.

It seems that Shakespeare was everywhere during the referendum. Prior to the beginning of the campaign on 2 February 2016, Donald Tusk, the President of the European Council, had jokingly varied Hamlet in a letter to the members of the Council: “To be or not to be together” (Tusk). The voters decided for nothingness, as Thomas Piketty observed (Le Monde). The Shakespearean resonances of the villainy on display in the campaign also became apparent in the reaction of Boris Johnson’s father, who responded to Michael Gove’s stab in the back with the tag from Julius Caesar, “Et tu Brute” (BBC). Although this was not a political murder, the character assassination to which the Brexit shenanigans had led took on a mythical dimension. The campaigners stirred up the very deepest layers of British national identity, and the result was not a pretty sight. For the first time in living memory, irresponsibility took the place of honour; lies displaced truth; leading campaigners proved to be traitors; and the resultant betrayal of the State verged on treason. But how did it come about that the seemingly noble and bold defence of the British constitution turned into a suicidal act of betrayal?

The Brexit crisis opens up deep historical fissures. From time to time in the nation’s history it has undergone climactic relations with Europe, whether in the Napoleonic Wars, the First World War or the Second World War, all of which have been evoked in the Brexit campaign. But the roots are much deeper. One needs to revert to the Interdict of Pope Innocent in 1208, and to the humiliating surrender of Britain to the Papacy in 1213, in order to find a parallel for the accession to the European Union. As the Pope’s legate puts it in Shakespeare’s play: “All form is formless, order orderless, / Save what is opposite to England’s Love.” (Jn. III. i. 179-80). Next, as first noted by Patrick Bahners (2016), we must turn to the Reformation, for the moment when Henry VIII broke the links with Europe. There
were several Acts of Parliament from 1532-34 by means of which he accomplished this, notably the Act of Supremacy of 1534. From this moment on until Britain joined the EEC, the nation arguably retained complete sovereignty. A single spirit defined the nation, as expressed at the end of King John:

This England never did, nor never shall,
Lie at the proud foot of a conqueror. (Jn. V. vii. 112-3)

This has been Britain’s motto, and provides the unshakeable belief that unites the nation and underpins its national identity.

Yet these momentous happenings do not really offer an opportunity with which most people can identify. If there is one event that divided the nation like Brexit, it was the Civil War. The traditional division of the population into ‘Roundheads’ and ‘Cavaliers’ seems to be the closest historical analogy to the current opposition between ‘Brexiters’ and ‘Remainers’. Everyone is familiar with this polarity which characterises every aspect of British life: politics and culture, taste and dress, art and sport. There are ‘Roundhead’ Prime Ministers such as David Lloyd George; and ‘Cavaliers’ such as Winston Churchill. The novelist Evelyn Waugh is a typical ‘Cavalier’; and George Orwell is a characteristic ‘Roundhead’. It was this self-same split that arguably typified the referendum: by and large, it was the ‘Roundheads’ who voted for Europe; and the ‘Cavaliers’ who chose to leave. Of course, these categories are not absolute, but they provide a general pattern for the vote. Such distinctions tend to be more significant for British society than class or Marx’s concept of the class struggle. I don’t offer this argument as a historical proof, but I think that none the less it is indicative. If I am right, it would mean that the Brexit debate went to the heart of the British constitution, as it had been established in the Glorious Revolution of 1688, when the country decided on the sovereignty of Parliament.

The ‘Cavaliers’, in the spirit of Burke, wish to rely on a long-standing, natural, organic, and uncodified constitution, whereas the ‘Roundheads’ would by and large prefer a written constitution, of the kind that established itself world-wide with the American and the French Revolutions. This crux, the unusual nature of the British constitution in the modern world, made it difficult, indeed impossible, to mediate between the constitution and the Lisbon Treaty. In the words of Vernon Bogdanor, Britain’s entry into the European Community in 1973 “put heavy strains upon the body politic” (New British Constitution 31). Neil MacCormick talks about a “revolution” (79). In actual fact, Britain’s position vis-à-vis Europe became constitutionally incoherent. At the very moment when, according to Bogdanor, devolution transformed Britain into what he calls a “quasi-federal” or a “multinational” State (New British Constitution 89), the electorate came to regard Europe’s crypto-federal structure as a reason to leave the Union. This paradox lies
at the heart of the Brexit project. Although the advocates of Westminster accept
the devolution of sovereignty to the regions, and regard this as a positive step,
they refuse to permit a cognate sharing of powers with Europe, although this too
is politically, economically, and culturally advantageous. Thus, their position in
regard to shared sovereignty appears to be conflicted, even contradictory. Indeed,
the Brexiteers overlooked the extent to which Britain had already grown together
with Europe in an organic fashion – politically, legally, militarily, economically,
and culturally – so that a separation might undermine the very existence of the
United Kingdom. One might well speak ironically of “little England”. In 1688,
British sovereignty was a serious concept; in the meantime, however, it has become
a mere delusion, a wish dream, that can no longer be realised in a global world.
One only needs to recall Ernst Kelsen’s concept of “pure law” in which nation-
al legal systems merge with the international order (138 ff.) or to consider Neil
MacCormick’s “post-sovereignty” (197-8) to recognize the futility of prioritising
sovereignty in the modern world.

Britain, whilst presenting a brave face to the world, is still unable to liberate
itself from the trauma of the Civil War. The differences between Parliament and
the Crown conceal a long-standing antagonism, and this internal division, a kind
of national neurosis, stands in the way of any peaceful relation to the rest of the
world. Hence the vital imperative of war, whether in Suez, in the Falklands, in Af-
ghanistan or in Iraq. Even Britain’s attitude to Europe is agonistic, as any perusal
of the popular prints will show. In recent years, the dependence on warfare has
become sublimated in the commemoration of military events – such as D-Day –
and the compulsory observation of Remembrance Day. This has long since eman-
cipated itself from the memory of the war dead and become a national obsession.
The self-understanding of this tiny island heavily depends on being at war with the
rest of the world. This is closely connected to the Britons’ character as adventur-
ers, from Sir Francis Drake to David Cameron, the Prime Minister who gambled
away the future of the Kingdom for reasons of political expediency. No wonder
the name for the people who want a Brexit is Brexiteer – a word that so obviously
recalls not just the musketeer but the buccaneer.

There is no end to British militarism. When Parliament reconvened after the
referendum, it had nothing better to do than to ignore the major decision that
had just been taken by the electorate, a crisis which actually demanded a debate;
instead, it debated national security – not in relation to the Common European
Defence and Security policy, as might have been expected, but with regard to the
next generation of nuclear submarines, a folly that the Government estimates will
cost the country a cool £31 Billion, but which some observers believe will require
a cool £130 Billion. During the debate, when the newly appointed Prime Minister
Theresa May was asked whether she would countenance killing one hundred thou-
sand innocent men, women, and children, she responded enthusiastically without pausing for a moment’s consideration giving a loud and resounding “Yes!” (Parliament, “MP’s debate”).

Whereas Hobbes’s Leviathan of 1651 possesses largely historical significance in Europe, in Britain it still forms a part of our constitutional arrangement; for inasmuch as Hobbes attempts to provide a valid political plan in order to overcome the chaos of the Civil War, he offers a nexus of ideas that have flowed directly into more recent constitutional thinking. Thus, although authorities from Dicey to Bogdanor do not actually cite him, his take on sovereignty can clearly be felt behind their work. It resurfaces in Dicey’s disquisition (3 ff.), and it lies behind Bogdanor’s musings (New British Constitution 29-31), to the exclusion – for example – of ideas indebted to Kelsen. Indeed, Scott G. Nelson considers the opening of Leviathan and its analysis of sovereignty to be perhaps the greatest passage in modern political thought (133). Its position is inherently hostile to the idea of a federation or a union of states. Hobbes’s deliberations on the emergence of a just government explains both the absolute monarchy that once governed Britain and the parliament, that the nation learned to combine with the monarchy, which produced that unique dual structure which – with various changes on the way – still holds the country together. Although power migrated from the ruler to parliament and thence to the people, the original duality remained more or less unchanged. Even at the beginning of the 21st Century, Britain is still operating with an arrangement based on Hobbes, as described in the 17th Chapter of Leviathan in 1651:

The only way to erect a Common Power, as may be able to defend them from the invasion of Foreigners, and the injuries of one another, and thereby to secure them in such sort, as that by their own industry, and by the fruits of the earth, they may nourish themselves and live contentedly; is to confer all their power and strength upon one Man, or upon one Assembly of Men, that may reduce all their Wills, by plurality of voices, unto one Will. (78)

The lawgivers in their wisdom proposed uniting the two arrangements into a single system, a mixed method, of the type lauded by Machiavelli (Book 1, Chapter 2), by means of which they created a constitution of a unique stability. The dual ambition of securing liberty, in that the State aims to prevent Civil War and to control relations with foreign powers, remains the highest goal of the constitution, even in our time. As needs no further clarification, this sovereignty is indivisible. There is no room for compromise with other states.

The next major phase in the development of the theory of the State, it needs no emphasis, can be found in John Locke’s Two Treatises of Government of 1689. This
Jeremy Adler

may have introduced innovations but did not really weaken Hobbes’s point. Locke explains the departure from the state of Nature as follows:

If man in the state of nature be so free, as has been said; if he be absolute lord of his own person and possessions, equal to the greatest, and subject to no body, why will he part with his freedom? Why will he give up this empire, and subject himself to the dominion and control of any other power? To which it is obvious to answer, that though in the state of nature he hath such a right, yet the enjoyment of it is very uncertain, and constantly exposed to the invasion of others: for all being kings as much as he, every man his equal, and the greater part no strict observers of equity and justice, the enjoyment of the property he has in this state is very unsafe, very unsecure. This makes him willing to quit a condition, which, however free, is full of fears and continual dangers: and it is not without reason, that he seeks out, and is willing to join in society with others, who are already united, or have a mind to unite, for the mutual preservation of their lives, liberties and estates, which I call by the general name, property. (154-5)

Locke is completely clear: “The legislative cannot transfer the power of making laws to any other hands” (163). His Treatises consider the role of representation and include the possibility of revolution: if the legislative oversteps the mark, the people can set out to recover their original freedom.

Notwithstanding Locke’s concession, the revolutionary option has met with little interest, and the appetite for a fundamental change in the constitution has been limited. There is a long memory of the seventeenth century revolution, as some such as Christopher Hill regard the civil war, and this has qualified the desire for sudden, total change. Indeed, the very age of the British constitution – like some old country house, as has been said – seems to lend it legitimacy. This conservatism was further entrenched by the French Revolution. Burke’s Reflections on the Revolution in France of 1790 are not only a reflection on continental disorder; they are a hymn to British order. According to Burke, the French constitution was “the very reverse of ours” (155).

This constitution was guaranteed by tradition. That grants it apodictic certainty. The continuity is absolute and defines Britain’s national identity. By means of his rhetorically exaggerated contrast between the English and the French systems, Burke heightens the national antagonism to the abstract form of arrangement typical of the continent. Years later, the First World War and the rise of the Third Reich confirmed this constitutional hostility as a means to self-defence, not least since the values Britain fought for linked national identity to the Constitution. In most other European countries – say the Netherlands or the Federal Republic, with the sole exception of Switzerland – I do not think we find the same potent mix of identity and liberty, custom and law with a living constitution. Thus, the scepticism (Tournier-Sol and Gifford) that arose after the European Communities
Act of 1972 had its roots in Burke’s view of the continent in uproar, and thus in the origins of British Conservatism (Jones). Ironically, however, it was the demagogues who took control, whom Burke calls the “bidders at an auction of popularity”; the “flatterers instead of legislators, the instruments, not the guides of the people” (Revolution 156). At this point, one may recall Marc Antony’s words in Julius Caesar:

Good friends, sweet friends, let me not stir you up
To such a sudden flood of mutiny.
They that have done this deed are honourable.
What private griefs they have, alas, I know not,
That made them do it. They are wise and honourable,
And will, no doubt, with reasons answer you. (JC III. ii. 211-5)

To grasp the bitter cause and consequence of the Brexit vote, political theory is insufficient; only the national poet can provide a true measure; and his grasp of politics needs to be wedded to philosophy and the idea of the polity. The constitutional antagonism which I trace to Shakespeare, Hobbes, Locke and Burke reaches its climax in Dicey. Writing in his Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution of 1885, Dicey asserts:

Parliament means, in the mouth of a lawyer (though the word has often a different sense in conversation) The King, the House of Lords, and the House of Commons: these three bodies acting together may be aptly described as the “King in Parliament”, and constitute Parliament. The principle of Parliamentary sovereignty means neither more nor less than this, namely that Parliament thus defined has, under the English constitution, the right to make or unmake any law whatever: and, further, that no person or body is recognised by the law of England as having a right to override or set aside the legislation of Parliament. (3-4)

Notwithstanding the very considerable changes that the British Constitution has undergone since Dicey, and I have no wish to underestimate them, its core of truth still holds good – if not for all thinkers, at least for many Parliamentarians – and forms the bulwark for the opposition towards Europe. In actual fact, this seemingly absolute analysis is highly polemical; for Dicey is arguing against the plan for a Federated Empire. Correlatively, therefore, he castigates federalism: he calls it a weak form of rule; a danger for Britain; and a peril for the Empire (xv, xcix). This hostility may survive in the antipathy towards a quasi-federated Europe.

It would appear, then, that the constitution, which preserved the country so well in the past, is now at risk of proving its undoing, chiefly of course because a new factor has entered the arena: the referendum. This instrument, advocated by Dicey (cxivff; Qvortrup 11-12) and accepted by Bogdanor (Power and People 148), introduced as a vehicle to legitimize democratic decisions, has proved to
have had the well-known boomerang effect, as when President De Gaulle resigned in 1969 after a lost vote. In an article reflecting on Brexit, Bogdanor notes the potential for a conflict between parliament and the people but offers no resolution to this dilemma (“Europe”). Books on Brexit such as that by Geoffrey Evans and Anand Menon (2017) tend to ignore the pivotal issue – the methodology of the referendum. Yet part of the problem surely arises from the careless, not to say feckless way in which the House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution treated the issue of a Referendum in its report of 2009-10 (House of Lords §§ 182, 184, 189). The minutes of their discussion look decidedly amateurish. Acting on advice, and after giving selective arguments, the Committee recommended a simple majority vote, with no voter turn-out threshold, and no supermajorities. The choice of this method, whose virtue appears to reside in its simplicity and transparency, and that seems to guarantee fairness, actually amounted to a flaw in their Lordships’ reasoning. This in turn translated into a mistake in the execution.

In Germany, by comparison, and for good reason, according to Article 79 Paragraph 2 of the Basic Law, a vote on constitutional change or an international treaty affecting the country’s security – and the British referendum was clearly such a matter – requires a qualified 2/3rd majority in Bundestag and Bundesrat. In the United States Article (V) of the Constitution requires (a) 2/3rd majority in both houses of Congress or 2/3rd of State Legislatives to pass an amendment AND (b) ¾ of all States to ratify. In Switzerland, which has the greatest experience of Constitutional Referendums and where over 550 have been held since 1848, a minimum participation of over 40% is required, and a double majority must be achieved of the votes cast and of the cantons. A hurdle of a qualified majority is also built into the Articles of Association of every British Company with respect to a vote on a change in the Articles. But apparently their Lordships have never visited a foreign country nor sat on the Board of a Company. It is not David Cameron who was reckless in calling the referendum, but the Lords, for setting such daft, inappropriate, and ill-thought out parameters.

Their error was compounded in a paper issued by the Parliamentary Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee under the title “Lessons Learned from the EU Referendum” of 11 April 2017. This makes no mention of the voting system. It also fails to address the fatal crux: on the one hand, it cites Burke’s definitive view: “[Y]our representative owes you, not his industry only; and he betrays instead of surviving you, if he sacrifices it to his opinion” (Electors). On the other hand, it quotes the evidence to the House of Lords Constitutional Committee: “[I]f the people vote one way, their representatives another, who should prevail, who is sovereign?” (House of Lords § 58). This question goes to the heart of the constitution. Failing an answer, the system, and indeed the constitu-
tion itself is fatally flawed. It would therefore appear that the lessons of the Brexit vote have been ignored by those elected to legislate on any future methodology.

Although referendums may “defuse tension” (Butler 10), their problems are well attested – one thinks of issues like “cognitive handicap” (19) and “majority tyranny” (3) – and these deficiencies surfaced in the vote. The genie that escaped the phial is now known as “The People”, and like the robotic postman that she is, Mrs May has committed herself “to deliver on the will of the people” (BBC News). Ironically, the vote intended to restore sovereignty to Westminster, gave it to the people, turning its elected representatives into the hostages of public opinion, i.e. not least the media. Thus, the vote, with its promise of a sovereign parliament, actually introduced that most continental of concepts into the British polity, Rousseau’s “volonté générale” (vol. I 149). They voted for Brexit – and got Article Six of the French Declaration of the Rights of Man. What a mess! Rarely can the law of unintended consequences have led to such a reversal. Truly a constitutional suicide.

Works Cited

Abbreviations for the Works of William Shakespeare

---. Henry IV, Part I [1H4]
---. Henry IV, Part II [2H4]
---. Julius Caesar [JC]
---. King John [Jn.]

Secondary Sources


Acknowledgements

Founded in 1949, the Academy of Sciences and Literature, based in Mainz, is composed of several branches of equally outstanding distinction for research in the arts, humanities, and social and natural sciences. It aims to promote cutting-edge research in these areas; and it also organizes regular conferences and symposia, with the aim of bringing interdisciplinary perspectives to bear on the biggest social and political problems. It is in precisely this context that the Academy organized an international symposium around the theme of Brexit and its consequences which took place at its headquarters in Mainz between 6–8 December 2017.

The programme consisted of panels on the various consequences of the UK’s decision to leave the EU, whether economic, migration-political, regional, academic and scientific, or continental; we also considered the political and cultural impact of media representations. The symposium was generously supported by the Mainz Academy and the Bosch Stiftung.

I would like to thank the authors for their patience and their uncomplicated cooperation. I am also grateful to Rabea Lucht, Alexandra Bumcke and Olaf Meding at the Academy of Mainz for their efficient help during the conference and for producing this online version. My special thanks go to Dr Robert Craig and Tessa Friedrich (University of Bamberg) for their assistance and proof reading.

June 2018

Christa Jansohn
Chair of the Committee for English Literature, Academy of Sciences and Literature, Mainz
After the British voted on 23 June 2016 to leave the European Union – by a narrow majority of 51.9% to 48.1% – the EU entered uncharted legal and political waters. It quickly became clear that the Exit negotiations would prove considerably more complex and complicated than was suggested by Prime Minister Theresa May's slogan at the first Cabinet meeting after the Summer Recess: »Brexit means Brexit, and we're going to make a success of it«.

This symposium is concerned less with the question of exactly how May's promised success story will be realized than with the myriad challenges that the United Kingdom and Europe now face with ›Brexit‹.

Concept and Organization:
Prof. Dr. Christa Jansohn
Lehrstuhl für Britische Kultur
Kapuzinerstr. 16
D-96047 Bamberg
T +49 (0)732-23 59 146
christa.jansohn@uni-bamberg.de
Wednesday, 6 December 2017
1:45 pm – 2:15 pm
Welcome Address
Prof. Dr.-Ing. Reiner Andler
President of the Academy of Sciences and Literature | Mainz

Introduction
Christa Jansohn (University of Bamberg)

Session 1: Brexit: Constitutional and Strategic Implications for the UK
Chair: Bernhard Dietz (University of Mainz, Chairman of the ›German Association for the Study of British History and Politics‹)

2:15 pm
Anne Deighton (University of Oxford)
Having your Cake and Eating it? Strategic Implications of Brexit

3:00 pm
Andreas Fahrmeir (University of Frankfurt)
British and European Migration Control Regimes – Conflicts, Experiences and Synergies
3:45 pm – 4:15 pm
Coffee Break

Session 2: Economy
Chair: Nick Jefcoat (Chairman of the Board at the ›Deutsch-Britische Gesellschaft Rhein-Main e.V.‹)

4:15 pm
Otmar Issing (University of Frankfurt)
Reflections on the Economic Consequences of Brexit

5:00 pm
Ian Begg (The London School of Economics and Political Science)
The Likely Economic Effects of Brexit

5:45 pm
Markus Wübbeler (University of Applied Sciences for Health Care Professions, Bochum)
Aging UK and Brexit: Consequences for the Healthcare System?
6:30 pm – 8:00 pm
Wine Reception

Thursday, 7 December 2017

Session 3: Scotland, the UK and EU
Chair: Daniel Gäcke (University of Kassel)

10:00 am
Marit Leslie (Member of the Scottish First Minister’s Standing Council on Europe & Associate Fellow of Chatham House, London)
Scotland and Europe: The End of the UK’s Other Union?
10:45 am – 11:15 am
Coffee Break

Session 4: Brexit and the Media
Chair: Matthias Schwab (University of Tübingen)

11:15 am
Henrik Müller (University of Dortmund)
The Personal, the Political, and Populism: Why Brits voted for Exit. And Why Others may Follow

12:00 pm
Linda Risso (University of London)
Harvesting your Soul? Cambridge Analytica and Brexit

12:45 am – 2:15 pm
Lunch

Session 5: Brexit and Culture
Chair: Julia Kün (University of Hong Kong)

2:15 pm
Stuart MacDonal (Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen, Stuttgart)
The Impact of Brexit on International Cultural Relations in Europe

3:00 pm
Marion Löhndorf (Neue Zürcher Zeitung)
Brexit and the Art World – From Hope to Despair and Back Again
3:45 pm – 4:15 pm
Coffee Break

Session 6: Brexit and the Academic World
Chair: Brian Gibbons (University of Münster)

4:15 pm
Vassiliki Papatsiba (University of Sheffield)
Brexit and the Quiet Europeanisation of UK Universities

5:00 pm
Stefan Vogenauer (Max Planck Institute for European Legal History)
Brexit: Winners and Losers in the Higher Education Sector

Friday, 8 December 2017

Session 6: Brexit and the Academic World (cont’d)
Chair: Andreas Fahrmeir (University of Frankfurt)

9:15 am
Brian Foster (Royal Society, University of Oxford)
Science is Global: What does Brexit mean for scientific research?

10:00 am
Georg Keiswitz (German Academic Exchange Service – DAAD, London)
Brexit: Possible Impacts of Brexit on Higher Education, Academic Exchange and Cooperation

10:45 am – 11:15 am
Coffee Break

11:15 am
Daniel Unterweger (University of Oxford)
Generation Y and the Academic Bubble – The View on Brexit as an Early Career Researcher in Oxford

12:00 pm
Jeremy Adler (King’s College, London)
There’s Method in their Madness. Britain’s National Suicide

End of Conference

(Last update: 9.11.2017)
Impressions
Reiner Anderl
President of the Academy of Science and Literature, Mainz

Christa Jansohn
Chair of the Committee for English Literature, Academy of Sciences and Literature, Mainz
Impressions
Participants at the Symposium

SPEAKERS

JEREMY ADLER is a Professor Emeritus of German and a Senior Research Fellow at King’s College London. He previously taught at Westfield College (London) and Queen Mary and Westfield College (London). He is a sometime Fellow of the Herzog August Bibliothek, Wolfenbüttel and a Fellow at the Institute of Advanced Studies, Berlin. He is also a Fellow of the German Academy of Language and Literature. He works chiefly on interdisciplinary studies and has published on literature and science, literature and art, literature and sociology, and literature and law. He has specialized in authors such as Goethe, Hölderlin, Kafka, Rilke, and Canetti. His essays on Europe and Brexit have appeared widely in the German-speaking press and he is currently preparing a book on the idea of Europe.

IAIN BEGG is a Professorial Research Fellow at the European Institute, London School of Economics and Political Science. His main research work is on the political economy of European integration and EU economic governance. His current research projects include studies on fiscal policy coordination and on the economic consequences of Brexit. He has undertaken a number of advisory roles, including acting as an expert witness or specialist adviser on EU issues for the House of Commons Treasury Committee, the House of Lords European Communities Committee and the European Parliament. His recent publications include papers on fiscal rules in the EU and the impact of Brexit on the UK’s public finances. See also: http://www.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/staff/academicStaff/begg/home.aspx

ANNE DEIGHTON is Professor of European International Politics in the Department of Politics, University of Oxford, UK, where she has worked since 1991. She is also a Member of the University’s Faculty of Modern History. She has published extensively on British foreign policy, the development of European integration, the Cold War, and European security. Anne has been a visiting professor at universities in Germany, France, Italy, Switzerland and Belgium. She has been on the Council and Executive Committee of Chatham House (RIIA). She sits on the board of several peer-reviewed academic historical journals. See also: https://www.politics.ox.ac.uk/academic-faculty/anne-deighton.html
ANDREAS FAHRMEIR is Professor of Modern History (with particular emphasis on the 19th century) at Goethe University Frankfurt, where he has worked since 2006. He has published on the history of citizenship and migration control and on the City of London; he co-edits the Historische Zeitschrift. From 2011 to 2016, he served on the German Research Foundation’s grants committee for ‘Collaborative Research Centres’.
See also: http://www.geschichte.uni-frankfurt.de/43147683/Fahrmeir

BRIAN FOSTER, FRS, is the Donald H. Perkins Professor of Experimental Physics at the University of Oxford and a Fellow of Balliol College. Since 2011, he has also been Alexander von Humboldt Professor at the University of Hamburg and a Leading Scientist at the DESY Laboratory. He is known for his pioneering work in high-energy particle physics. In particular, he has made major contributions to the study of elementary particles such as heavy quarks and leptons. He is a leader in the development and analysis of electron–positron and electron–proton colliders. For four years, he led the ZEUS collaboration of 400 physicists working at the DESY laboratory in Hamburg, Germany. From 2005–2016, he was European Director of the International Linear Collider — a next-generation particle collider that could give us new insights into the evolution of our Universe. Brian is a firm believer in popularising physics. In addition to writing widely in newspapers and magazines, he presents the lecture series ‘Einstein’s Universe’ and ‘Superstrings’, which combine his love of science and music. In 2003, he was awarded an OBE for services to research on particle physics. He has been an elected member of the Council and a Trustee of the Royal Society since 2015. In 2017, for obvious reasons, he applied for and was awarded dual nationality as a German citizen.
See also: https://royalsociety.org/people/brian-foster-11451/

OTMAR ISSING is President of the Center for Financial Studies at Goethe University Frankfurt. From 1998-2006 he was a Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank and its Chief Economist. From 1990-1998 he held the same position at the Deutsche Bundesbank. Before becoming a central banker he was Professor of Economics at the Universities of Würzburg and Erlangen-Nuremberg. He is a member of the Academy of Science and Literature, Mainz, and the Academia Scientiarum et Artium Europaea. His book The Euro (2008, also in German) was translated into Chinese. He is also the author of Einführung in die Geldtheorie, 15th edn 2011.
See also: http://www.adwmainz.de/mitglieder/profil/prof-dr-rer-pol-dr-hc-mult-otmar-issing.html
Participants

GEORG KRAWIETZ studied Art History, Philosophy and Political Sciences in Bonn and Munich and obtained an MA degree. Prior to joining the DAAD head office in 1998 he was assistant to a member of the German Federal Parliament (Deutscher Bundestag) and, after finishing his PhD, took up the position of art consultant. Within the DAAD he covered a number of different areas, most recently being in charge of the German Federal Ministry’s Initiative: “Schools: Partners for the Future” (PASCH). Since September 2014 Georg Krawietz has been head of DAAD’s London office. See also: http://www.cam.ac.uk/daad/about/dr-georg-krawietz

DAME MARIOT LESLIE was a British diplomat from 1977 to 2014, serving in Singapore, Bonn, Paris, Rome, Oslo and Brussels before retiring from the post of UK Permanent Representative to NATO. She has been a head of the British Foreign Office’s Policy Planning Staff, and a member of the UK’s Joint Intelligence Committee. In mid-career she also spent two years in Edinburgh working in the British Government’s Scottish Office Industry Department. She is currently a member of the Scottish First Minister’s Standing Council on Europe, and an Associate Fellow of Chatham House.

MARION LÖHNDORF is the arts correspondent of Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Switzerland, choosing and reporting about a wide range of cultural subjects from theatre to the visual arts, exhibitions and cultural institutions. In the same role, as a London arts correspondent, she worked from 2001–2004 for dpa, the German Press Agency, back then the fourth biggest news agency worldwide. Before that she worked as a freelance arts writer with the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung in Germany for 13 years. She is the author and co-author of a number of film books, among them studies on the works of Luis Buñuel, Ingmar Bergman and Robert De Niro for the annual Retrospective-Section of the Berlin Film Festival. See also: https://www.nzz.ch/impressum/impressum_marion_loehndorf-1.18350809

STUART MACDONALD is a consultant working in Germany for the ifa (Institut für Auslandsbeziehung) and for the new ifa-Akademie. He currently has two main areas of interest: research for the ifa and the German Federal Foreign Office on the implications of Brexit for Germany’s international cultural relations, and working for the ifa-Akademie on a range of projects for the EU. These include strategies for the professional development of cultural relations practitioners, and building the evidence base for the EU’s strategy for Cultural Diplomacy. Prior to that, he founded the Centre for International Cultural Relations at the University
of Edinburgh, and built it up to be a leading focal point for interdisciplinary academic research and study. He also has 20+ years’ experience of working in UK central Government and in agencies as a senior policy adviser on a range of subjects including international relations, cultural policy and education. See also: https://www.linkedin.com/in/symacdonald/

HENRIK MÜLLER is a Professor of Economic Policy Journalism at the Institute of Journalism at TU Dortmund University and speaker of the interdisciplinary Dortmund Center for data-based Media Analysis. He studied economics at the Christian-Albrechts University at Kiel and holds a doctorate degree from the University of the Armed Forces Hamburg (now Helmut Schmidt University). After working in journalism for two decades (last position: deputy editor-in-chief at manager magazin), his research today focuses on economic narratives and their relationship to economic developments and policy-making. See also: http://journalistik.tu-dortmund.de/institut/hochschullehrer/prof-dr-henrik-mueller/

VASSILIKI PAPATSIBA is the Director of the Centre for the Study of Higher Education in the School of Education at the University of Sheffield. Her current research focuses on three interrelated areas: a) Internationalisation in Higher Education and Academic Mobility; b) research collaboration, academic agendas of knowledge generation and public policies; c) Universities, their communities and networks within Knowledge Societies. Currently she is a Co-Investigator in the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) funded research ‘Brexit, trade, migration and higher education’. Between 2005 and 2008, Vassiliki held an EU Marie Curie Intra-European Fellowship at the University of Oxford. Prior to moving to England in 2004, she lectured at a university in France for eight years and served as National Expert at the Ministry of Education – Department for international relations and cooperation, as well as for Eurydice. See also: https://www.sheffield.ac.uk/education/staff/academic/papatsibav

LINDA RISSO is Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Historical Research in London. She is an expert on the history European defence and security in the 20th century. Her research focuses on the historical development of the European Union and of NATO, and – more broadly – on the legacies of the Cold War on today’s security and strategic thinking. Dr Risso is member of the editorial board of Cold War History. She is a ‘collaborateur scientifique’ at the Université Libre de Bruxelles. See also: http://www.history.ac.uk/about/linda-risso

158
Participants

DANIEL UNTERWEGER is an early career researcher at the University of Oxford. His research focuses on social interactions between bacteria. He received his undergraduate training at the University of Ulm (Germany) and moved to Edmonton to complete his PhD at the University of Alberta (Canada). In 2015, he received a fellowship of the European Molecular Biology Organization (EMBO) for his research project in the UK. The EMBO Fellowship is co-financed by the European Union. He is a Junior Research Fellow at Wolfson College, Oxford and a member of the Young Academy, Mainz.
See also: http://www.adwmainz.de/mitglieder/profil/dr-daniel-unterweger.html

STEFAN VOGENAUER has been Director of the Max Planck Institute for European Legal History since October 2015 and a member of Academy of Science and Literature, Mainz since 2016. From 2003–2015, he was the Professor of Comparative Law at the University of Oxford where he was also the Director of the Oxford Institute of European and Comparative Law and a Fellow of Brasenose College. He works mostly in the areas of European legal history, comparative law and transnational private law. He has a particular interest in legal transfers in the common law world, the history of European Union law and the comparative history of legal method.
See also: http://www.adwmainz.de/mitglieder/profil/prof-stefan-vogenauer.html

MARKUS WÜBBELER is a Visiting Professor of Gerontology and Geriatrics at the University of Applied Health Sciences, Bochum. He is also the spokesman of the Young Academy of the Academy of Science and Literature, Mainz. Markus Wübbeler was previously at the Harvard Medical School, where he worked as a post-doctoral research fellow. His research focuses on health services research in the field of ageing and cognitive disorders.
See also: http://www.adwmainz.de/mitglieder/profil/dr-rer-med-markus-wueb-beler.html

CHAIRS

BERNHARD DIETZ is Assistant Professor at the Department of History at the Johannes Gutenberg-University in Mainz and chairman of the German Association for the Study of British History and Politics (ADEF). He was VW-Research Fellow at Georgetown University in Washington DC (2016–17), Visiting Lec-
Particpants
turer at the University of Glasgow (2012), and received fellowships of the German Historical Institute London and the DAAD for his PhD research in London (2006–9). His research interests include right-wing extremism in Great Britain and the cultural history of capitalism since 1945.
See also:  http://www.geschichte.uni-mainz.de/neuestegeschichte/743.php
http://adef-britishstudies.org/mitgliedervorstand.html

ANDREAS FAHRMEIR is Professor of Modern History (with particular emphasis on the 19th century) at Goethe University Frankfurt, where he has worked since 2006. He has published on the history of citizenship and migration control and on the City of London; he co-edits the Historische Zeitschrift. From 2011 to 2016, he served on the German Research Foundation’s grants committee for ‘Collaborative Research Centres’.
See also: http://www.geschichte.uni-frankfurt.de/43147683/Fahrmeir

BRIAN GIBBONS read English at Cambridge and joined the then new University of York in 1965. Thereafter he was successively Professor in the School of English at the University of Leeds, Professor of English (Ordinarius), University of Zürich, and Professor of English Literature in the University of Münster, where he is now Emeritus Professor. He has been Visiting Professor at universities in France, Italy, Switzerland, Germany and California. He publishes on literary, theatrical and textual topics, mainly in Early Modern English Literature and Drama. For many years he was the sole General Editor of the New Mermaid Series of critical editions of British drama. He is still hard at work as the General Editor of The New Cambridge Shakespeare. 2017 is his eighteenth year as Corresponding Member of The Academy of Sciences and Literature.
See also: http://www.adwmainz.de/mitglieder/profil/prof-dr-phil-brian-gibbons.html

DANIEL GÖSKE is Professor of American Literature at the University of Kassel, Germany, and a member of the German Academy of Language and Literature (Darmstadt) and the Academies of the Sciences and Humanities in Göttingen and in Mainz. He was educated in Canterbury (UK), Penn State and Princeton (USA) and Göttingen (LS). His book publications include studies of American poetry and Herman Melville, German editions of Melville, Henry James and Carl Schurz as well as translations (Melville, Joseph Conrad, Derek Walcott). His current interest centres on literary and Bible translation, and German-British and German-American cultural relations.
NICHOLAS JEFCOAT has 40 years of experience in international finance. Based in Frankfurt, he now works as an independent adviser, with focus on corporate finance and capital raising. Nick started his banking career in 1977, as an International Trainee at Lloyds Bank International in London. After a phase in commercial banking, he switched in 1984 to merchant/investment banking, with spells at Kleinwort Benson, Robert Fleming and JPMorgan Chase. He then spent three years in private wealth management at JPMorgan Private Bank. From 2005 until December 2015 he was a senior corporate banker, managing global relationships with major corporations, first at Barclays Capital and latterly, as Managing Director in business development and a member of the General Management Board, at Bank of America Merrill Lynch, Frankfurt. Nick is Chairman of the Board at the Deutsch-Britische Gesellschaft Rhein-Main e.V. For the past 25 years Nick has lived and worked in Germany. He previously spent almost 10 years in Japan and has also worked in France, besides the UK. Nick holds an MA in Modern Languages from Oxford University. Besides his native English, he speaks fluent German, French and Japanese.

JULIA KUEHN is Professor of English Literature at the University of Hong Kong. With degrees in English and German Literature from the Universities of Bonn (MA), Oxford (MSt), London (PhD) and Bamberg (Habilitation), Julia is a long-term channel crosser who closely follows the Brexit debates even from seemingly far-away China. Her research and teaching interests are in Victorian literature and culture, especially women’s, popular and travel writing (often related to China), and critical theory. She has published in international journals including *Victorian Literature and Culture*, *Victorian Review*, *Studies in Travel Writing*, *The Journal of Popular Culture*, and *Frontiers: A Journal of Women Writing*. A current monograph project is a comparative study of nineteenth-century German and British realism.

MATTHIAS SCHWAB is Professor and Chair of Clinical Pharmacology at the University of Tübingen and director of the Dr. Margarete Fischer-Bosch-Institute of Clinical Pharmacology in Stuttgart. He studied medicine at the University Erlangen-Nuremberg, Bavaria, and received board certifications for Children’s Medicine and Clinical Pharmacology. His scientific interests focus on pharma-
cogenomics, cancer therapy and application of novel technologies. He contributes actively to public health initiatives and is the leader of several (inter)national research consortia. He has been full member of the Academy of Science and Literature, Mainz, since 2012 and member of the German National Academy of Sciences ‘Leopoldina’ (2014).
See also: http://www.ikp-stuttgart.de/content/language1/html/10672.asp  

ORGANIZATION

CHRISTA JANSOHN is Professor and Chair of British Culture at the University of Bamberg, Bavaria. She studied English, History and Archive Studies at the University of Bonn and the University of Exeter. She has been a visiting fellow of several colleges of the University of Cambridge, most recently Trinity (2005) and Churchill (2010–11, 2015–16). She has made particular contributions in a number of different areas, including the reception of Shakespeare in Germany; D. H. Lawrence and his European reception; the relationship between literature and the history of science and medicine; the history of literary societies; scholarly editing and translation studies. She has been a full member of the Academy of Sciences and Literature, Mainz since 2005, and since 2011 has served as Chair of the Academy’s Committee for English Literature.
See also: http://www.adwmainz.de/mitglieder/profil/prof-dr-christa-jansohn.html